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S U M M A R Y 
This paper analyses the changes in the external environment and in domestic 
economic policy that would be required in order to make the recovery and 
growth of the Latin American and Caribbean economies compatible with a 
decrease in inflation, the achievement and maintenance of a reasonable external 
balance and the improvement of the living conditions of the poorest groups of 
the population and of the opportunities open to them. 
The first chapter contains a brief description of the main features and 
effects of the crisis which has been affecting most of the economies of the region 
since 1981, together with a discussion of the adjustment efforts they have made 
in order to reduce their external imbalances. On the domestic front, some of the 
main repercussions of the crisis have been a large and widespread drop in per 
capita income, a sharp decrease in capital formation, rising unemployment, the 
decline of real wages and higher inflation. In analysing the adjustment process, 
emphasis is placed on the extraordinary speed with which the countries of the 
region have been obliged to reduce the deficit on current account in their balance 
of payments the high social cost which, because of its speed, this process has 
entailed. As a result of the fact that the sharp decrease in net capital inflows since 
1982 has been accompanied by a rise in international interest rates, the countries 
of Latin America and the Caribbean have had to generate huge trade surpluses in 
order to be able to continue meeting their external obligations. However, 
primarily because of unfavourable trends in world trade and in the international 
prices of most commodities, these surpluses have had to come almost exclusively 
from a reduction in imports, which has been of such great proportions that the 
adjustment has taken on a markedly recessionary character. The decrease in net 
capital inflows and the increase in interest payments have also given rise to a 
considerable transfer of resources out of the region which has adversely affected 
import capacity and national saving. 
The second chapter provides an analysis of the challenges which the 
present crisis poses and the opportunities it offers as regards economic policy. It 
is asserted that, when viewed from these two angles, this crisis can be compared 
to the Great Depression of the 1930s. It is further maintained that, after having 
lost ground during the past five years, the economies must now be reactivated, 
but in order for an economic recovery to result in growth which will not soon be 
interrupted once again, both external imbalance and inflation will have to be 
kept under control. The difficulties involved in accomplishing this are 
considerable; the chances of overcoming them, as well as the extent of the costs 
this will involve, will depend partly on conditions in the world economy and 
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partly on the content and consistency of domestic economic policy. If most of the 
economies of the region are to resolve the immediate problems posed by the 
crisis, changes will have to be made in the adjustment process so that an external 
balance can be achieved or maintained in conjunction with an expansion of 
economic activity instead of economic stagnation or retrogression. To this end, 
the transfer of resources abroad will have to be reduced, since the region's 
limited import capacity currently represents the main constraint on its growth. 
Since the increases in both external financing and per capita consumption are 
likely to be slight in what remains of the 1980s, economic policy should place 
special priority on export and import-substitution activities and on measures 
designed to improve the quality of investments and to ensure the satisfaction of 
the basic needs of the poorest groups of the population. 
The third chapter contains a more detailed analysis of the policies and 
changes required in order to overcome external constraints on growth and to 
carry out an expansionary and equitable adjustment process. 
Firstly, policies designed to reduce external constraints by changing the 
structure of production and domestic spending are examined. In addition to a 
discussion of the fundamental role which exchange-rate policy should play in 
these two processes, the need is underscored for the adoption of selective tariff, 
para-tariff, credit and export-promotion policies that would make it possible to 
carry out a rapid and sustained increase in the production of tradeable goods. It is 
stressed that special incentives for import substitution and the production of 
exports should be of a temporary nature so that they will be in keeping with an 
efficient allocation of resources, and emphasis is placed on the differences in the 
selective criteria which should be used in the short and long terms in order to 
provide special incentives for- those exports and import-substitution activities 
which a given country wishes to develop. 
Secondly, an analysis is presented of ways to reduce external constraints on 
growth by means of changes in external financial relations. In this connection, 
the function performed by international public policy during the crisis is 
described and assessed. Although it is acknowledged that this policy has helped 
to avert the collapse of the international financial system, it is nevertheless 
maintained that the development of the debtor countries has been only a 
marginal component of the conventional strategy for dealing with the crisis and 
that this strategy has now run its course. Accordingly, broader public-sector 
initiatives should be mounted at the international, level in order to reduce the 
transfer of resources from the debtor countries to the exterior. A detailed 
discussion is presented of the various multilateral mechanisms for achieving this 
objective, along with a comparative analysis of the effects which the following 
steps would have on the region's net external financing: a) lowering interest 
rates and the spreads charged by private international banks, b) increasing the 
net inflow of loans, c) increasing the flexibility of banking regulations in creditor 
countries, d) modifying the conditionality imposed by commercial banks and the 
International Monetary Fund in debt negotiations, and e) reducing certain 
obstacles which limit the adoption of broader multilateral initiatives. The 
various unilateral steps which debtor countries could take to diminish the 
transfer of resources to the exterior are then analysed and evaluated. 
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The chapter closes with an analysis of the relationship between the 
adjustment and social equity. Following a description of the deterioration in the 
social situation caused by the crisis, three policy packages are examined which 
could help to improve the situation of the poorest groups and to increase the 
opportunities available to them. T o this end, and bearing in mind the constraints 
to which many countries will be subject as regards the expansion of public 
spending in coming years, it is recommended that such spending be 
systematically restructured so that it is oriented towards items which will benefit 
the neediest strata on a preferential basis. Furthermore, it is recommended that 
procedures should be applied to minimize the "leakage" of social spending to 
less needy groups and that greater stress should be placed on increasing 
employment than on raising wages. 
The fourth and final chapter includes a discussion of the most suitable 
policies for reconciling the control of inflation with the maintenance or 
expansion of economic activity. Firstly, the causes and analytical implications of 
the failure of traditional stabilization programmes are analysed. The costs of 
inflation and the risks of stabilization are then examined in relation to the 
intensity and duration of a given inflationary process. The conclusion is reached 
that, whereas the costs of inflation are greater when there is a sudden and 
unexpected outbreak of inflation or when the economy is slipping towards 
hyperinflation, the risks of a stabilization programme causing a recession are 
greater when the country is dealing with persistent but relatively stable 
inflation. Using this classification, an analysis is made of the different relative 
roles played by the guidance of expectations, the control of aggregate demand 
and the correction of price lags in stabilization programmes directed towards 
combating occasional inflation, persistent inflation and hyperinflation. Lastly, a 
number of the approaches and general principles applied in stabilization 
programmes as regards policies on prices, income and the control of aggregate 
demand are described and discussed, and the preferable sequence for efforts to 
achieve external adjustment and domestic stabilization in the presence of 
inflationary processes of varying intensities is analysed. 
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I. T H E E C O N O M I C CRISIS A N D T H E 
A D J U S T M E N T P R O C E S S 
A. T H E E C O N O M I C CRISIS 
Since 1981 most of the Latin American and Caribbean countries have been 
suffering from the deepest and longest economic crisis to hit them in the last 50 
years. Indeed, they have lost so much ground that, from the standpoint of 
development, it is probable that the 1980s will turn out to be a "lost decade" for 
many of the region's economies, in more than a few of which per capita income 
may prove to be substantially lower in 1990 than it was in 1980. 
The present crisis has also been widespread and multi-faceted, as well as 
severe and long. Although its repercussions have been more serious and longer-
lasting in some countries than in others, it has affected the large as well as the 
medium-sized and small economies of the region, oil-exporting countries as well 
as those which are wholly dependent on imports for their fuel supplies, 
economies which had made relatively more progress towards development as 
well as the poorest countries with the least diversified structures of production, 
and countries which have applied more interventionist policies oriented towards 
the domestic market as well as those which have followed development 
strategies based on an opening-up of their economies and on the free play of 
market forces. 
The exceptional nature of this crisis 'has also been manifested in the 
simultaneous and persistent deterioration which has been seen in the main 
economic indicators. Many countries have experienced not only a drop in 
production or in their rate of growth, but also a deterioration of the employment 
situation and a decrease in real wages. Moreover, inflationary processes have 
intensified and become more widespread, and the problems of the external 
sector have become more severe. 
As may be seen in table 1, the growth rate of domestic product dropped 
sharply in 1981, while the product actually decreased in absolute terms in 1982 
(for the first time in 40 years), and then declined once again, but even more 
markedly, in 1983. Although this downturn was interrupted in 1984, the 
increase in economic activity was slight in that year and it grew still weaker in 
1985: the per capita product rose by less than 1% in 1984 and by scarcely 0 . 5 % in 
1985. Furthermore, this last increase was almost entirely due to the rapid growth 
of the Brazilian economy, which alone accounts for around one-third of the 
region's production of goods and services and which expanded by over 8 % in 
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1985 (see table 2). In contrast, the per capita product in the rest of the region 
declined by somewhat more than 1 % in 1985 after having dropped steadily 
between 1981-1983 and stagnated in 1984. Thus, in Latin America and the 
Caribbean as a whole, the per capita product was 9 % lower in 1985 than in 1980 
and was only equivalent to its 1977 level. 
Since at the same time the terms of trade showed a sharp and persistent 
deterioration and net remittances abroad of interest and profits rose 
considerably, per capita national income (which is a better indicator of the 
current standard of living) dropped by even more ( - 1 4 % ) than the per capita 
product (see table 1). 
The unfavourable trend of economic activity has also been quite 
widespread: during the past five years, there has been a notable decrease in the 
per capita product in 21 of the 24 countries for which information is available,1 
almost no variation in Colombia and Panama, and a considerable increase only in 
Cuba. Moreover, in many countries this decrease has reached colossal 
proportions: during this period the per capita product fell 2 8 % in Bolivia and 
2 4 % in El Salvador, between 2 2 % and 1 8 % in Venezuela, Guyana, Uruguay, 
Argentina and Guatemala, and between 1 5 % and 1 1 % in Peru, Trinidad and 
Tobago, Costa Rica, Haiti, Honduras and Nicaragua (see table 3). 
The decline in economic activity has had a particularly strong effect on 
capital formation, which, after having grown very rapidly between 1970 and 
1980, stagnated in 1981, fell steeply during the two following years and showed 
only very slight growth in 1984. This brought the investment coefficient to its 
lowest level in the past 4 0 years. Furthermore the decline was very widespread. 
As may be seen in figure 1, between 1980-1981 and 1982-1984 gross domestic 
fixed capital formation increased slightly only in Colombia and Nicaragua, while 
it showed a very sharp decrease in the other 17 economies for which data are 
available. Hence, in addition to affecting present living conditions, the crisis has 
also lessened the possibility of securing a rapid rise in the standard of living in 
the future. 
As was to be expected in view of the rapid growth rate of the labour force, 
the decline in economic activity has been coupled with a sharp rise in open 
unemployment and an increase in various forms of underemployment. In fact, 
despite the decrease in unemployment seen during the last few months of 1985 
in most of the region's cities, Brazil was the only country in which the average 
unemployment rate was lower in 1985 than it was in 1980. In contrast, over the 
past five years open unemployment has risen moderately in Costa Rica and 
Mexico and very sharply in Argentina and Bolivia, Chile, Colombia, Honduras, 
Uruguay and Venezuela. The deterioration in the employment situation was also 
reflected in the substantial drop in employment in manufacturing industry (see 
tables 4, 5 and 6 and figures 2 and 3). 
The harmful social effects of the deterioration in the employment 
situation were also exacerbated by a significant decrease in average real wages in 
most of the countries for which information is available.2 As shown in figure 4, 
in 1985 the purchasing power of average urban wages was higher than it had 
been in 1980 only in Argentina, Brazil and Colombia, and even in those countries 
it was lower than it had been in 1974, 1982 and 1984, respectively. In the past 
five years average real wages have dropped by around 7 % in Costa Rica and 
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Chile, 12% in Uruguay, 2 7 % in Mexico and 4 3 % in Peru. The poor have also 
been hurt by the even more unfavourable trend in minimum wages in a number 
of countries and by the cuts in social spending made by many governments with a 
view to reducing their fiscal deficits.3 
Despite the increase in unemployment and the drop in real wages, and 
notwithstanding the easing of some exogenous inflationary pressures, the rate 
of price increases has risen in most of the economies of Latin America and the 
Caribbean during the crisis. In the region as a whole, the annual average 
variation in consumer prices climbed steadily from 2 7 % in 1980 to 4 4 0 % in 
1985, while the population-weighted rate went up from 5 6 % to 2 7 5 % during 
the same period (see table 7). Even though the extraordinary acceleration of 
inflation in Bolivia (whose annual rate rose from 2 4 % in 1980 to 8 1 7 0 % in 
1985) played a large part in these increases, the rise in inflation for the rest of the 
region was nonetheless quite substantial. 
Inflation, which affected only a small number of Latin American and 
Caribbean countries until the beginning of the 1980s, has become more 
widespread as well as more intense. Indeed, Barbados, Honduras, Panama, 
Trinidad and Tobago and Venezuela are the only countries in which consumer 
prices rose less than 10% in 1985. In all the other countries except Costa Rica, 
the rate of inflation was significantly higher: it reached enormous proportions in 
Argentina ( 3 8 5 % ) , Nicaragua ( 3 3 5 % ) , Brazil ( 2 2 8 % ) and Peru ( 1 5 8 % ) and 
was also very high in Uruguay ( 8 3 % ) and Mexico ( 6 4 % ) (see table 7 and 
figure 5). 
Nonetheless, a number of countries in the region have made significant 
progress in their fight against inflation since mid-1985. As may be seen in 
figures 6,7 and 8, particularly notable advances in this respect have been made by 
Bolivia and Peru and, above all, Argentina. Inflation had speeded up sharply in 
these countries during the first six or nine months of the year, but the initiation 
of unconventional stabilization programmes brought about a sharp reversal in 
this trend.4 The progress made in the fight against inflation during the second 
half of 1985, although much less striking than in the above three countries, was 
also substantial in Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador and Venezuela, as 
shown in figure 9. 
B. T H E A D J U S T M E N T P R O C E S S A N D T H E 
T R A N S F E R O F R E S O U R C E S A B R O A D 
In general, the unsatisfactory picture with respect to production, employment 
and domestic prices has been closely related to the highly unfavourable changes 
which have occurred on the international economic scene and to the adjustment 
processes that many Latin American and Caribbean countries have embarked 
upon since 1982 in an attempt to rectify the huge external imbalance which had 
built up during previous years. 
Indeed, although the generation and development of the crisis have been 
greatly influenced by a wide range of domestic economic, political and social 
factors —both structural and cyclical in nature—5 external factors have had a 
particularly decisive impact. 
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The main factors which set off the crisis, after several years of increasing 
deterioration in external demand, were the abrupt decrease in net capital inflows 
which occurred in 1982 and the huge increase registered at the same time in net 
external payments of profits and interest. As may be seen in table 8, this twofold 
process was of extraordinary proportions. The net intake of loans and 
investments, which had been rising sharply and steadily during almost the whole 
of the 1970s, reaching an unprecedented high in 1981 of overUS$ 37 billion, fell 
to less than US$ 20 billion in 1982. At the same time, net remittances of interest 
and profits climbed from US$ 27 billion in 1981 to nearly US$ 39 billion in 
1982. As a result of these changes, and despite a merchandise trade surplus of 
over US$ 9 billion, the deficit on current account remained above US$ 40 billion 
in 1982. Unlike what had occurred in preceding years, however, the very steep 
drop in the inflow of external loans and investments and the serious flight of 
capital from some countries of the region meant that over half of the deficit on 
current account had to be financed by means of a considerable reduction in 
international reserves (see table 1). 
Thus, faced with a deficit on current account which was equivalent to 4 0 % 
of the value of its exports of goods and services and which, under the new 
circumstances, could no longer be financed by the net inflow of loans and 
investments, the region was forced to embark upon an adjustment process. T o 
this end, many Latin American and Caribbean governments have applied — t o 
varying degrees of intensity and using different methods— the two groups of 
economic policies which are theoretically necessary in order to carry out an 
adjustment process and which comprise, basically, measures designed to control 
aggregate demand (e.g., fiscal, monetary and income policies) and those aimed at 
raising the relative price of internationally tradeable goods (e.g., exchange-rate, 
tariff or export promotion policies).6 In some countries these policies have been 
coupled with public investment programmes and other government measures 
whose direct purpose is to step up the substitution of certain imports which have 
played a major part in the foreign trade deficit. 
Adjustment policies have often been carried out within the framework 
established by loan agreements reached with the International Monetary Fund. 
These agreements have contained restrictive monetary and fiscal provisions 
which usually place a limit on the expansion of the Central Bank's net internal 
assets as well as on external and domestic public-sector borrowing. Furthermore, 
they have stipulated that the government must reduce its deficit by raising taxes, 
increasing the rates charged by public-sector enterprises and cutting current 
expenditure. Within the framework of these agreements, it has usually been 
accepted that during the adjustment process it is necessary to raise the real 
exchange rate, reduce real wages and maintain interest rates that are positive in 
real terms.7 
To be sure, the strictness and persistence with which the agreed-upon 
policies have actually been applied have varied from one country to another, as 
has the extent to which these policies have been successful in achieving their 
basic objectives. Nevertheless, in terms of the region as a whole, the reduction in 
the external imbalance has been achieved with extraordinary speed. As early as 
1982 a sharp turnabout was achieved in the merchandise trade balance of Latin 
America: after running a deficit of US$ 1.7 billion in 1981, the region marked up 
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a surplus of over US$ 9 billion in 1982. This trend grew stronger in 1983 when 
the trade surplus exceeded US$ 31 billion and continued in 1984, when a record 
merchandise trade surplus of nearly US$ 39 billion was achieved. Mainly as a 
result of these changes in the trade balance, the deficit on current account 
plummeted in both 1983 and 1984: in 1984 it amounted to no more than US$ 1 
billion, which was only 2 . 5 % of the enormous deficit of over US$ 4 0 billion 
recorded just two years before. Even though the deficit on current account rose in 
1985, at approximately US$ 4 .4 billion it was still much lower than the deficits 
recorded before adjustment policies began to be applied (see table 1). 
However, because of the way in which it was achieved, this marked 
reduction in the deficit on current account had a high cost in terms of the 
decrease in economic activity and employment. The sudden and drastic nature of 
the decrease in external financing and the sharp increase in interest payments 
meant that the time span during which adjustment had to be carried out was 
extremely short and, because of this, it was not possible to carry out an adequate 
reallocation of resources from the production of internationally non-tradeable 
goods to export activities and import substitution, since this is a process which, 
precisly because it requires a substantive change in the structure of production, 
can only be accomplished over a longer period of time. In these circumstances, 
the region had to take extremely rapid action to reduce an external deficit which 
was much larger than it would have been under more normal external financial 
relations. In fact, in addition to making the "normal" adjustment required in 
order to correct the excessive deficits on current account which many Latin 
American countries had incurred during the years leading up to the crisis, they 
also had to carry out what might be called an "overadjustment" in order to deal 
with the repercussions of the pro-cyclical behaviour of the international 
commercial banks and, in some countries, the considerable outflow of national 
capital. Due to this situation and to the highly unfavourable external 
environment for the region's exports, virtually the entire burden of correcting 
the huge external imbalance of Latin America and the Caribbean initially had to 
be shouldered by imports, whose drastic reduction gave the adjustment a 
markedly recessionary character. Until 1983 the expansion of exports was also 
limited by the sharp decline in the international prices of most of the region's 
main export commodities and by the decrease in the volume of world trade 
occasioned by the long recession in the industrialized countries, the increase of 
protectionist practices in many of them, and the slowdown of the economies of 
the OPEC member countries. As a result, and despite the fact that (as shown in 
figure 10) the volume of exports of goods continued to rise rapidly, their value 
fell 9 % in 1982 and showed no growth in 1983. 
Thus, the spectacular change (amounting to US$ 33 billion) seen in the 
merchandise trade balance between 1981 and 1983 was due in its entirety to the 
steep drop in imports. Their value plunged from nearly US$ 9 8 billion in 1981 
to US$ 56 billion in 1983, while the volume of imports shrank during this brief 
period of time by an almost unbelievable 41 % . The drop in import volume was 
even greter in Argentina and Chile (where it was halved between 1981 and 
1983) , Venezuela (where it went down by 4 7 % in 1983 alone) and especially in 
Uruguay (which reduced its imports in real terms by over 6 3 % in the period 
1981 -1983 ) and Mexico (which cut its imports by nearly 6 7 % in the period 1982-
1983). 
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Although these spectacular reductions were partly due to the unusually 
high pre-crisis level of imports, the decreases not only affected external 
purchases of non-essential consumer goods and capital equipment, but also 
included a considerable drop in imports of raw materials and intermediate goods 
necessary for the maintenance of domestic economic activity. It should thus 
come as no surprise that the domestic product stagnated or declined in many 
countries as early as 1982, or that another and even greater decrease was seen in 
1983. 
There was a lull in this highly adverse trend in the foreign trade of Latin 
America and the Caribbean during 1984 when, as a result of the recovery being 
made by the industrialized economies and, above all, the enormous increase in 
United States imports which was seen that same year, the volume of world trade 
expanded at a satisfactory rate for the first time since 1979. In response to this 
more favourable external environment and the higher level reached by the 
effective real exchange rate in many countries as from 1982, the volume of the 
region's exports climbed by around 7 % (although there were substantial 
differences between individual countries) and their value slightly exceeded its 
pre-crisis level. Moreover, for the first time since 1981, the greater volume of 
exports was coupled with an increase in the volume of imports. However, this 
increase was very slight ( 5 % ) , was concentrated in a few countries (Mexico, 
Venezuela, Costa Rica, Chile, Ecuador and Guatemala) —most of which had seen 
an enormous drop in the volume of their imports during the preceding years— 
and was followed by a slight decline in import volumes in 1985. Import volumes 
have thus remained far below their 1981 levels in all the countries of the region 
except Colombia and Paraguay, and the volume of merchandise imports of Latin 
America and the Caribbean as a whole during 1985 was still 3 8 % below its 1981 
level. 
The spectacular turnabout seen in the region's trade balance between 1981 
and 1985 was in sharp contrast to the stability displayed by net payments of 
interest and profits. These remittances, after having climbed steeply since 1978 
to an all-time high of nearly US$ 39 billion in 1982, fluctuated around US$ 35 
billion during the three following years: double their average during the four-
year period preceding the crisis (see figure 11). 
This huge increase and the even more pronounced decrease in net capital 
inflows which coincided with it produced a drastic change in the net result of 
foreign financial transactions from 1982 onwards. Until 1981 the total amount 
of loans and investments coming in from outside the region was well in excess of 
the sum total of remittances of interest and profits on foreign capital. The net 
result of these financial flows was therefore favourable to the region and allowed 
it to acquire goods and services from abroad which were worth considerably 
more than its exports. Due to the pro-cyclical behaviour of the private 
international banks and the simultaneous rise in interest rates, however, the 
relationship between these two financial flows underwent a reversal in 1982, so 
that in that year, for the first time in recent history, Latin America had to 
transfer abroad resources amounting to the considerable sum of nearly US$ 19 
billion (see figure 12). 
The problem grew worse in 1983, when the positive effect of a slight 
decrease in remittances of interest and profits was more than offset by another 
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sharp decline in net capital inflows; the difficulties eased only very slightly in 
1984, as a result of the partial recovery in net inflows of loans and investments, 
and in 1985 the situation grew more serious once again, with the net inflow 
dropping off sharply. Thus, during the past four years the region has transferred 
resources amounting to over US$ 100 billion to the exterior, between factor 
payments and amortization of the debt. 
This figure —which is equivalent to nearly a quarter of Latin America's 
exports of goods and services during this period— fails, however, to give an 
adequate idea of the magnitude of the reversal brought about by the sharply 
reduced capital inflows and bigger interest payments in the region's import 
capacity. Whereas the positive difference between the net inflow of capital and 
payments of interest and profits added an amount equivalent to nearly 16% of 
the region's exports of goods and services to its import capacity in the four-year 
period 1978-1981, the negative difference between these two financial flows 
subtracted an amount equivalent to approximately 2 6 % of the region's external 
sales of goods and services from its import capacity during the four-year period 
1982-1985 (see table 8). The change occurring for this reason between the two 
periods in question was therefore equivalent to a deterioration of 4 2 % in the 
terms of trade. 
The change has been even greater in Argentina, Brazil and Venezuela, and, 
above all, in Chile, Mexico and Uruguay, as may be seen in figure 13. It has been 
less intense, but nonetheless appreciable, in Ecuador and Bolivia. Although the 
decline in net capital inflows and the increase in interest payments have not been 
great enough to reverse the direction of the transfer of resources in Colombia, 
Costa Rica, the Dominican Republic and Paraguay, they have nonetheless played 
a part in sharply reducing the net contribution of financial operations to these 
countries' import capacity, compared with the situation before the crisis. 
T le only countries in which the relative contribution of financial 
operations to import capacity has not only remained positive but even increased 
during the crisis are Haiti, El Salvador and Nicaragua (see figure 13). 
The financing of most of the interest payments by generating big trade 
surpluses has not only affected the region's growth rate as a result of the sharp 
cutback in imports, but has also meant that a considerable proportion of its 
domestic savings have been transferred abroad during the past four years. 
This transfer, in addition to playing a part in reducing domestic 
investment, has also lowered the proportion of such investment which is 
financed with national saving, thus giving the impression that less effort is being 
made to save. Actually, just the opposite has occurred in many countries of Latin 
America and the Caribbean since, at the same time that national saving has 
declined, domestic saving proper has increased. As is well known, it is the latter 
(which, in statistical terms, corresponds to the difference between the domestic 
product and total consumption when both are ..valued at constant prices) which 
actually measures the sacrifice made by the community in terms of forgone 
current consumption in order to save. Therefore, the fact that the coefficient of 
domestic saving has increased despite the decrease or stagnation of the total 
product shows that the saving effort made by the region, far from having ebbed 
(as, at first glance, the decrease in the portion of investments financed by 
national saving would appear to suggest), has actually increased. The divergent 
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trends of these two coefficients do, however, provide an illustration of yet 
another way in which the unfavourable evolution of external factors has affected 
the development of the Latin American and Caribbean countries. Owing to the 
combination of the rise in interest payments and the serious deterioration in the 
terms of trade, a considerable portion of the region's saving has been transferred 
abroad, thereby leaving a smaller proportion available for financing domestic 
investment and thus limiting both the pace and the autonomy of the growth 
process. 
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II. T H E C H A L L E N G E S O F E C O N O M I C P O L I C Y 
A. T H E CRISIS: A C H A L L E N G E A N D A N O P P O R T U N I T Y 
As we have seen, over the past four years the Latin American and Caribbean 
countries have paid an enormous cost for reducing the considerable external 
imbalance with which they were faced in 1981: in the region as a whole, per 
capita national income was 14% lower in 1985 than it was in 1980, and in some 
countries it fell to the levels it had reached a generation ago; inflation has hit 
record levels in more than a few economies, and most of them have seen a 
deterioration in the employment situation and a considerable drop in real wages. 
Since there has been a very sharp decrease in capital formation during the same 
period, the crisis has also compromised future levels of consumption and well-
being. The impact of the crisis has been made even more serious by its 
exceptional length, since the deterioration in the living conditions of vast sectors 
of the population in many countries has consequently been long-lasting as well 
as acute. 
Under these conditions, the need to reactivate the region's economies and 
to resume the growth process is becoming increasingly urgent, since it will 
otherwise be impossible to raise employment, wages and investment from their 
currently depressed levels. 
Nonetheless, the recovery of economic activity, although essential, is not 
of itself enough to ensure sustained and socially satisfactory economic process. In 
order for a reactivation to result in growth that will not soon be interrupted once 
again, both external imbalance and domestic inflation will have to be kept under 
control. Moreover, if the expansion of the economy is to represent more than 
merely a return to the pre-crisis development pattern, measures will have to be 
adopted which will gradually but steadily lay the foundations for a more 
autonomous, efficient and equitable style of development. 
In many ways, these tasks pose a challenge which has no equal in the 
history of the region save for that which the countries faced (for the most part, 
successfully) during the period between the beginning of the Great Depression 
and the end of the Second World War. If they manage to meet this new 
challenge, then the present crisis —even though it has been a period of economic 
and social regression— will also have provided an opportunity for the 
introduction of major reforms in the prevailing development pattern, thus 
playing a role similar to that which the depression of the 1930s performed in 
replacing the primary exporter model with industrialization based on import 
substitution. 
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This is an enormously complex task. The difficulties it entails stand out 
particularly clearly when it is considered within the context of the severe 
constraints which the crisis and its aftermath have placed on the future 
development of the Latin American and Caribbean countries. At least until the 
end of the 1980s, the expansion of many of these countries will be held back by 
the heavy debt burden which they incurred in the period up until 1981 and by the 
reluctance to increase net loans to the region which private commercial banks 
have shown since that time. These two phenomena will place severe limitations 
on import capacity, which currently represents the main constraint on economic 
growth in most of the Latin American and Caribbean countries. In the 
immediate future, economic growth will also be restricted by the extremely low 
level to which, as already noted, fixed capital formation has fallen in recent years 
and (in more than a few countries) by the limitations which stabilization 
programmes and the need to reduce the fiscal deficit will place on any increase in 
public investment. 
It is also clear that the chances of successfully meeting this challenge and 
the extent of the costs involved will depend, in part, on the conditions prevailing 
in the world economy and, particularly, on future trends with respect to the 
volume of world trade, commodity prices, international interest rates and 
international capital flows. 
These are variables over which national economic authorities have very 
little influence. Hence, notwithstanding the individual or joint efforts they may 
bring to bear in an attempt to make the external factors affecting the 
development of the region more favourable, such development will also depend 
to a great extent on the content and coherence of domestic economic policy. In 
most of the countries of the region, the authorities will have to deal in the 
coming years with a series of long-standing economic and social problems whose 
severity has been vastly increased by the crisis. Moreover, in tackling these 
problems, they will have a much lower level of external resources at their 
command than they did during the preceding decade. Thus, the fundamental 
challenge which they will have to overcome will be, in an almost literal sense, to 
"do more with less". 
Certainly, the various objectives of economic policy will carry different 
relative priorities in the various countries of the region, just as they may also 
differ, in the short and medium term, within a single country. Be that as it may, 
one vital task for many of the countries in the next few years will be to change the 
adjustment process in such a way that the achievement or preservation of 
external balance can take place within a context of economic expansion rather 
than stagnation or retrogression, as has occurred up until now. 
B. C H A N G I N G T H E A D J U S T M E N T P R O C E S S 
The adjustment process upon which the region embarked in 1982, although 
rapid and effective if evaluated from the standpoint of its specific objective (i.e., 
the reduction of the deficit on the balance-of-payments current account), has 
been enormously costly in economic and social terms. The fact is that in most 
cases the "over-adjustment" which the Latin American and Caribbean countries 
have had to make has been based almost exclusively on a reduction in the volume 
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of imports which, because of its extraordinary proportions, has inevitably 
affected domestic levels of production, employment and wages. 
It is therefore clear that this approach to adjustment has run its course; in 
future, policies will have to be implemented that will make the achievement or 
maintenance of external balance compatible with reactivation and economic 
growth. In order to achieve these objectives, however, it will be necessary to 
modify the nature of the adjustment process so that its pivotal element will no 
longer be the indiscriminate reduction of domestic spending but rather a rapid 
expansion of the exports and import substitutes. 
This will require that two general conditions be met: firstly, the reduction 
of the huge foreign transfer of resources which the region has been making in 
recent years, and secondly, the reorientation of domestic economic policy with 
the twofold purpose of promoting growth and structural changes in production 
and of improving the present situation and the future outlook for the poorest 
and most vulnerable groups of the population. 
1. Reducing the transfer of resources abroad 
At present, the region's limited import capacity constitutes the main constraint 
on its economic recovery and growth. The truth is that in most of the countries 
the shortage of foreign exchange currently represents a more serious limitation 
than does the insufficient level of domestic saving. Thus, despite the existence of 
underutilized capital and labour resources (which could be employed in the 
production of tradeable goods, thereby reducing the external imbalance), they 
cannot be fully exploited because the shortage of foreign exchange makes it 
impossible to purchase the necessary volume of complementary imported 
inputs. The social productivity of foreign exchange is greater under such 
circumstances than it is when the economy is operating at full capacity, because a 
greater supply of imports makes it possible to increase not only domestic 
spending but also production and saving.8 
It is therefore crucial for the Latin American and Caribbean countries to 
increase the amount of foreign exchange that can be used to buy imports. To this 
end, particularly in the short term, the transfer of financial resources abroad 
must be reduced so that a greater amount of foreign exchange can be used to 
increase imports of basic inputs and capital goods, which will then make it 
possible to expand domestic economic activity as well. 
The best way of diminishing the transfer of resources is by reducing the 
very large interest payments which the Latin American and Caribbean countries 
have to make on their external debt.9 As may be seen in table 9, during the past 
four years these remittances have absorbed around 3 6 % of the total value of the 
region's exports, which is double the percentage they represented before the 
crisis. Hence, if these payments could be reduced, it would then be possible to 
increase external purchases significantly without producing any increase in the 
deficit on current account. Furthermore, if the decline in interest payments were 
the result of a drop in international interest rates, of a decrease in the spreads 
charged to the Latin American and Caribbean countries or of specific agreements 
reached between them and their creditors, then the reduction in the transfer of 
resources and the ensuing reactivation of the economy could be achieved without 
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expanding the external debt, and would therefore have the additional advantage 
of not jeopardizing future import capacity. 
Even so, in order for sustained economic growth to be resumed in the short 
term in most of the countries of the region, more external financing will also 
have to be made available. Naturally, the supply of such financing will have to be 
still greater if real interest rates remain at their pfesent high levels or show a 
tendency to rise. 
Although this method of reducing the transfer of resources is less desirable 
than that of decreasing the region's interest payments, since it would mean that 
greater import capacity would be achieved at the cost of an immediate increase in 
the external debt or in the cumulative amount of foreign investment (which 
would entail higher payments of principal and interest and profit remittances in 
the future), it is nonetheless worthwhile for four main reasons. 
The first advantage of an increase in external financing is that it would 
make it easier to change the nature of the adjustment process which has been 
carried out thus far. As already noted, this process has been taking place under 
extremely adverse external conditions, particularly with respect to the 
availability of financing. Indeed, the very steep and sudden drop in net capital 
inflows was the factor which forced the economies of the region to reduce their 
deficit on current account with such extraordinary haste. Because of this, 
adjustment had to be carried out primarily by means of a sharp reduction in 
domestic spending and imports rather than through an increase in the 
production of internationally tradeable goods. This latter method —although 
socially and economically preferable, since it allows the external imbalance to be 
reduced while domestic economic activity is maintained or even increased— 
works more slowly than the former because it means that resources must be 
transferred from the production of non-tradeable goods to the production of 
exports and of import substitutes. Therefore, unlike policies designed to bring 
about an adjustment by reducing domestic spending, it can be geared only to a 
gradual —not a swift— reduction in the deficit on current account. Precisely 
because of this feature, it requires a significant, although decreasing, amount of 
external financing. 
The second reason why a greater net capital inflow would be advantageous 
is that it would help to raise domestic investment, which, as mentioned earlier, 
has fallen to extremely low levels during the crisis. Because of this, and despite 
the fact that in the short run it would be possible to increase production 
significantly through a fuller and more efficient utilization of existing installed 
capacity, an increase in investment is an essential prerequisite if a more rapid 
rate of economic growth is to be achieved and maintained in coming years. 
Obviously, increased investment would also require increasing saving. In order 
to reinforce the autonomy of the development process, and ever-increasing 
proportion of such savings should come from domestic sources. In many 
countries, however, this goal will be difficult to achieve in the immediate future 
since, due to the very substantial decreases in real wages and government social 
spending which took place during the crisis, the pressure for an increase in 
consumption on the part of the majority groups of the population is very strong 
at present. For this reason, as well as basic ethical considerations, it is highly 
unlikely that such pressure could be ignored once the growth process has been 
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resumed. Under these conditions, it is probable that the increase in the domestic 
rate of saving which would be socially and politically attainable would initially be 
lower than the increase in the investment coefficient which would be required in 
order to speed up the rate of economic growth to a satisfactory pace. In order to 
step up the growth of the economy, especially during the first few years, it would 
therefore be essential to increase the region's net inflow of capital. 
The third reason why a greater net intake of external loans and investment 
would be beneficial is that it would finance a larger portion of interest 
remittances and thus make it possible to reallocate part of the foreign exchange 
earnings from exports now being used for that purpose to the purchase of 
additional imports, which would have a favourable effect on domestic 
production levels. 
Finally, the fourth reason is that greater external financing would make it 
possible to reverse the process whereby the region's real external debt has been 
steadily reduced since 1984. While it is evident that the countries of Latin 
America and the Caribbean should gradually reduce their debt/exports and 
debt/product coefficients in order to achieve a more autonomous form of 
economic development this does not mean that they must also reduce the 
absolute value of their external debt in real terms; furthermore, it would be 
patently absurd to oblige them to do so just when they are facing the deepest and 
longest crisis to hit them in over half a century. Hence, at the very least, net 
external financing should increase at a rate similar to that of world inflation. 
2. Reorienting domestic economic policy 
The reduction of the transfer of resources abroad, although essential, would not 
in itself be enough to ensure the achievement or maintenance of external balance 
in a manner compatible with the sustained growth of economic activity. This 
would be the case particularly if the decrease in the transfer of resources were to 
stem from an increase in net capital inflows, since a greater intake of loans and 
investment would soon give rise to additional external obligations in the form of 
increased pyments of interest and profits. Hence, although it would help to ease 
external constraints in the immediate future, it would tend to heighten them in 
the medium term, at least until enough time passed for the investment of such 
resources to result in an increase in exports or in the production of import 
substitutes. Thus, the ultimate effect of a greater net inflow of capital depends, 
when all is said and done, on how such resources are utilized. If new loans are 
used to finance an increase in consumption, the production of non-tradeable 
goods or capital flight (as occurred in a number of cases during the period of 
financial permissiveness which preceded the crisis) this will exacerbate external 
constraints on development. Such constraints will be diminished, however, if the 
resources are used to increase investment, expand exports and augment import-
substituting production. 
a) Priority for the production of tradeable goods 
Therefore in order to overcome external constraints once and for all, in 
addition to reducing the net transfer of resources it will also be essential to orient 
domestic economic policy in such a way that it stimulates a rapid and sustained 
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expansion of the activities involved in the production of tradeable goods and a 
gradual but steady rise in domestic saving. These changes are indispensable 
because external constraints on growth in many countries of Latin America and 
the Caribbean primarily stem from the very high ratio which currently exists 
between the level of the external debt, on the one hand, and the value of exports 
and the domestic product, on the other. Therefore, unless there is a considerable 
drop in international interest rates or a marked improvement in the terms of 
trade, external constraints can only be reduced if domestic production and, 
particularly, export and import-substitution activities expand more rapidly than 
the external debt. 
A rapid increase in the production of tradeable goods is also essential if 
external balance is to be compatible with a sustained expansion of economic 
activity. This is because, in the expansionary type of adjustment advocated, the 
reduction of the deficit on current account or its maintenance within tolerable 
limits should be based on the more rapid growth of exports and import-
substituting activities rather than on cuts in domestic spending, which have 
frequently been the key component of the recessionary adjustment processes 
carried out in many of the countries of the region thus far. Hence, although it 
may be necessary to keep domestic demand —and especially spending on 
tradeable goods under control— the core element of an expansionary 
adjustment programme must be formed by a package of measures designed to 
raise the level and modify the structure of domestic production. 
To this end, given the existence of underutilized capacity in some 
production activities involving tradeable goods, what is required in the short run 
is to provide special exchange, tariff, tax and credit incentives to these subsectors 
in order to put their resources to use in the production of exports and import 
substitutes. As will be explained in greater detail in the following chapter, when 
the main constraint on economic activity is a shortage of foreign exchange, two 
of the main objectives of economic policy should be to expand import capacity 
and to assign the available foreign exchange in such a way as to maximize the use 
of existing installed capacity. In the short term, this means that the importation 
of intermediate inputs (especially those required for the production of tradeable 
goods) should be given preference above all over the acquisition of non-essential 
consumer goods and, to a lesser extent, over that of capital goods. With respect 
to the latter, preference should be given to those capital goods which will 
eliminate critical bottlenecks in export or import-substituting activities, as a 
means of paving the way for a rapid increase in the country's ability to generate 
or save foreign exchange. 
In order to facilite an expansionary adjustment, credit policy should be 
deliberately designed to promote the production of tradeable goods while at the 
same time helping to limit the domestic demand for such merchandise. 
Although reducing an external imbalance often requires that the overall growth 
of loans be restricted, this limitation should not be applied equally to all. 
activities. One situation which often arises and which should particularly be 
avoided is when, in an effort to meet an overall quantitative credit target, large 
cutbacks are made in the support provided to companies which, in net terms, 
generate or save a substantial amount of foreign exchange. Such a policy may not 
only lead to a slump in economic activity, but also runs counter to the prime 
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objective of an expansionary adjustment process, i.e., to reduce the deficit on 
current account by bringing about a more rapid expansion in production than in 
the demand for tradeable goods. 
These measures, whose purpose is to direct as much as possible of the 
output that can be produced with the existing installed capacity towards exports 
and import-substitution, should be backed up by a systematic reorientation of 
investment towards these activities. Indeed, this reallocation of capital 
expenditure is the factor which will ultimately bring about the structural changes 
in production that are needed in order to permanently overcome external 
constraints. Moreover, along with an increase in domestic saving, this reshaping 
of the production structure is an essential factor in reducing the region's 
dependence on external financing in the medium term and, as a result, 
increasing the autonomy of the development process. 
Brazil's experience following the first oil crisis is enlightening in this 
regard. Faced with a sharp deterioration in its terms of trade as a result of the 
increase in international oil prices, in the mid-1970s Brazil embarked upon an 
ambitious investment programme aimed at reducing its dependence on fuel 
imports, providing substitutes for other imports which weighed heavily in its 
trade balance, and expanding its exports. These investments were facilitated by 
the ample supply and low cost of external financing at the time. This financing 
also covered the large deficit on current account which Brazil had built up in its 
balance of payments during this period. At the same time, however, these 
investments were paving the way for a permanent reduction in its external 
imbalance. The possibility of accomplishing this began to take a more concrete 
form in 1982 when some of the large investment projects started to mature. As a 
result of this and of the relatively orthodox adjustment policy applied in 1982-
1984, the country saw a spectacular turnabout in its trade balance, which went 
from a deficit of US$ 2.8 billion in 1982 to a surplus of US$ 11.3 billion in 1984. 
Therefore, both in 1984 and in 1985 (when the country again marked up a huge 
merchandise trade surplus) it was possible to use this surplus to finance all of 
Brazil's interest payments while, at the same time, the economy was expanding 
forcefully. Thus, thanks to the rapid growth of the production of tradeable goods, 
the country was able not only to combine very rapid economic growth with the 
balancing of its external accounts, but also to reinforce the autonomy of its 
development process.10 
b) Emphasis on the quality of investments and the consumption of essential 
goods 
For the reasons given above, most of the Latin American and Caribbean 
countries may achieve only modest economic growth during what remains of the 
decade. This state of affairs will make it even more difficult than in the past to 
resolve the traditional dilemma posed by the need to decide whether more 
resources should be allocated to the expansion of consumption or to an increase 
in investment. Under these circumstances, special attention will have to be 
devoted to measures designed to increase the utilization of existing capacity, 
improve the allocation of investment and, in general, raise the productivity and 
efficiency of the economic system. In view of the fact that in the immediate 
future the supply of resources available for increasing capital formation will 
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grow more slowly than it did in the 1970s, and because of the sharp decrease in 
investment that occurred during the crisis, the expansion of economic activity 
will depend much more than it did before on the quality of the new projects 
which are undertaken and on the efficiency with which existing production 
facilities and human resources are utilized. Stress will have to be placed on means 
of raising productivity and augmenting the value added to natural resources 
through the increased processing of raw materials, so that the Latin American 
and Caribbean economies can be more competitive at the international level and 
so that they can expand and diversify their exports and so reduce their still-
excessive dependence on commodity exports. 
Given the slow rate at which economic growth is likely to proceed and the 
efforts that will be required in order to raise domestic saving, the increase in per 
capita consumption is also going to be slow in coming years. Under such 
circumstances, the composition and distribution of increases in consumption are 
of fundamental importance. Unlike what occurs when total consumption is 
expanding rapidly —in which case it is possible for all groups (including the 
poorest) to enjoy a considerable improvement in absolute living standards even 
if the distribution of total consumption is becoming more unequal— in a 
situation of austerity such as that which will probably exist in the next few years, 
an uneven distribution of the increase in total consumption would tend to 
produce a deterioration in absolute terms in the living conditions of the poorest 
groups of the population. Such a situation would be ethically unacceptable, 
especially in view of the fact that in many countries these are the groups which 
have borne the brunt of the crisis and of the adjustment and stabilization policies 
applied in recent years. Therefore, just as emphasis will have to be placed on the 
quality of new investments in the case of capital formation, likewise, in respect 
of consumption, priority will have to be given to its proper distribution and, 
particularly, to the satisfaction of the basic needs of the poorest and most 
vulnerable sectors of the population. To this end, the increase in total wages will 
have to come primarily from an expansion in employment rather than from 
wage rises," while social spending will have to be maintained or increased and 
policies in the areas of health, nutrition, education, housing and social security 
will have to be restructured in such a way as to ensure that they truly benefit the 
poorest groups on a preferential basis.12 
There will be an even greater need to stress the quality of new investments 
and the proper composition and distribution of increases in consumption in the 
case of those countries which are going to see a deterioration in their terms of 
trade, a decrease in net external financing and an increase in interest payments 
during the next few years, since the rate of expansion of the supply of goods and 
services that can be used for consumption or investment in these countries will 
need to be more rapid than the growth rate of the gross domestic product. 
Carrying out a more dynamic and socially fairer adjustment is not the only 
reason for placing systematic emphasis on an increase in productivity and 
efficienty as basic means of promoting economic growth and improving the 
living conditions and opportunities of the poorest groups, however; such 
emphasis is also an essential and ongoing factor in ensuring that the prevailing 
development pattern of the region gradually becomes more efficient and 
equitable. 
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c) Separation of the adjustment and of stabilization in time 
In order to make the adjustment less costly in social terms, the economic 
authorities should pursue the objectives of striking an external balance and 
stabilizing domestic price levels in succession rather than simultaneously. An 
attempt to achieve both these goals at the same time increases the danger of 
causing a recession. In addition to having a high social cost, a recession makes it 
more likely that, after a time, the stabilization policy will be abandoned, giving 
way to a resurgence of inflation. 
The possibility of this occurring arises out of the fact that, basically, 
policies designed to control domestic demand and raise the relative prices of 
tradeable goods (which, as already noted, are the two main policy packages 
comprising orthodox adjustment programmes) have different types of effects 
on inflation. Whereas the former serve to reduce a country's external imbalance 
while also lowering inflation, the latter —although they expedite an 
adjustment— speed up the inflationary process, at least in the short run. For 
example, measures such as raising the exchange rate, tariffs, or the domestic 
prices of such products as foodstuffs and fuels which are designed to boost 
exports and reduce imports by raising the relative prices of tradeable goods, 
bring about an immediate rise in domestic costs and prices. Therefore, if such 
policies are applied at the same time as domestic spending is being reduced by 
means of restrictive, non-selective fiscal, monetary and credit policies (as 
typically occurs in orthodox adjustment and stabilization programmes), then 
they will tend to cause both an acceleration of inflation and a drop in economic 
activity. 
This is why there should be a separation in time between the application of 
adjustment policies and stabilization policies. Generally speaking, except when 
inflation is very intense, it would appear best to carry out the adjustment process 
first and then the stabilization programme. 
There are three main reasons for this sequence. The first is the urgency 
and, indeed, inevitability of an adjustment process when a country is faced with a 
deficit on the current account of its balance of payments which it cannot finance 
by having recourse to its net intake of external loans and investments or by 
drawing down its international reserves. Under such conditions, an adjustment 
becomes an immediate necessity because, in the final analysis, the need for it 
stems from a basic limitation: the economy's inability to expend more resources 
than the sum total of the resources at its command (both its own and those lent 
to it). Thus, unlike inflation, which the countries can "live with" for a relatively 
extended period of time, an external imbalance that cannot be financed must be 
dealt with promptly by means of an economic adjustment. 
The second reason why it is preferable to carry out an adjustment before 
making a stabilization effort relates to the fact that the adjustment process must 
be gradual if it is to be efficient. As already noted, in order for a reduction of the 
ex ternal deficit to be compatible with the maintenance or expansion of economic 
activity, resources and investments must be reassigned from the production of 
non-tradeable goods to exports or import substitution, and this is a process 
which can only be carried out over a relatively long period of time. Thus, by its 
very nature, and in contrast to what occurs with a stabilization programme, an 
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adjustment effort is a proces which does not lend itself to shock policies and, if 
carried out very rapidly, tends to produce a significant decrease in economic 
activity. 
Finally, the adjustment should precede stabilization because it helps to 
control inflation. If the changes in relative prices required in order to eliminate 
an external imbalance have already been made and if the deficit on current 
account has already been reduced to a level that can be financed, then 
stabilization, although arduous, will be a less complex task because it will 
basically consist of slowing down the momentum of inflation by controlling 
aggregate demand and expectations. 
However, when the rate of increase in domestic prices is speeding up at an 
exceptional rate and, above all, when the economy is slipping towards 
hyperinflation, the sequence should be the reverse. As suggested by the recent 
experience of various countries in the region, under these conditions the 
economic damage caused by inflation and the threat it poses to political and 
institutional stability are so great that, for a time, reducing the rate of price 
increases comes to be the first —and sometimes the only— priority of economic 
policy. 
In sum, although the order in which attempts should be made to reduce a 
country's external imbalance or to lower inflation may differ depending on the 
prevailing conditions, in order to minimize the risk of a recession it is usually 
preferable to avoid undertaking adjustment and stabilization programmes at the 
same time. 
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III. A D J U S T M E N T , R E A C T I V A T I O N A N D E Q U I T Y 
As already pointed out, one of the essential features of the recent evolution of 
many Latin American and Caribbean economies has been the fall in global 
output and, in particular, in levels of activity in manufacturing and construction. 
This decline has been accompanied in most cases by a sharp upswing in open 
unemployment and by the spread of various forms of underemployment. In 
practice, in countries where the economic contraction has been very severe, the 
unemployment situation has affected not only untrained workers, but also large 
groups of skilled operatives, technicians, professionals and management 
personnel. 
Thus, in many countries of the region today underutilization of installed 
capacity is to be found side by side with unemployment and underemployment of 
manpower. In principle, then, it would be possible to achieve substantial 
production increments with no necessity for any significant prior increase in 
investment in fixed capital. 
This does not mean, however, that the said production increments can be 
obtained over the short term merely by means of measures directed towards 
expanding domestic demand. In fact, this option is severely limited in practice by 
the balance-of-payments situation. As has already been explained, the 
exceptional reduction of the deficit on current account between 1981-1982 and 
1985 was almost entirely due to the phenomenal contraction of imports, the 
volume of which shrank by almost 4 0 % in the region as a whole in the course of 
the past four years. Furthermore, in many economies this decline was 
accompanied by a disproportionate reduction of imports of luxury or non-
essential consumer goods and by a similarly pronounced decrease in purchases of 
capital goods, so that the inflexibility of imports increased. 
Thus, by reason, in the first place, of the very small absolute terms of 
imports; secondly, because of the exceptionally high proportion currently 
represented by purchases of raw materials and intermediate products; and, 
lastly, on account of the extremely low level to which the import coefficient has 
sunk, the capacity to import is at once the main determinant of the level of global 
output and the fundamental constraint on it. Accordingly, in many of the Latin 
American and Caribbean countries almost any attempt at an additional external 
sector adjustment via a decrease in imports would precipitate new slumps in 
domestic economic activity. Conversely, to raise levels of production and income 
to a significant extent, it would be absolutely essential to increase the volume of 
imports, which would mean, unless at the same time there were an 
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improvement in import capacity, a further enlargement of the balance-of-
payments deficit. In other words, in present circumstances, in order to reactivate 
the economy, to reduce underutilization of manpower and of installed capacity 
and, above all, to achieve rapid and sustained growth, it is indispensable to 
increase the capacity to import. 
This essential task can, in turn, be carried out by expanding exports, by 
procuring a larger net amount of external loans and investments, or by reducing 
remittances of interest and profits. Thence the crucial role which will have to be 
played during the rest of the decade both by policies designed to vigorously and 
persistently step up exports and import-substituting production, and by those 
directed towards renegotiating the external debt so that its servicing may 
permit, instead of obstructing, the region's economic growth. 
Of course, both the effectiveness and the cost of these policies will largely 
depend upon external circumstances. For instance, inducing the growth and 
diversification of exports will be easier or more difficult according to whether 
international trade expands quickly or slowly and whether the downward trend 
of the terms of trade continues or is reversed. Whether in practice the first of 
these possibilities prevails or the second occurs will closely depend, in turn, upon 
the economic policies applied in the industrialized economies as well as on their 
rate of growth and on the course followed by their protectionist practices. As will 
be explained in detail later, the possibility of raising the capacity to import by 
obtaining more loans or investment or by reducing interest payments is likewise 
conditioned by external factors which are largely beyond the control or decision-
making sphere of the economic authorities of the Latin American and Caribbean 
countries, particularly if these do not act in co-ordination. 
Even so, as is reflected in the variations discernible in regional experience, 
both the resumption of the growth process and its persistence and speed, 
although powerfully conditioned by the evolution of the external environment, 
mainly depend upon the quality and coherence of domestic economic policies. 
A. O V E R C O M I N G T H E E X T E R N A L C O N S T R A I N T : 
S T R U C T U R A L A D J U S T M E N T P O L I C I E S 
1. Changes required in the composition of 
production and domestic expenditure 
In order to achieve sustained economic expansion and at the same time maintain 
adequate external equilibrium, most of the economies of the region will have to 
introduce significant changes during the next few years both in the structure of 
production and in the composition of domestic expenditure: while in the former 
they will have to raise the proportion represented by internationally tradeable 
goods and services (exports and import-substituting products), in the latter, on 
the contrary, they will have to increase the fraction allocated to the purchase of 
non-tradeable goods and services. If this were done, concurrently with the 
expansion of the capacity to import there would be a tendency for the imported 
components of domestic production and expenditure to decrease, with the 
consequent two-way reduction of the external constraint on growth. 
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Of course, the relative priority of this twofold process of change will differ 
in the different countries: it will be, for example, lower in an economy like that of 
Brazil, which has succeeded in generating a sizeable trade surplus through a 
boom in exports and a structural reduction of its import coefficient; and, in 
contrast, it will be higher in those economies where the trade surpluses achieved 
are relatively smaller and have been obtained almost exclusively through an 
abrupt and unsustainable curtailment of imports; where the terms of trade have 
deteriorated to a greater extent or have less favourable prospects; and where the 
burden of debt servicing is relatively heavier. 
Moreover, the pace at which the structural adjustment will have to be 
made, as well as its social cost, will depend upon the available supply of net 
external financing: the more abundant this is, the more gradually can the 
requisite changes be made in the composition of domestic supply and demand, 
since in that event a proportion of the increased imports required for the 
expansion of economic activity can be paid for with the increased external 
financing; on the contrary, if this latter is in very short supply, it will be more 
difficult and costly to attain a satisfactory rate of economic growth and at the 
same time to maintain a reasonable degree of external equilibrium, since this 
will call for a much more intensively-executed reorientation both of domestic 
production and of domestic demand. 
2. Exchange-rate, tariff and export 
promotion policies 
As already remarked, in order to promote production of tradeable goods, to 
simultaneously discourage, in relative terms, their domestic consumption, and to 
ensure that these changes take place in the context of a process of expansion of 
economic activity and employment, a multiplicity of economic policies needs to 
be coherently and systematically applied. Among these, special importance 
attaches, in the short term, to those conducive to raising the prices of tradeable 
goods in relation to those of non-tradeable goods and services,13 while over the 
medium term particular importance is attached to investment and development 
policies directed towrds generating structural changes in the rate of growth and 
the orientation of installed capacity. 
Of the policies that modify the relative prices of tradeable and non-
tradeable goods, it is exchange policy that produces the most general effects. 
Unlike tariff policy or that of export promotion, both of which encourage 
production of one group of tradeable goods at the cost of another, or of 
production of non-tradeable goods, devaluation favours production (and 
discourages domestic use) of tradeable goods as a whole at the expense of that of 
non-tradeable goods. 
Hence the importance of fixing and maintaining a high real exchange rate 
in any programme designed to reduce external disequilibrium or keep it under 
control. This is particularly necessary when the deficit on current account is due 
to a marked and relatively permanent deterioration of the terms of trade, to 
external financing, or to substantial and prolonged upward movements of 
international interest rates. 
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However, the response of export and of import-substituting activities is 
sensitive not only to the real level of the rate of exchange, but also to its stability. 
As shown by the experience of some countries of the region during the pre-crisis 
period, the progress made in the field of export growth and diversification and 
import substitution under the aegis of realistic exchange policies came to a halt 
or even disappeared altogether when effective exchange rates declined steeply as 
the result of an abundant supply of external financing, of a marked rise in the 
international price of some staple export product, or of the use of exchange 
policy as an instrument of anti-inflation programmes. 
Accordingly, for the purpose of stimulating the structural changes 
involved in a lasting adjustment process —which by their very nature are 
relatively slow—, it is not enough for effective real exchange parity to rise for a 
short spell; it must be maintained at that higher level over relatively lengthy 
periods. In so far as this happens, exchange policy will provide producers with a 
clear indication of the real value of foreign exchange over the long term and will 
help to ensure that not only current production but also investment is channelled 
into exports and import substitution. In addition to this benefit, the elimination 
of abrupt and frequent variations in the effective real exchange rate, by reducing 
uncertainty as to the future level of exchange parity, lessens the risk that 
speculative capital movements may be generated which are apt to produce 
destabilizing effects on the balance of payments, economic activity and price 
levels. 
In situations like those of today, in which the overcoming of the external 
bottleneck is a basic prerequisite for economic reactivation and in which there 
are appreciable but different margins of idle capacity in the various sectors, it 
may be necessary to complement high effective real exchange rate policy with 
the temporary and selective application of tariff surcharges on imports and with 
subsidies and other measures favouring exports. On the one hand, the selective 
and temporary use of these instruments makes it possible to encourage those 
export or import-substituting activities which have greater potential for 
response over the short term. On the other hand, selective tariff increases and 
subsidies have the advantage of not exercising so general an upward pressure on 
costs as that normally produced by devaluation and, likewise, do less to influence 
the unleashing or accentuation of inflationary expectations. 
Over the short term, in some Latin American economies export incentives 
may probably generate net foreign exchange earnings that exceed the savings of 
foreign exchange derived from tariff surcharges or other measures designed to 
reduce imports. This is partly because, as a result of the foreign trade policies 
traditionally applied in the region —which have placed much greater emphasis 
on saving foreign exchange through import substitution than on earning foreign 
exchange through export promotion—, activities geared to production for the 
domestic market are protected by a "total exchange rate"14 considerably higher 
than that received by the exporting sectors. But this too is due to conjunctural 
factors. If allowance is made for the enormous decreases in the volume of 
imports and the equally significant changes in their structure that have taken 
place in almost all the Latin American countries since 1982, together with the 
likewise notable decline in import coefficients, it is reasonable to assume that the 
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short-term possibilities of achieving a significant additional amount of import 
substitution are limited. 
Nevertheless, selective import restriction measures may also help to make 
the external adjustment compatible with the recovery and growth of domestic 
economic activity. Generally speaking, this contribution will be greater in those 
countries where the tariff and para-tariff protection accorded to manufacturing 
industry and the agricultural sector is relatively low and equally-matched; where 
there is a higher degree of underutilization of installed capacity in activities 
competing with imports; and where the proportion of luxury or non-essential 
imports is relatively larger. In such cases, the imposition of temporary tariff 
surcharges or restrictions on imports for which domestic products can be 
substituted more expeditiously and at lower social cost by using existing 
production capacity may help to change the composition of imports in such a 
way that a given amount of them may make it possible to maintain a higher level 
of domestic production. 
These temporary surcharges would have to be especially high where 
luxury consumer goods were concerned. Albeit in normal conditions tariff duties 
on non-essential imports are less effective as an instrument of economic policy 
than a tax applied to luxury goods irrespective of whether these are of domestic 
or foreign origin, they are preferable in present circumstances, in which there is 
an acute shortage of foreign exchange and an abundance of underutilized 
domestic resources. In fact, by diverting demand from imports to domestically-
produced substitutes, they are conducive both to releasing foreign exchange for 
other more essential purposes and to stepping up employment of domestic 
resources. However, in so far as changes in the structure of production and 
expenditure gradually attenuate the external constraint and underutilized 
domestic resources are progressively absorbed, these surchages should be 
replaced by a domestic tax on consumption of luxury goods. Otherwise, the 
surcharge on imports will raise the rate of return not only on current production 
of such goods, but also on investment earmarked for expanding the capacity to 
produce domestic substitutes for goods of that kind. While the former effect is 
desirable —inasmuch as foreign exchange can consequently be saved and 
employment increased by using existing installed capacity (which has little or no 
social opportunity cost )— the second is undesirable, in that it means channelling 
part of domestic saving and of imports (which have a high positive opportunity 
cost) into expansion of the capacity to produce goods whose social priority is low. 
Generally speaking, temporary incentives to the production of tradeable 
goods should meet two basic criteria. The first is that they should be selective and 
should favour activities in which supply is highly elastic over the short term.15 
The second is that their structure should conform to the basic principle of 
efficiency according to which the cost of earning a certain additional amount of 
foreign exchange through export expansion must be equal to the cost implicit in 
saving the same amount of foreign exchange through import substitution. 
Hence, ideally the incentive granted to exports should be equivalent to the tariff 
protection accorded to import substitution. As a first approximation, this 
implies that the export subsidy for a specific good must be equivalent to the tariff 
rate protecting that good in the domestic market.16 In so far as the tariff structure 
is differentiated, export stimuli should also be differentiated, so as to match up 
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the incentives not only to exports and to import substitution, but also to the 
various potential exports. 
Of course, to the extent that the external constraint is mitigated and the 
growth process is consolidated, the level of tariff surcharges and of special 
incentives to exports should be gradually lowered and the criterion by which the 
selectivity of import substitution and export promotion policies is guided should 
undergo a change. In practice, the basic principle favouring those activities 
which show a greater short-term capacity to earn or save foreign exchange 
through fuller use of existing production capacity should be replaced by that of 
promoting sectors with greater dynamic comparative advantages over the 
medium and long term. These sectors —capable of competitive production of 
exports or import substitutes after a reasonable length of t ime— may not be the 
same as the above-mentioned activities, some of which can export or produce 
import substitutes only in so far as they enjoy very high protection and need to 
cover solely their variable production costs. 
However, like tariff surcharges and export subsidies directed towards 
short-term alleviation of the external constraint, incentives to promote 
development of sectors with dynamic comparative advantages should be 
selective and temporary. Both because of the inevitable limitation of the 
resources available for such purposes and because of the need to make optimum 
use of them, protection, instead of being general and indiscriminate —as it has 
been in many Latin American countries— should be concentrated on a few 
activities which have clear prospects of attaining international competitiveness 
and can therefore contribute to external equilibrium through import 
substitution and export expansion, without needing special and permanent 
protection to that end. Initially, the activities in question would have to be given 
intensive support so that advantage could be taken of economies of scale from 
the outset and so that their productivity and competitiveness could be rapidly 
increased. But after a reasonable period the protection accorded to them should 
be gradually but steadily reduced in conformity with a predetermined time 
schedule, for the dual purpose of obliging them to improve their efficiency and to 
release resources by means of which other activities with dynamic comparative 
advantages could be launched upon a similar cycle of initial intensive support 
and subsequent gradual withdrawal of protection.17 
In order to speed up the growth and increase the diversification of exports, 
policies relating to a high and stable effective real exchange rate and to 
promotion of activities with dynamic comparative advantages will have to be 
complemented with other measures designed to support production and 
marketing of exports. Among these, special mention may be made of the 
following: measures making it possible for the intermediate goods used in 
export production to be purchased at international prices; provision of supplies 
of credit to finance the working capital requirements of exporter enterprises; 
improvement and strict control of the quality of exports; identification of rapidly 
expanding markets and of the products for which international demand 
increases most briskly; timely and systematic dissemination of this information 
among domestic producers; and establishment and enlargement of trading 
systems which will facilitate the sale of exportable products on the international 
market.18 
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3. Investment policies 
As already pointed out, a definitive overcoming of the external bottleneck 
necessitates, in the last analysis, changes in the structure of production making 
for an increase in the absolute dimension and relative participation of export 
activities and of those competing with imports. Although over the short term 
this larger volume of output must be achieved basically through more intensive 
use of existing installed capacity, in the medium term it will be obtainable only if 
production capacity is expanded in the sectors producing tradeable goods. 
For this reason, and also because of the very low levels to which 
investment has fallen in most of the countries during the crisis, in the next few 
years it will be indispensable to raise the rate, increase the efficiency, and modify 
the structure and orientation of global capital accumulation. 
Since two basic objectives of economic policy in the remainder of the 
present decade will be to reduce external disequilibrium or keep it under control 
and persistently boost levels of production and employment, priority will have 
to be systematically given to investment channelled towards expanding 
production capacity in respect of exportable and import substituting goods as 
well as labour-intensive goods requiring relatively few imported inputs. 
This latter principle implies, particularly in the more immediate future, 
increasing investment in machinery and equipment relatively less than 
expenditure on construction. In most Latin American countries, construction 
has a very low import content and, on the contrary, generates, directly or 
indirectly, a great deal of employment. Accordingly, abrupt curtailment of public 
works and housing programmes —a decision which is often one of the first to be 
taken in programmes designed to reduce a fiscal deficit, and which has in fact 
been adopted in recent years in many countries of the region— yields very few 
benefits from the standpoint of adjustment, since it reduces imports hardly at all, 
and, on the other hand, has a high economic and social cost, since it leaves jobless 
many workers for whom it is difficult to find employment quickly in export or 
import-substituting activities. 
Nonetheless, if expenditure on construction is to contribute to 
employment, it will be necessary to modify its allocation. Thus, in the selection 
of public works preference will have to be systematically given to those which 
increase or promote production of exports and of import substitutes (such as, for 
example, irrigation and drainage works, opening-up and improvement of roads 
in agricultural and mining areas, expansion of port facilities, etc.), over those 
(such as underground railways, motorways and other highway and 
modernization projects, etc.) which only improve the living conditions of certain 
groups resident in the larger and normally wealthier cities. 
Besides according priority to works which directly or indirectly facilitate 
the production of tradeable goods, construction policy will have to be guided by a 
redistributive criterion, seeking to satisfy some of the basic needs of the poorest 
groups. In this sense, the building of low-cost housing, construction of piped 
water and sewage networks, and environmental sanitation of the poorer 
neighbourhoods have the threefold advantage that their execution signifies the 
use of a minimum of imported inputs and capital goods, employment of a great 
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deal of labour and immediate and lasting improvement in the living conditions 
of the most deprived groups. 
Generally speaking, as regards both investment in construction and 
investment in machinery and equipment, priority will have to be given to 
investment projects which have a shorter maturity or which supplement 
existing installed capacity. As long as the net capital inflow fails to recover and it 
is necessary to apply a restrictive monetary policy in order to facilitate 
stabilization and adjustment, the rate of interest will tend to be very high and, 
consequently, it will be advisable to postpone investment projects involving 
longer gestation periods; these can be undertaken once the crisis in the external 
sector has been overcome, when greater financial elbow-room and a more 
plentiful supply of foreign exchange will be favourable to projects with long 
maturities and with a higher imported content. 
Similarly, with a view to upgrading the efficiency of investment and 
complying with the basic principles implicit in giving priority to investment 
which increases production of exports and import substitutes, which has a 
relatively low imported content, and/or which creates more jobs, it will be 
necessary to subject all public-sector investment projects to a rigorous and 
uniform evaluation, based on the application of social prices, and to take care 
that as far as possible the market values of the rate of exchange, the interest rate 
and wages reflect relative social scarcities. 
B. O V E R C O M I N G T H E E X T E R N A L C O N S T R A I N T : 
E X T E R N A L F I N A N C E 
As mentioned earlier, in the present context of a severe economic recession the 
return on a dollar of foreign exchange is quite high. However, the productivity of 
foreign exchange is one thing; access to it is another. In the long run the 
preferable way of securing foreign exchange is through "expenditure 
switching", and especially the production of exports and import substitutes. But 
we have already seen that there is also something of a vicious circle here, since to 
produce foreign exchange the region will need foreign exchange. Moreover, that 
circle is tightened by the sluggish performance of the world economy. This is 
because a relatively slow growth of the world product weighs especially heavily 
on the prices of primary commodities, which still account for 8 0 % of Latin 
American exports. Also slow world growth generates less space for new and 
marginal exporters and makes greater demands on investment (hence savings) 
in order to increase international competitiveness. 
The persistence of sluggish economic activity at the world level naturally 
causes attention to shift increasingly to creditor-debtor relations. The reason for 
this is that an enormous amount of foreign exchange potentially available for 
economic recovery is being transferred from debtor to creditor countries. In fact, 
over the last four years, this transfer has absorbed the equivalent of one-quarter 
of the region's annual export earnings. Viewed from the standpoint of 
generation of domestic resources, it has represented an average annual drain of 
3 .5% of the gross domestic product. 
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To what is so large a transfer attributable? It stems on the one hand from 
the extraordinarily high level of world interest rates (see figure 14) —coupled 
with the relatively onerous conditions negotiated for rescheduling debts (see 
table 1 0 ) — and on the other from the collapse of capital inflows, which until 
1981 had been more than covering factor payments. This latter phenomenon, in 
turn, reflects the massive withdrawal of new lending by creditors (mostly 
banks), beginning in mid-1982, a sharp slowdown in direct foreing investment 
flows, and a considerable flight of capital belonging to private economic agents 
(see table l l ) . 1 9 
The question that must be addressed is how this transfer may be reduced so 
as to generate additional foreign exchange for economic recovery and dynamic 
adjustment. In terms of the amount of financing that is required, an idea is 
provided in some recent simulations undertaken by ECLAC.20 In its base case 
scenario, which postulates only a modest recovery that will permit the region to 
recoup 1980s per capita income in 1990, there is a need for net current account 
financing of US$ 20 billion per annum, in contrst to the less than US$ 2 billion 
recorded in 1984.21 
1. The catalytic role of international public policy 
An obvious way for the outward transfer of financial resources from Latin 
America to be reduced is for commercial banks —holding somewhat less than 
three-quarters of Latin America's US$ 368 billion external debt— to curtail 
their intake of the region's resources. This can be done either by lowering 
interest charges, or by increasing new lending, or by some combination of both. 
Of course, from the standpoint of development, the more the transfer can be 
reduced through lower interest payments the better, since this type of relief does 
not involve any further accumulation of debt. 
The outward transfer to the banks has been extremely large. Since the 
outbreak of the crisis, new net lending from banks has fallen drastically; in 1985 
it was expanding by less than 1 %, in face of an average interest rate of about 
10% (including spreads). Thus the net reverse flow of resources to these 
creditors (by interest payments) has been equivalent to around 9 % of 
outstanding commitments.22 
The banks have been able to effect this net transfer from the debtors to 
themselves because of the aforementioned large trade surpluses generated by 
Latin American countries during the adjustment process, and secondarily 
because of net disbursements to them from other creditors, principally official 
public lenders.23 The outward transfers have had a very salutary effect on the 
banking system. In effect, the banks have been able to avoid 1930-style defaults 
and receive interest income, all without significantly expanding their own 
portfolio in the region. This has permitted the banks to report healthy profits 
even in the face of the most severe financial crisis in the post-war era, and also 
allowed the creditors to substantially reduce their vulnerability by lowering 
asset/capital ratios in Latin America.24 The main sacrifice imposed upon the 
creditors has been a more rigid loan portfolio due to the rescheduling of 
amortization (also necessary to avoid losses) and the deterioration of the value of 
bank shares, as stockholders are apparently anticipating some losses in the 
future.25 
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This relatively benign set of circumstances for the banks was achieved with 
the aid of multilateral public policy. First, IMF adjustment programmes helped 
to introduce financial discipline among the borrowers and have contributed to 
the rapid generation of trade surpluses. Secondly, OECD governments and the 
IMF assisted the big commercial banks to exert enough control over small and 
medium-sized banks to ensure that they would participate in new loans packages 
designed to partially refinance interest payments and thereby avoid default on 
the part of the debtor countries.26 Thirdly, the United States Treasury and the 
Bank of International Settlements extended bridge loans to debtor countries to 
help them pay interest to the banks while they negotiated with these creditors 
and the IMF. 
Multilateral public policy has, however, been cautiously deployed and 
limited in scope. This has reflected the underlying preference of the creditor 
governments for relying on "natural" or market-related forces to resolve the 
crisis. In effect, public intervention has been reluctant and pragmatically 
designed to stem a classic panic among bank creditors, which would have induced 
defaults and large balance-sheet losses for the international financial system, 
while "buying time" until i) an expected strong recovery of the world economy 
took hold and ii) the debtors net transfers to the banks and export growth 
pushed down debt/export coefficients to below 2:1, —conventionally considered 
a threshold for renewed creditworthiness and autonomous access to the 
Eurocurrency market. 
The creditor governments' strategy has successfully avoided a collapse of 
the international financial system. However, the debtor countries' economic 
growth and development have consistently been a residual part of the overall 
management of the crisis.27 The failure of many key variables to move in 
expected directions has contributed to an extremely asymmetric adjustment 
process, in which debtors have borne a disproportionate amount of the costs of 
the crisis. Moreover, continued economic stagnation in the debtor countries is no 
longer functional even to the narrowly-defined goal of servicing the foreign 
debt. 
The conventional strategy for handling the current debt crisis has clearly 
exhausted itself. The strategy's serious shortcomings, long highlighted by the 
Latin American governments,28 have been implicitly recognized in the recently-
announced "Baker Initiative". It proposes an abandoning of the focus on 
austerity for a new focus on growth, through expanded public initiatives at the 
international level designed to reduce the outward transfer of the debtors.29 But, 
as observed in the Declaration of Montevideo, issued by the Cartagena 
Consensus in December 1985, the Baker Initiative, while a positive step forward, 
falls short of the comprehensive action needed to break the vicious circle of 
economic stagnation in Latin America.50 
This vicious circle, arising from the negative externalities that frequently 
eddy around a debt crisis, was anticipated in a study which ECLAC first published 
in early 1984 . " The study suggested that a socially efficient "first best" solution 
to the crisis was a comprehensive set of multilateral public policy measures 
which would be directed at these negative externalities and would quickly restore 
growth and repayment capacity in Latin America. An argument which some in 
the North then saw as persuasive, has now become compelling. 
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The limited success of the management of the debt crisis in the last few 
years is indeed not entirely surprising. As already mentioned, the conventional 
strategy has been heavily influenced by a faith in natural or market responses. 
There appears, however, to have been a systematic underestimation of the 
paralysis that can set in throughout private financial markets during a crisis. 
Both history and theory show that private financial institutions tend to 
exaggerate their expectations of profit (underestimate risk) in the upswing of a 
credit cycle and then to sharply reverse this tendency and exaggerate their 
expectations of losses (overestimate risk) in a crisis.32 Indeed, during a crisis 
revulsion often occurs in credit markets, as reflected in Latin America by the 
retreat from the region of all but the big bank creditors (which are "locked in")33 
and a dramatic slowdown of international lending more generally (see tables 12 
and 13). Furthermore, it is well known from historical experience that once 
revulsion sets in it takes a long time to be overcome.34 
Under these circumstances, reliance on mechanical formulas to establish 
conditions for reintegration into autonomous credit markets —such as 
debt/export ratios of 2 : 1 — are of limited usefulness, as even some financial 
experts now admit. Indeed, certain analysts have found that considerably higher 
ratios are fully compatible with profitable investment, growth and 
macroeconomic equilibrium.35 
Correction of private expectations is a time-consuming process, in part 
because of the aforementioned negative externalities attendant upon a crisis. For 
example, a financial institution with more buoyant expectations about Latin 
America may nevertheless refrain from lending if it perceives that its loans will 
merely finance the withdrawal of other more pessimistic lenders, or domestic 
holders of capital. Alternatively, persistent problems in a large debtor country 
can have negative repercussions, or a contagion effect, on the creditworthiness 
image of better-off neighbouring countries, as risk perception is systematically 
regionalized.36 Witness to the burden of negative externalities is borne in Latin 
America today by the failure of credit markets to respond with new autonomous 
(or voluntary) lending in cases where external adjustment has been manifestly 
quite successful, e.g., Brazil.37 
Underlying much of the phenomenon is the fact that banks are run on the 
criterion of private profit, which is generated in an environment of heightened 
uncertainty. Such circumstances are known tc contribute to procyclical 
behaviour.38 This in turn introduces the need for an anticyclical agent, which 
traditionally is a public entity. In a crisis, the role of the anticyclical agent is to 
provide a critical mass of assistance to the market in order to turn around private 
expectations; in this way the market's procyclical tendencies are exploited to 
generate a virtuous circle of growth which pulls economies out of stagnation. 
Moreover, the multiplier effect of public policy on foreign finance can be 
quite considerable, because banks are not the only procyclical agents. The 
shortage of foreign exchange and economic stagnation in Latin America have 
also severely curtailed opportunities for direct foreign investment and have 
circumscribed the efforts of debtor governments to repatriate the large amounts 
of private capital held abroad by their residents. (As shown in table 14 total 
deposits placed by Latin American residents in commercial banks greatly exceed 
official international reserves.) The greater the extent to which multilateral 
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initiatives can rekindle growth and help to restore normal rates of return in the 
region, the bigger will be the role that both foreign private investment and 
expatriated national capital will assume in the financing of current account 
deficits. 
Apart from the catalytic role of public policy in extricating economies from 
crisis, another strong reason for comprehensive multilateral public action is that 
resolution of the crisis is fundamentally handicapped by macroeconomic 
disequilibria in the OECD economies. These include the extraordinarily high 
levels of real interest rates and the persistence of a relatively sluggish economic 
performance in the OECD area. 
2. Reducing the outward transfer of financial resources: 
multilateral initiatives 
As outlined earlier, underlying the adjustment process is the medium-term 
objective of a structural change in the Latin American economies which, will 
make them more internationally competitive and creditworthy. However, in the 
short term the process needs to be "lubricated" with additional foreign finance 
that will permit the economies to employ existing idle domestic resources in the 
production of traded goods, and to initiate the investment so much needed for 
international competitiveness. Given the procyclical nature of private capital, 
the required amounts of finance can be efficiently mobilized and channelled into 
adjustment only through more comprehensive multilateral initiatives on the 
part of creditor and debtor governments. Such new initiatives must substantially 
reduce Latin America's debt burden and promote more equitable sharing of the 
costs of the crisis. Apart from its technical merits, the new strategy is also 
justified by what Latin American governments have termed co-responsibility in 
the crisis, i.e., current problems have arisen not just because of policies pursued 
by the debtor countries, but also because of those adopted by the banks and their 
governments.39 
a) Lowering interest rates 
Of all the potential international public actions to resolve the crisis, the 
bringing down of interest rates to historical levels stands out as perhaps the 
most important. Abnormally high rates are a primary impulse behind the 
vicious circle of economic stagnation that is plaguing the region; they increase 
debt burdens, scare off private creditors, and at the same time prejudice export 
growth through their depressive effects on the volume of world output and trade 
as well as on the level of primary commodity prices. Moreover, as long as real 
interest rates persistently remain higher than the growth rate of output, and 
nominal interest rates remain higher than the growth rate of export earnings, 
there is a progressive risk that debtor countries will drift into insolvency. The 
urgency of the need for more normal interest rates is given prominence in the 
Declaration of Montevideo, which states that a reduction of the current high rate 
of interest constitutes a fundamental element in the resolution of the debt 
problem.40 Obviously, too, it is one of the least conflictive ways of tackling the 
crisis, since it benefits both debtors and creditors: substantial relief can be 
afforded to borrowers while new lending by creditors can be minimized. 
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Since mid-1985 LIBOR has hovered around 8%. If that rate fell to 6 % — 
which at the prevailing level of world inflation would approximate to a 
historically normal real interest rate— Latin America would have US$ 5 billion 
more as foreign exchange at its disposal. In effect, a 2-point drop in the interest 
rate would generate resources equivalent to an increase of almost 5 % in the 
region's exports of goods and services; moreover, since exports exceed imports 
by 4 0 % , the effective rise in the capacity to import would be even greater: 6 .5%. 
An additional US$ 2.5 billion could be raised if government authorities in 
the North pursued policies which "encouraged" their banks to at least 
temporarily lower their spreads by 1 %. Such a move —which would still leave 
the banks' interest rate above LIBOR (whereby the cost of funds is measured for 
many lending institutions)41— could be promoted by multilateral guarantees on 
part of the bank debt, direct "moral suasion" by OECD Central Banks, and 
flexible interpretation of regulatory bank accounting.42 Moreover, such 
transitory interest rate relief would be in the same spirit as action taken by the 
banks when their domestic clients have encountered debt servicing problems. 
For example, the United States banks, with the assistance of their government, 
have made important concessions for problem borrowers such as the City of 
New York, large corporations (like Chrysler and International Harvester) and 
domestic farmers (see table 15).43 
Finally, for those few debtor countries that exhibit clear signs of 
insolvency, rates of interest below LIBOR are clearly appropriate. In the first 
place, it is technically impossible for these countries to pay a commercial rate, 
and to force them to do so will merely be conducive to arrears and astronomical 
debt/GDP and debt/export ratios. Secondly, the banks share co-responsibility 
for the problem through their own erroneous evaluation of risk and therefore 
must bear part of the costs of resolving it. 
b) Increasing capital flows 
The less successful public policy is in terms of lowering interest rates, the 
greater will be the ones on increased capital flows for reducing the outward 
transfer on the part of the debtors. There have been numerous proposals in this 
area.44 
First, public policy in the OECD governments could strongly "encourage" 
private banks to temporarily capitalize a greater share of Latin America's 
interest payments. At a minimum, the goal should be to follow the suggestion 
made in the Declaration of Montevideo and require the banks to maintain their 
credit balances in real terms. This is because to the extent that the banks' 
exposure increases by less than the rate of inflation, the countries are forced to 
endure effective amortization of their foreign debt even though the lenders may 
be completely rescheduling their maturities falling due.45 By conventional 
standards amortization of debt during a crisis is certainly unwarranted and 
should be postponed. If banks maintained their real credit balances and 
expanded lending by 4 % per annum (an approximate rate of world inflation), 
the region would receive nearly an additional US$ 10 billion in foreign 
exchange. 
Secondly, official lenders could raise the rate of disbursement on 
committed loans. While multilateral lenders are in theory anticyclical creditors, 
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their behaviour in practice has been relatively procyclical due to difficulty in 
increasing disbursements. This in turn stems in part from the fact that 
stabilization programmes and economic recession have made it difficult for 
borrowers to raise counterpart funds and to pursue new projects, which become 
less attractive as an economy's utilization of capacity declines.46 Disbursements 
could be increased if these institutions stepped up their participation in existing 
projects and channelled more financing to general balance-of-payments suppo rt 
(programme lending) which is usually designed to reduce the foreign exchange 
constraint. Gauging the position from some estimates of committed but 
undisbursed funds from official lenders, there is a considerable amount of 
potential relief in this area.47 
Thirdly, in 1983 the Government of Mexico proposed the establishment of 
a window at the IMF which would finance that part of the debtors' interest rate 
which exceeded 2 % real (the historical interest rate).48 Such a facility, which 
would be an extension of an existing compensatory programme that finances 
export shortfalls, could moreover sharply reduce the burden of interest rate 
capitalization, since it would be financed at less than market rates. This 
particular proposal continues to be a very commonsense solution to the payment 
problems of developing countries. 
Fourthly, governments hold about 8 % of Latin America's foreign debt. In 
the context of the Paris Club, OECD governments have been rescheduling 
amortization payments since 1982. Non-OECD governments have been doing 
the same in bilateral negotiations with the debtors. Creditors have, however, 
been generally resistant to providing relief on interest payments. Assuming an 
average interest rate of 7 % on government-to-government debt, an emergency 
capitalization of interest on these liabilities on a temporary basis —as recently 
proposed in the Declaration of Montevideo— could raise roughly US$ 2 billion 
in additional foreign exchange. This particular measure would be especially 
helpful for smaller debtor countries which have a proportionally greater amount 
of official obligations in their debt structure. 
Fifthly, the financial power of multilateral official lenders was sharply 
eroded during the 1970s, and this undermined their mission as stabilizing 
anticyclical lenders.49 Their ability to respond to the current crisis would be 
enhanced if they were provided with more funding. By raising the capital base of 
these institutions and/or changing their gearing ratios, they could act as more 
efficient intermediaries for channelling private funds into the financing of 
structural adjustment. The December Declaration of Montevideo called for a net 
increase in multilateral lending of 20% per annum over the next three years. 
Finally, a new issue of Special Drawing Rights (SDRs) for developing 
countries would be a practical way of providing relief from debt burdens and 
economic stagnation. 
c) Flexibilizing bank regulation 
Greater flexibility in the application of banking regulations and 
accounting is fundamental to resolving the crisis. Tfie commercial banks' ability 
to respond flexibly to the crisis is at present often handicapped by barriers of a 
legal and accounting nature. 
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In some OECD countries capitalization of interest and/or lower spreads for 
problem borrowers are interpreted as non-commercial "concessions" that 
detract from the value of the asset and require reserves allocations and/or 
writedowns. However, to the extent that a borrower's problems approximate to 
one of illiquidity, temporary concessions do not seriously jeopardize asset values; 
indeed they should be encouraged as a means by which those values can be 
preserved. 
On the other hand, concessions granted to insolvent borrowers are bound 
to be reflected in a depreciation of the value of the asset. Yet bank regulatory 
authorities should recognize the systemic character of the crisis and thus deal 
with the consequent losses imaginatively, and in a way that will not jeopardize 
the viability of the lending institution. This will require the spreading of the 
costs of the concessions over a relatively prolonged period of time. 
Alternatively, the banking authorities' enforcement of rules relating to 
correct valuation for insolvent borrowers should be translated into debt relief. 
As matters stand now, when authorities demand a writedown of an asset the 
banks customarily keep the face value of the loan on their books. Regulators 
should require that when a loan is written down there be a corresponding 
reduction in its face value, an action that will automatically reduce the debtor's 
interest obligations. Without such an alteration in book value the insolvent 
country's debt will grow exponentially even though the creditor has accepted the 
loss incurred through an erroneous credit decision. 
Bank regulatory authorities might also play a more active role in stemming 
the commercial banking system's contribution to capital flight. The capital flight 
problem has been exacerbated by the banks' active solicitation of deposits from 
Latin American residents and by the refusal of OECD governments to provide 
their Latin American counterparts with information on interest earned from 
deposits by the latters' citizens in OECD banking systems.50 
The flight problem can also be attenuated to the extent that bank 
regulatory authorities actively "encourage" their banking institutions to 
maintain as a minimum, their real net credit balances in Latin America. Flight 
capital is procyclical by definition; a retreat by foreign commercial banks in the 
middle of a foreign exchange crisis merely lowers the expected returns on 
domestic assets and induces private agents to flee into foreign assets. 
d) Adjusting conditionality 
Conditionality has become one of the more polemical aspects of the 
adjustment process. Moreover, it has been multiplying steadily during the crisis 
and aggravating the already severe constraint on public policy brought about by 
the scarcity of foreign exchange. 
First come the commercial banks which condition the adjustment process 
by the amount of resources they are willing to reschedule and/or lend and the 
terms and conditions on which that financing will be provided. Secondly, the 
banks normally link their co-operation to the country's submission to IMF stand-
by programmes, which carry their own controversial brand of conditionality on 
the evolution of the macroeconomy.5' Thirdly, the Baker Initiative envisages a 
more important role for the World Bank in the adjustment process, but with this 
comes more conditionality as an integral pat of the Bank's expanded lending for 
45 
so-called structural adjustment. Finally, much bilateral government-to-
government financing is now subject to diverse forms of macro and 
microeconomic conditionality. 
In so far as creditors were to make major concessions on interest rates and 
increase their loan commitments there would be a legitimate demand for 
conditionality in the adjustment process. In these circumstances, conditionality 
would form part of the necessary quid pro quo in debtor-creditor relations, as it 
provides lenders with an assurance that resources will be used in a way consistent 
with efficient structural adjustment and improved creditworthiness. But in its 
present form conditionality is progressively weighing down the adjustment 
process and fatigue is setting in among the debtors. 
One aspect of the burdensomeness of conditionality relates to the fact that 
there are so many different agencies administering a dose of it, each with its own 
particular view point and interest. Thus, in Latin America it has now become 
increasingly difficult to successfully reconcile the different demands on public 
authorities made by the diverse creditors. 
Furthermore, conventional conditionality also enforces an extreme degree 
of rigidity in economic policy. This is because the economic philosophy 
underlying it is in practice defined externally and has a homogeneous vision of 
the world based on a notion of automatic, dynamic market response to 
equilibrium pricing, liberalization of trade and finance, and privatization of the 
economy. Moreover, this vision of adjustment tends to be mechanically applied 
to any and all debtor countries, with limited attention to structural differences in 
their economies and divergent social preferences.52 Even more significantly, 
conventional conditionality also leaves economic growth as a residual in the 
adjustment process. This, coupled with what some have found to be a 
recessionary bias in conditionality,53 means that the debtors' reward for 
compliance with the demands of their creditors is more often than not economic 
stagnation and aggravation of social tensions. 
The fatigue debtors are experiencing on account of conditionality could be 
alleviated through some commonsense "adjustments" in creditor policy. First, 
Latin American authorities could be given more opportunity to design their own 
conditionality with a view to achieving structural adjustment and attaining 
bilaterally-negotiated targets concerning trade and current-account deficits. 
Secondly, the processes of adjustment and stabilization should be 
considered separately. The practice of demanding external adjustment and 
stabilization simultaneously is extremely onerous for the debtors. On the one 
hand, some external adjustment policies such as devaluation tend in the short 
term to aggravate inflation. On the other, effective external adjustment —the 
creditors' legitimate area of concern— can in practice be achieved even while 
authorities temporarily postpone attention to stabilization matters. The 
shortcomings of the conventional approach, which demands progress on the 
two fronts simultaneously, are attested in the experience of some debtors: 
countries which have been adjusting quite successfully have found their 
rescheduling agreements and IMF finance aborted by a failure to meet one or 
more stabilization targets. 
Thirdly, conditionality in whatever form becomes much more palatable 
when economic growth is an integral and explicit part of the programme. In 
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other words, when adjustment and conditionally are designed around explicit, 
reasonable growth targets it is much easier for authorities to justify policy 
changes to their political constituencies. 
Finally, the introduction of creditor guarantees for reasonable economic 
growth during adjustment raises the issue of adequate amounts of foreign 
exchange. Recent empirical work has demonstrated that one of the major 
reasons for the recessionary bias in conditionality is that it has been accompanied 
by finance which is insufficient to support socially efficient adjustment.54 Thus, 
until creditor governments make a greater financial contribution to the 
adjustment process, conditionality will be perceived by the debtors as a cost with 
very few benefits. 
e) Reducing obstacles to broader multilateral public policy initiatives 
It is thus clear that more comprehensive multilateral public policy is 
needed to end the debt crisis and promote socially efficient adjustment. It is 
frequently objected, however, that proposals for such bold initiatives are 
impracticable because of budgetary constraint in the OECD governments. 
However, this must be weighed against the following considerations. 
First, much of the finance to support a socially efficient adjustment process 
can be secured via contingent liabilities: for example, public guarantees on 
commercial bank lending and support of expanded multilateral lending (where 
paid-in capital is traditionally low). Although these liabilities often have to be 
accounted for in budgetary processes, they will remain largely paper liabilities to 
the extent that more active public policy can prevent the debt problem in Latin 
America from degenerating into a case of severe insolvency. 
Secondly, the commercial banks themselves can be made to bear a greater 
share of the costs of resolving the crisis (and thereby avoid an open bail-out) if 
banking regulation is flexibilized, as pointed out before, and those costs are 
allowed to be distributed over the future in an organized manner. 
Thirdly, since 1982 the debtors have borne an overwhelming proportion 
of the costs of the crisis. This state of affairs has reached its limits, however. A 
greater share of the future costs of the crisis will have to be borne by the creditors 
and their governments. Moreover, the cost of more comprehensive public 
management of the debt problem today will be less than that which will be 
incurred should the debt crisis continue to drift and be determined by the force of 
events. It must be remembered that latent in the crisis are large costs for the 
industrialized countries. These include the deterioration of the real value of the 
creditors' assets in Latin America; should events in the debtor countries cause 
this real value to be translated into book value, destabilizing losses would be 
inflicted on the world's biggest banks.55 
3. Reducing the outward transfer of financial resources: 
unilateral action by the debtor countries 
It has been established that in the present recessionary circumstances of Latin 
America a dollar of foreign financing has strong potential effects on investment 
and economic growth. However, without the help of a comprehensive and 
multilateral anticyclical initiative to reduce debt burdens there is only very 
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limited scope for raising finance through conventional channels. Thus, as long as 
OECD government policy on the debt problem remains hesitant, authorities in 
the debtor countries will be under increasing pressure to consider unilateral 
action that will reduce debt service and release foreign exchange for increasing 
imports and thereby accelerating economic growtte. 
To date, the most frequent method employecTby governments unilaterally 
to relieve the foreign exchange bottleneck has been to begin an informal 
accumulation of arrears on debt service and to enter upon non-compliance with 
the IMF. Over the last three-and-a-half years this strategy has been employed at 
one time or another by most of the Latin American debtors. Generally, countries 
have eventually come to new terms with the creditors and have renewed not only 
payment on the debt but also their programmes with the IMF. However, there 
are an increasing number of exceptions to this rule. 
In the case of several smaller debtors (Nicaragua, Bolivia and Honduras) 
the accumulation of arrears has now evolved into a de facto moratorium. 
Another country, Peru, declared that it would temporarily limit its public debt 
service payments to the equivalent of 1 0 % of its exports. More recently, with the 
fall in petroleum prices, there has been widespread discussion in Latin America 
concerning the possibility of unilaterally establishing an interest rate below 
LIBOR (with capitalization). Meanwhile, the list of countries which have 
rejected, or have expressed intentions to reject, submission to an IMF 
programme continues to expand. 
Another important initiative of the Latin American debtors has been their 
formation of the Cartagena Consensus to co-ordinate regional action bearing on 
the debt problem. T h e group is made up of Ministers of State —Foreign 
Relations and F i n a n c e — of the 11 member countries, who have been meeting 
regularly since June 1984 to discuss solutions to the debt crisis and to promote 
dialogue with the creditor countries. The group has avoided any pretension of 
being a debtors' cartel and has always confirmed Latin America's commitment to 
honour its foreign liabilities. Y e t with time it has become an increasingly 
effective tool for improving the bargaining power of the debtors in their 
negotiations with a co-ordinated creditor cartel for a more equitable distribution 
of the costs of the crisis. In December 1985 the Cartagena Consensus affirmed in 
its Declaration of Montevideo that if international measures to resolve the debt 
problem were not soon forthcoming, the region would be confronted with an 
extremely serious situation which would inevitably compel it to limit its net 
transfers of resources in order to avert an aggravation of social and political 
instability which might forfeit all the ground gained by democratic consolidation 
processes.56 
In this respect, it is useful to remember the lessons of the past. Keynes, in 
his study of World W a r I debts, once observed that even though countries may 
be forced to service heavy debt burdens, a broader policy of enlightened self-
interest on the part of creditor governments would suggest that relief be 
granted.57 This is because an unduly heavy debt burden that stifles legitimate 
national aspirations for growth and development creates resentment, 
undermines international commitments and encourages debtor countries to look 
elsewhere for friends. T o this insight is added the success of the post-World 
W a r II Marshall Plan which, through its emphasis on investment programmes 
48 
and economic growth, promoted political and economic commitments among a 
large group of countries and thereby contributed to one of the most prosperous 
periods in history. The message is clear: it is socially dangerous to permit 
creditors to myopically pursue financial discipline, while there is a very 
considerable pay-off for generosity in the management of excessive debt 
burdens. 
C. A D J U S T M E N T A N D S O C I A L E Q U I T Y 
1. Deterioration of the social situation 
In terms of equity and satisfaction of basic needs, the economic crisis and the 
stabilization and adjustment programmes applied in recent years have notably 
worsened a situation which was already disquieting. This deterioration has, of 
course, differed in the different countries of the region and is likewise due to 
different causes. Nevertheless, generally speaking it has been influenced by two 
factors: in the first place, the slump in the real income of vast sectors of the 
labour force caused by the contraction of economic activity and of employment, 
by restrictive wage policies and by the acceleration of inflation; secondly, the 
decline in public expenditure on education, health and housing which has taken 
place in many countries in consequence of the application of policies designed to 
reduce the fiscal deficit. 
The fall in real wages has been very marked in most of the countries for 
which data are available. As can be seen in table 16, between 1982 and 1985 
average real remunerations rose only in Colombia, Costa Rica and Argentina. In 
Argentina, however, this increase represented no more than a recovery from the 
enormous downward slide that had occurred in the period 1976-1982, while in 
Costa Rica it did not suffice to offset the tremendous reduction undergone by real 
remunerations between 1980 and 1982. On the other hand, in the biennium 
1983-1985, the real value of wages dropped by 4 0 % in Peru, 3 2 % in Mexico, 
18% in Uruguay, 15% in Chile and 7 % in Brazil. During that space of time, the 
pay received by wage-earners in the lower income groups followed similar 
trends: except in Argentina and Colombia, the urban real minimum wage 
contracted sharply in all countries on which data for 1985 are to hand (see 
table 17). This trend is corroborated by the evolution of real wages in the 
construction sector, in which wages are normally higher than the legal minimum 
but lower than those paid in industry (see table 18). 
As already remarked, employment too has followed a very unfavourable 
course. Notwithstanding that in the second half of 1985 unemployment rates 
were reduced in several countries of the region, they were still much higher than 
those recorded before the crisis (see table 4 and 5). Moreover, this increase in 
open unemployment affected young people i-n particular and was accompanied 
by a significant change in the socioeconomic level of the unemployed. Whereas 
traditionally they had been members of the secondary labour force from middle-
income households, nowadays they also include many heads of low-income 
families. For example, it has been estimated that among the poorest 2 0 % of 
families in Santiago, Chile, the proportion of heads of households out of work 
shot up from 10% in 1981 to nearly 2 5 % in 1983.58 This greater incidence of 
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unemployment among heads of households is also reflected in the systematic 
decline recorded between 1979 and 1982 in the percentage of total 
unemployment represented by those seeking work for the first time in 
Colombia, Costa Rica, Chile and Venezuela.59 Lastly, in some countries the 
deterioration of the employment situation was also reflected in a marked 
increase in underemployment. Thus, between 1981 and 1983 employment in the 
urban informal sector —where much of the urban underemployment is 
concentrated— expanded by 4 4 % in Costa Rica, by between 2 0 % and 2 8 % in 
Argentina, Brazil and Peru and by between 9 % and 11% in Bolivia, Mexico and 
Panama.60 
To the repercussions of the increase in unemployment and 
underemployment have been superadded those of the reduction of public 
expenditure in the social sectors. As can be seen in table 19, between 1979 and 
1983 the proportion of total government disbursements allocated to education 
and health shrank in 13 countries of the region and expanded in only four. 
In some cases the effects of these retrenchements have been striking. In 
Costa Rica, for example, reductions in social expenditure resulted in a fall of 
2 0 % between 1979 and 1982, in the number of beneficiaries under school 
feeding and other supplementary feeding programmes, and doubled the number 
of children treated for serious malnutrition in the country's main rehabilitation 
centre between 1981 and 1982.61 In Peru, in its turn, in consequence of a cut in 
public resources the number of mothers receiving care under the Food Aid 
Programme plummeted by 5 4 % between 1981 and 1984, that of nursing 
mothers and pre-school children dropped by 3 7 % and that of children of school 
age fell by 1 7 % , while cases of dysentery skyrocketed from 399 per 100 000 
inhabitants in 1980 to 937 in 1984.62 Lastly, in Bolivia —where social 
expenditure shrank by 2 5 % in real terms between 1981 and 1 9 8 3 — more than 
78 000 children who ought to have been enrolled in basic education in 1983 were 
not entered.63 
However, it is not only in the immediate downturn of indicators like those 
mentioned above that the deterioration in the social situation caused by the crisis 
makes itself felt. Changes like the greater incidence of infectious and contagious 
diseases, the decrease in weight at birth, the larger number of abandoned 
children —all phenomena which tend to become more marked during periods of 
intensive and long-drawn-out recession— not only do immediate harm but also 
produce negative effects of a more lasting character which usually become fully 
apparent after some time has passed.64 This dephasing occurs both because of 
the time it takes for these effects to materialize and because families use their 
resources and adapt their behaviour as far as possible in such a way as to avoid 
lowering still farther their often very precarious level of living.65 
The probable evolution of the poverty situation in Latin America up to the 
end of the century also illustrates the enduring consequences of the crisis. On the 
basis of certain reasonable assumptions it has been calculated that in the year 
2000 there will be 20 million persons in Latin America in a state of poverty, who 
if the crisis had not occurred would have risen above that situation; the total 
number of poor would thus be 170 million (a figure equivalent to 3 0 % of the 
population) instead of 159 million.66 
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Possibly, moreover, the indicators of provision of public services may not 
accurately keep track of the negative changes that have actually taken place. For 
example, in almost all the countries of the region the rate of school attendance 
has gone on rising during the crisis years. Nevertheless, curtailment of the 
resources allocated to education may mean that in some cases this masks 
increased pupil/teacher or pupil/classroom ratios, smaller supplies of 
educational material and possibly less diligence in their class work on the part of 
teachers in consequence of the sharp reductions in their real wages (whether 
because of the loss of incentive or because they have to devote part of their time 
to other gainful activities). 
2. Adjustment and equity: relations and policies 
Considering in the first place, the deterioration that has already occurred in 
living conditions and, secondly, the probability that because of the external 
constraint the economic growth rate in many countries of the region will be 
relatively moderate during what remains of the present decade, while in addition 
the evolution of per capita consumption will be even slower in consequence of 
the need to raise the coefficient of domestic saving, it is obvious that in the future 
a much higher priority will have to be accorded to policies directed towards 
ensuring a more equitable distribution of the fruits of development. In particular 
it will be necessary to give reference to measures designed to reducing critical 
poverty and increasing equality of opportunities. 
If considerations of social equity are to be allotted their proper place in the 
formulation of economic policy, the principles which have traditionally guided 
stabilization and adjustment programmes will have to be appreciably modified, 
and it will also be necessary to see that economic reactivation policies, besides 
promoting the recovery of production and employment, facilitate progress 
towards the shaping of a new development model. To that end it will be 
indispensable to systematically take into account the effects of global 
macroeconomic policies on the situation of the lower income groups and to 
adopt specific measures in the social sphere to alleviate poverty in the short 
term, and over the medium term to promote greater equality of opportunities. 
On the macroeconomic level, policies must be based on the idea that 
attainment of these objectives depends both on a satisfactory structure of the 
various components of the major economic aggregates and on the global 
magnitude of these latter or their rates of increase. For example, if in order to 
restore the basic macroeconomic balances public expenditure must inevitably be 
cut or imports contracted, this should be done not indiscriminately, but 
concentrating on reductions in those items which have less effect on the levels of 
activity and employment and maintaining, as far as possible, those which make a 
more direct contribution to the satisfaction of the basic needs of the poorer 
groups.67 
Where specifically redistributive policies are concerned, they should 
basically include programmes of two types. In the first place, those guaranteeing 
a minimum monetary income, which is essential for the satisfaction of needs 
implying private expenditure (food, clothing, transport, etc.); secondly, direct 
measures adopted by the State to provide an adequate supply of goods and 
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services in key areas such as health, nutrition, education and housing. This 
second group of policies is reflected and crystallized in the State's social 
expenditure proper, whereas the former takes shape through policies designed 
to create jobs and to improve the production capacity of the poorer groups. 
a) Social policies 
As in recent years social public expenditure per capita has been 
considerably reduced in many countries of the region, its expansion is 
particularly necessary. It must be recognized, however, that in the short and even 
in the medium-term public resources will still be severely restricted. Hence the 
crucial importance that will attach to increasing the efficacy of social policies. 
This, in turn, calls for concentration of effort on the restructuring of global social 
expenditure and on enhancing its efficiency as regards benefiting the poorer 
groups. 
Generally speaking, there are four basic mechanisms through which 
greater efficiency in social expenditure can be achieved. They are the following: 
i) rechannelling of global social expenditure into those items which are 
proportionally more favourable to the lower income groups; ii) restructuring of 
expenditure within each social sector, placing the accent on those components 
whereby coverage of the poorer groups can be broadened; iii) adequate 
identification of the groups selected as the targets of social policy, i.e., those that 
it is desired to benefit preferentially; iv) progressive replacement of generalized 
price subsidies on certain goods by direct transfers to the poorer groups. 
In the light of the first of these principles, the emphasis in social 
expenditure should fall on health and education. The information to hand 
testifies to the fact that subsidies granted in these areas benefit mainly the poor 
and middle-income strata (see tables 20 and 21). This is partly because in respect 
of both health and education the higher income groups largely meet their own 
needs through private expenditure, since they can afford the heavier costs 
implied by better-quality services; in the case of health, moreover, it must be 
borne in mind that the members of poorer households are more likely to fall ill. 
On the other hand, as is shown in table 22, the structure of expenditure on social 
security does not primarily benefit the lower income goups, although there is 
plenty of room for improvement in its redistributive effect. 
It is within each social sector, however, that there are greater possibilities 
of significantly increasing the efficacy of social expenditure as regards benefiting 
the lower income groups. Proper exploitation of the technical advances which 
make it possible to give the poorer groups wider coverage and at the same time 
to bring down costs; reallocation of expenditure towards areas inhabited mainly 
by those groups; and utilization of the linkages or positive externalities existing 
between the various components of social expenditure, are three elements which 
may quickly and substantially help to heighten the distributive efficacy of social 
expenditure. 
These possibilities are significantly exemplified in the advantages that can 
be obtained by re-directing expenditure on health from individual curative 
medicine to preventive medicine and the protection and promotion of 
environmental sanitation. The fact is that preventive health techniques require 
far fewer resources, and particularly less expenditure on imported components, 
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than curative health care and, therefore, make it possible to look after a much 
larger number of beneficiaries with a smaller amount of resources.68 
On account of its very low cost in comparison with other options and 
because of the rapidity of its results, as well as in view of the priority that must be 
accorded to children as a target group for social policies, programmes in the 
health area can in many cases be organized around a central nucleus consisting in 
four basic techniques which, as UNICEF puts it, would constitute a veritable 
"pro-children revolution".69 Among such techniques are oral rehydration 
therapy; expansion of mass immunization campaigns; control of children's 
growth by their mothers at home; and diffusion of scientific knowledge on breast 
feeding and proper weaning practices. These techniques are not only extremely 
efficacious, but reinforce one another. A very good case in point is that of oral 
rehydration therapy, which consists in administering a solution of salts and 
sugar to children suffering from diarrhea, to prevent their dehydration and 
subsequent death. In 1982, for example, this therapy was brought into 
generalized use in an area with 64 000 inhabitants in the Eastern region of 
Guatemala, where the main cause of infant mortality was dehydration induced by 
diarrhea. A year later, the number of infant deaths from diarrhea had been 
reduced by one-half. The total cost of putting this campaign into effect 
throughout the country was estimated at less than 5 U.S. cents per person, i.e., 
0 . 2% of the country's total health budget. In Costa Rica, in its turn, the 
implementation of an oral rehydration therapy programme at the end of the last 
decade not only reduced the number of deaths from diarrhea and dehydration by 
9 8 % , but allowed enormous savings to be made. Whereas in 1977 the cost of 
medical attendance and hospital care for cases of diarrhea had been estimated at 
US$ 3.5 million, the entire oral rehydration therapy programme was carried out 
at a cost of US$ 232 000.7 0 
In the sphere of education, too, although such spectacular results in so 
short a time, cannot feasibly be expected, there is also plenty of room to improve 
its distributive effects and at the same time increase the social return on public 
expenditure. In developing countries, the social yield of education is not only 
greater as a rule than that of investment in physical capital, but is also especially 
high in primary education. In practice, in this latter the rate of return tends to 
hover between 2 2 % and 2 7 % , while in higher education it fluctuates around 
12%. 7 1 For this reason, and also in the light of redistributive considerations, it is 
necessary to give special preference to basic education, which clearly benefits the 
poorer children, and to reduce in relative terms the public resources allocated to 
higher education, which, in practice, is much more easily accessible to young 
people from higher-income families.72 Secondly, incentives must be created to 
encourage parents of poor families to keep their children at school, a matter 
which acquires particular importance in periods of intensive and long-drawn-
out economic crises, such as that which the region has been facing in recent years. 
In periods of recession there is generally a rise in the rate of school drop-out 
among children from poorer families, mainly because of the need for the 
children to collaborate in the generation of family income. It is therefore 
indispensable to create incentives that will offset the "loss" of earnings which in 
the short term is implied for a low-income family by keeping a child at school, 
and to subsidize private expenditure relating to school attendance. According to 
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the resources available, the incentives may include free supply of teaching 
materials, clothing and footwear, provision of school breakfasts and lunches, and 
health check-ups for pupils from poorer families. Thus, an educational policy 
which places emphasis on basic education is recommendable on much the same 
grounds as one which accords priority to preventive medicine in the area of 
public health: there is a broad consensus as to its necessity, through it the 
coverage of poorer groups can be extended, and it fulfils the requisite of 
considering children as a focal group for social policy. 
Nutrition is another sector in which public action may mitigate the 
negative social consequences of adjustment policies over the short term and help 
to lay the foundations for more equitable and dynamic development in the 
medium term. "Overcoming deficiencies in nutrition produces stronger, more 
energetic workers, reduces the number of work-days lost because of illness, 
lengthens the working life-span, and increases cognitive skills. The flow of 
earnings is thereby increased above what it would have been in the absence of 
improved nutrition and health."73 And as UNICEF has rightly stressed, "it is 
important also to recognize that these nutritional benefits accrue not only by 
enhancing the productivity of workers in the recognized (or formal sector) part 
of the labour force, but to others also, especially but not only women engaged in 
household activities which may not be counted in national income but which 
greatly influence economic production and household living standards".74 
Furthermore, policies in this field are especially necessary because the 
nutritional state of the population, and in particular that of children, is affected 
when real household income decreases, and because the harm done by 
malnutrition to children and to pregnant or nursing mothers is very serious and 
lasting. Both on this account and in view of the contribution that a better 
nutritional state can make to the improvement of productivity, the maintenance 
of nutritional programmes during the phase of adjustment and their 
reinforcement during that of recovery are indispensable ingredients of more 
equitable development with a more human face. 
Although there are many ways of improving nutritional levels, the most 
efficacious measures are those adopted in conjunction with the provision of 
other services such as those relating to health, education and environmental 
sanitation.75 
The possibilities of restructuring public expenditure in order to improve 
the living conditions of the poorer groups are also important in the case of 
housing. Given the shortage of available resources, this will in many cases 
necessitate limiting the size of the subsidies directly or indirectly granted to the 
middle or upper-middle income groups, which have often been the main 
beneficiaries of government housing programmes, so that these latter can be 
reoriented towards the poorer strata. Likewise, in order to increase the number 
of dwellings, some of the public sector effort must be concentrated on the 
construction of minimum units which are, however, provided with piped water, 
sewerage and electricity services. In addition to the expansion of coverage which 
can be achieved with the same resources, there are three reasons that justify this 
option. In the first place, it is essential that these services be available in housing 
units in order to consolidate and strengthen the favourable effects of 
expenditure on health and nutrition;76 secondly, in the construction of piped 
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water, sewage and electricity networks, economies of scale are considerable; and 
lastly, supplying these minimum units to poorer families, by means of subsidies, 
permits more efficacious harmonization of public expenditure with the families' 
individual effort to complete and gradually enlarge the dwelling around the basic 
nucleus, in accordance with their needs and the resources at their disposal.77 
On the other hand, there are fewer redistributive possibilities in the 
sphere of social security for two reasons: first, because to be eligible for social 
security benefits it is generally necessary to be or to have been a worker in the 
modern sector of the economy, a condition which normally excludes the poorest 
groups; secondly, except in the case of family allowances, benefits under the 
system are calculated in proportion to the insured person's income and, 
therefore, tend to reproduce the inequities of overall income distribution.78 
As already noted, a third requisite for improving the efficiency of social 
expenditure is precise identification of the group which it is intended to benefit. 
Generally speaking, this group is constituted by the poorer population; more 
specifically, special emphasis must be placed on the mother-child binominal. Just 
as evidence has been found of the high rate of return on investment in human 
capital in general,79 so too has it been established that the return on investment 
in children in particular is even better.80 The reason is that in the latter case the 
opportunity cost is less, the period during which benefits are obtained from the 
investment is longer and the earlier years of life are decisive for a person's 
development.81 In addition to these general factors, it is also true that 
investment in poor children is socially more productive than investment in 
children in general, since they are a long way from the stage at which additional 
investment in human capital begins to show diminishing returns. Furthermore, 
where children from the higher income groups are concerned, public 
expenditure takes the place, up to a point, of private outlays which would have 
been made in any event. Lastly, the benefits of action in favour of children and 
young people from lower-income families strongly influence on their 
motivation to redouble their efforts to escape from the hardships of poverty. 
Lastly, the fourth requisite for increasing the redistributive effects of 
public expenditure is the gradual replacement of general subsidies on prices of 
goods and services by a system of direct transfers to the poorer groups. There are 
basically three grounds for this change. In the first place, by lowering the cost of 
purchasing a good for all buyers, irrespectively of whether they are rich or poor, 
price subsidies often mean that a large amount of public resources is wasted as 
regards the objective of benefiting the lower income groups;82 secondly, and 
precisely for the foregoing reason, the negative effect on the purchasing power 
of the poorer groups that would be caused by the withdrawal of the subsidy can 
be neutralized by a direct transfer of income to these groups, a process which 
would signify saving part of the resources that were formerly used to finance the 
subsidy; and lastly, since the goods normally subsidized —fuels, food products— 
are internationally tradeable, the elimination of the subsidy and the consequent 
price increases would promote a reduction of demand for these goods and an 
increase in output, two changes which operate in favour of the adjustment 
process. While these principles of efficiency in subsidies policy are permanently 
valid, they become especially relevant when, as happens in many countries of the 
region today, the fiscal deficit has to be reduced and external adjustment 
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fostered, or when the object pursued is a reactivation which will maintain 
balances that are hard to achieve in the spheres under discussion. 
b) Job creation programmes 
As already noted, one of the major manifestations of the crisis in Latin 
America and the Caribbean has been the increase in unemployment and 
underemployment, a phenomenon which has helped to aggravate long-standing 
structural deficiencies. It goes without saying that the overcoming of these 
weaknesses through the generation of a sufficient number of productive and 
well-paid jobs is an essential requisite for permanently resolving the problems 
of poverty and inequality of opportunities. Obviously, however, this is a long-
term solution, which depends not only on the achievement of a high and 
sustained rate of economic growth, but also on complex processes such as those 
linked to transformations of the structure of production, selection of suitable 
technologies and changes in the growth rate and skills of the labour force. Hence, 
while the adoption of policies aimed at increasing the rate of absorption of 
manpower ¿ver the medium term should not be neglected, it is also necessary to 
apply measures that will contribute to short-term relief of the unemployment 
and underemployment problems. 
Two of the basic instruments that can be used to this end are special job 
creation programmes and subsidies on additional recruitment of labour in the 
private sector.83 
Special employment programmes constitute, in principle, an efficacious 
instrument for coping with poverty and massive underutilization of manpower 
problems in a time of recession.84 These programmes can be drawn up in such a 
way as to afford the more needy groups two kinds of benefit: one —direct and 
individual— is represented by the income in cash or in kind which workers 
employed under the programme receive; and the other —of an indirect and 
social character, but no less efficacious— consists in the improvement in 
environmental living conditions which the programmes may signify for the 
poorer groups, in so far as the work executed under them —construction of 
streets, waterpipes and sewerage networks, schools, clinics, and social, sports 
and recreational centres; environmental sanitation projects; irrigation, 
drainage, reafforestation, levelling and recovery of agricultural land, etc.— are 
concentrated in the urban settlements or neighbourhoods and rural areas where 
the poorer groups live. Secondly, such programmes can be implemented with a 
minimum use of equipment, and, in particular, of imported inputs and 
machinery, a characteristic which makes them particularly attractive in periods 
when foreign exchange is in short supply. Thirdly, the financial cost of these 
programmes is relatively low and so is their cost in terms of seepage, since 
neither the jobs they offer nor the wages they pay are likely to attract persons in 
the middle and upper income groups. Fourthly, they have the advantage of 
bringing about a rapid reduction in unemployment and a similarly immediate 
increase in the earnings of poor families. Lastly, they can be used to improve 
labour skills, thereby helping to raise the productivity of the economy over the 
medium term. To make the most of these potential advantages, however, it is 
necessary to allocate fairly considerable resources to planning and project 
selection a n d , above all, to the organization, management and control of the 
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works involved, requisites which are not always easy to meet, especially over the 
short term. 
It is precisely the possibility of combining an increase in employment with 
the use of management capacity and capital resources which are at present 
temporarily underutilized that constitutes one of the attractions of the 
programmes for subsidizing additional recruitment of manpower. These 
programmes, moreover, have another favourable feature in comparison with 
direct employment programmes, i.e., the contribution they can make to export 
growth and import substitution. This characteristic is especially important in 
periods when insufficient import capacity constitutes the main constraint on 
economic reactivation and growth, and is in favourable contrast with the 
orientation of special employment programmes which, by their very nature, 
tend to be geared primarily to the production of non-tradeable goods and 
services. Even so, policies for subsidizing manpower recruitment are apt to be 
less effective in times of crisis, when enterprises' demand for manpower 
depends more upon their sales volumes and prospects than upon the cost of 
labour. Hence these policies are more efficacious in the phase of recovery, or 
when they are combined with export promotion or import substitution 
programmes. 
c) Policies improving the production capacity of the informal sector 
State action not only may supplement the income of poor families by 
means of social policies or employment programmes, but can and must also see 
to it that their productive capacity is increased. 
Generally speaking, the sectors which should be targets of these policies 
are the urban informal sector, in which between 7 0 % and 9 0 % of the poor in 
Latin American cities find employment,85 and the sector formed by small rural 
producers, who, although they seem to be less affected by the crisis than the 
urban poor,86 formed the poorest group and the one with most precarious living 
conditions in the society. However, given on the one hand the enormous 
magnitude of these groups' unsatisfied needs, and, on the other, the shortage of 
available resources, it will be necessary to concentrate action in this sphere on a 
subgroup in each of the said sectors. These subgroups comprise small 
manufacturers and producers of non-personal services in the urban informal 
sector, and producers of internationally tradeable agricultural goods in the rural 
area. If well-directed government support could be relied on, the greater relative 
dynamism of each of these subgroups in its respective area would not only enable 
it to make the most of the role which, within its limitations, it can play in the 
reactivation process, but would also allow it gradually to absorb workers in the 
less productive segments (small shopkeepers or street vendors and workers in 
personal services in the urban informal sector, and producers of non-tradeable 
goods in the rural area). In this way, one of the important effects of the policy 
would be to initiate and promote a necessary structural change. 
There are basically three policy measures designed to improve the 
production capacity of informal urban producers and small rural producers: first, 
the provision of an adequate supply of credit, which entails the creation of non-
traditional mechanisms enabling the existing financial institutions to extend 
loans to producers of this type, and the establishment of new special loan and 
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guarantee funds; secondly, the rechannelling of a part of public sector demand 
towards the purchase of goods and services which can be produced at 
competitive costs in the informal sector (uniforms, furniture, school textbooks, 
repair services); thirdly, provision of technical assistance and opening-up and 
strengthening of marketing channels, whereby output can be increased and the 
sale of goods produced by the informal sector can be facilitated. 
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IV. S T A B I L I Z A T I O N A N D ECONOMIC A C T I V I T Y 
A. T H E C H A L L E N G E OF S T A B I L I Z A T I O N 
One of the most serious problems currently facing many Latin American 
economies is their extraordinarily high rate of inflation. Hence, along with the 
preservation of an adequate external balance and the resumption of the growth 
process, bringing down inflation is both a priority objective and a fundamental 
challenge of economic policy in many countries of the region. 
Theoretically, there is no reason why the attainment of this objective need 
inevitably cause a recession. On the contrary, if —to use a well-known 
expression— inflation can be described as a process in which "too much money 
is chasing after too few goods", it is hardly logical to try to reduce inflation by 
producing even fewer goods, as occurs during a recession. If this is often what has 
occurred in practice, it is because of the faulty design or implementation of 
stabilization programmes, not becaused it is theoretically inevitable. 
Strictly speaking, from an analytical standpoint the reduction of inflation 
"merely" requires that the growth rate of the nominal value of the main 
economic variables (such as the exchange rate, interest rates and wages) be 
slowed down as evenly as possible. The reduction of inflation does not require 
that production be lowered nor that basic changes be made in economic variables 
in real terms. This is certainly one aspect in which the process of price 
stabilization differs from that of adjustment to external disequilibrium; in effect, 
to the extent that adjustment calls for a radical turnabout in the trade balance 
real costs will ensue, for such a turnabout in many instances will entail a decrease 
in the domestic supply of goods and services available, which is ultimately what 
determines the population's real standard of living.87 
That price stabilization not require recession is not merely a theoretical 
fine point. Although such cases are the exception rather than the rule, 
expansionary stabilization programmes have indeed been carried out, inter alia: 
the abrupt halt put to hyperinflation after the First World War in some 
countries,88 and, more recently, the cases of Indonesia,89 which managed to lower 
its inflation from 1 0 0 0 % per year to 10% between 1965 and 1970 without 
sacrificing growth; Uruguay, which reduced inflation from 125% to 2 0 % 
between 1968 and 1969 without falling into a recession and which slowed the 
rate of increase in consumer prices in consumer prices from 107% to 4 6 % 
between 1974 and 1978 while, at the same time, expanding overall production by 
an average annual rate of 4 % ; Bolivia, which managed to reduce its inflation 
from 3 9 % to 5.5% between 1974 and 1976 while growing by nearly 7 % per 
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year; and Costa Rica, where inflation plunged from somewhat more than 100% 
in the third quarter of 1983 to 10% in late 1984 while the country's gross 
domestic product grew 6%. 
To be sure, examples of the opposite phenomenon abound but, as 
previously mentioned, they are usually the result of poor design —in the case of 
both traditional stabilization programmes as well as those whose sole purpose is 
to repress inflation— or of faulty implementation. 
B. T H E F A I L U R E OF T R A D I T I O N A L 
S T A B I L I Z A T I O N P R O G R A M M E S 
1. Causes 
One may well ask why, if it is not inherently necessary, have stabilization 
programmes in the past in fact tended to lower output, and often by a 
considerable amount. 
It is well known, of course, that if a country wants to bring down its rate of 
inflation, it needs to reduce the growth rate of nominal aggregate demand. This 
is not enough, however, since the deceleration in nominal demand may either 
have an impact on the rate of inflation (the desired result) or on the growth rate 
of production (an undesired result). Indeed, one of the main problems of present 
macroeconomic theory is how to explain the extent to which a decrease in 
demand divides itself between falls in prices or in production. In practice, this 
division depends on the specific policies adopted to stabilize prices as much as it 
does on inflationary expectations. If the various economic agents' expectations 
are substantially the same in this regard and, above all, if they are in line with the 
inflation target implicit in the country's monetary and fiscal policies, then the 
impact of a deceleration in nominal aggregate demand will fall largely on prices. 
On the other hand, if a considerable disparity exists between the public's 
inflationary expectations and the inflation target inherent in monetary and fiscal 
policy, the slowdown of demand will also fall on production, causing recession. 
How inflationary expectations are handled is thus central for the success of 
a stabilization programme. Indeed, the failure of such programmes in Latin 
America has been largely due to the fact that they have been designed to have an 
effect only on demand or only on costs and have either neglected to steer 
expectations in the necessary direction or have attempted to control only some 
of the variables influencing them. 
It is surely not surprising that stabilization programmes aimed at reducing 
inflation simply through price controls have failed since these have not, 
simultaneously, curbed monetary expansion to the necessary extent. Such 
programmes attack the symptoms rather than the causes of inflation; in such 
cases inflation is held down temporarily, but at the cost of shortages, balance-of-
payment crises or a combination of both. Under such circumstances, inflation 
will inevitably make a reappearance after a time and, when it does, the rate of 
inflation is often even higher than before. 
Programmes which have focused exclusively on limiting monetary 
expansion and reducing the fiscal deficit have not generally been successful 
either. While there is no theoretical or empirical doubt that in order to reduce 
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inflation it is essential to reduce monetary expansion as well, a policy which 
achieves the latter but without controlling cost pressures risks recession. If, for 
example, economic agents expect inflation to be greater than the inflation target 
implicit in monetary policy, prices will be set at a level higher than that which 
would permit total potential production to be purchased with the amount of 
money available. In such circumstances, the government will be faced with the 
dilemma of either maintaining its restrictive monetary policy (and thus bringing 
on a recession) or of abandoning its stabilization goal, thereby ratifying the 
economic agents' expectations of higher inflation through a passive monetary 
policy. This crucial dilemma is the reason why stabilization programmes whose 
basic focus has been the restriction of aggregate demand have often brought on 
contraction of economic activity or have had to be abandoned after a time. This 
has been particularly common in countries with a long history of inflation, 
because such a tradition generates expectations and mechanisms which, 
although they make it economically-and politically easier to "live with" steadily 
and rapidly rising prices, also make it more difficult and costly to apply measures 
designed to reduce inflation. 
This also explains the failure of stabilization programmes which, in 
addition to holding down demand, have controlled or frozen only one key price. 
For example, at different times various countries have attempted to curb 
inflation by applying restrictive monetary and wage policies. However, since 
they have allowed all other prices to be set freely and have not taken steps to 
guide expectations, inflation has decreased much more slowly than nominal 
wages, thus giving rise to Keynesian recessions, i.e., recessions due basically to a 
drop in real demand. In such cases, the social costs entailed in the failure of a 
stabilization programme are twofold, because in addition to a lower level of 
economic activity, income distribution also worsens. 
In still other cases, attempts have been made to reduce inflation by means 
of exchange policies. To this end, exchange rates have been readjusted, not on 
the basis of past or present inflation, but rather on the basis of the inflation 
target set for some future period, in an effort to slow down the growth rate of 
prices and costs while, at the same time, guiding and equalizing economic agents' 
expectations of future inflation. In these instances the main cause of failure has 
been the fact that the rate of price increases for import-competing goods and 
non-tradeable goods and services declined much more slowly than the rate of 
devaluation. In practice, and in contrast to what would be expected to occur 
according to the "law of one price", imports initially tended to be sold at prices 
similar to those of their nearest domestic substitutes prior to the liberalization of 
trade rather than at their long-term value (the international price plus tariffs) In 
other words, at least at first, the convergence of the prices of domestic products 
and imports was "upwards" (towards domestic prices) rather than "downwards" 
(towards the international price). The resulting.lag in the exchange rate often 
tended to generate a considerable disequilibrium in the balance of payments and 
a decline in economic activity. Initially, both of these phenomena were offset by 
substantial inflows of capital, but the persistent drop in the real exchange rate 
increasingly eroded the credibility of the exchange policy and also played a part 
in the gradual but steady displacement by imports of the domestic products 
which had to compete in the local market with such imports. As a result, levels of 
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activity and employment declined and the pressure for a devaluation mounted. 
As it became evident that the exchange policy could not be maintained without 
massive external borrowing, capital inflows also diminished. Thus, in the end, 
the exchange rate had to be sharply increased, and there was a consequent 
upsurge in inflation as well. 
2. Analytical implications 
In large part, traditional programmes have been based on erroneous analytical 
concepts of the inflationary process, especially when such processes have 
reached a certain level of persistence and intensity. In fact, neither the demand-
pull nor the cost-push theory of inflation make an adequate distinction between 
the initial stimulus which sets off inflation or speeds it up and the mechanism or 
spiral which keeps inflation going once it has started. Strictly speaking, the 
distinction between demand-pull and cost-push inflation is only relevant for 
countries in which there are occasional outbreaks of inflation. In contrast, it is 
almost irrelevant for countries where inflation is a persistent phenomenon. In 
these cases, the debate regarding these two theories about the origin of inflation 
is not only fruitless but has often resulted in the implementation of poorly-
designed stabilization programmes. In fact, when inflation is intense and 
continuous it is almost impossible to distinguish between demand-pull and cost-
push pressures. At the most, phases can be identified in which one or the other 
appears to have predominated, since, in practice, inflation becomes a spiral in 
which both demand and costs are continually rising and in which its intensity is 
also influenced to a decisive degree by expectations. Moreover, expectations 
affect both demand (for goods and for money) and costs (wages, interest rates, 
the exchange rate). 
Strictly speaking, if increases in price levels were due only to excessive 
spending, as is postulated in the demand-pull theory, rapid inflation could not 
exist at the same time as a deep recession, whereas, in reality, this situation 
occurs quite frequently. Such situations, however, cannot be convincingly 
explained by cost-push theories of inflation either, since according to these 
theories, a recession would be due to cost rigidities and, especially to wage 
inflexibility. Yet, if there is any outstanding feature of Latin America's 
experience during the past ten years, it is not the rigidity of relative prices but, on 
the contrary, their astounding variability. Indeed, the terms of trade have 
fluctuated by as much as 4 0 % in a single year; the ratio between the prices of 
tradeable and non-tradeable goods (which is one means of measuring the real 
exchange rate) has varied by up to 50% in a single year in various countries 
while, in relation to wages, real increases in exchange rates have been even 
greater (as much as 100%); in cases where an abrupt liberalization of financial 
systems has been carried out, real interest rates have gone from an annual 
average of -40% to over + 3 0 % in a very short time; finally, as for the much-
feared pressure exerted by wages —which is often pointed to as the sole or main 
cause of unemployment and recession— it should be remembered that in a 
number of the countries of the region, real wages have fallen by up to one-third 
in the space of just one year. 
62 
Thus, the truth is that the really significant type of rigidity (at least in 
countries with persistent inflation) is not so much of an institutional, trade 
union or political sort but is rather due to the rigidity of the inflationary 
expectations generated by the very process of continuous price increases. As a 
result of these expectations, almost all the factors which influence prices and 
costs (wages, rents, taxes, interest rates, exchange rates, credits) are adjusted 
either formally —through contracts or laws— or informally —through the 
market— in anticipation of future inflation.90 
If expectations of future inflation are correct, they do not create major 
disturbances in production or income distribution, this explains how a number 
of countries in the region have "lived with" severe inflation for many years 
without their economic growth being seriously affected. However, if the 
authorities try to reduce inflation more quickly than economic agents feel is 
possible, then their stabilization programmes will become ineffective: as already 
noted, if inflation is expected to be higher than the rate on which the 
stabilization programme is based, then part of the deceleration of nominal 
aggregate demand will affect production and a recession may ensue. This is why 
the most adverse effects associated with inflation tend to be produced either 
when it speeds up suddenly or when the authorities try to reduce it to a level 
lower than what the public expects. 
This is also why the unemployment which results from stabilization 
programmes is not only or even mainly due to an increase in real wages. It is true 
that if the rise in nominal wages (whether because of expectations prevailing in 
the labour market or because a formal system of indexation exists) is greater 
than the increase in price levels provided for by the stabilization policy, real 
wages will climb and will tend to generate unemployment (of a neo-classical 
type) just as cost-push theoreticians fear. Nevertheless, experience 
demonstrates that unemployment and recessions can occur when real wages 
drop as well: if wages are adjusted in accordance with the inflation target which 
has been established, but producers expect higher inflation and set their prices 
accordingly, real wages will decrease, and in consequence, demand and sales of 
non-tradeable goods will also dwindle. Therefore, as long as this imbalance in 
the market for goods persists, production will drop and unemployment will rise. 
This will occur despite the decline in real wages, because the sectors oriented 
towards meeting domestic demand (which usually account for more than half of 
total production) will have a greater incentive to lay off personnel in response to 
the drop in sales than they will to hire more workers because their wages are 
lower. 
C. T H E COSTS O F I N F L A T I O N A N D T H E RISKS OF 
RECESSION I N V O L V E D IN S T A B I L I Z A T I O N 
Although in theory it is possible to reduce inflation without causing a recession 
(and this is what has in fact occurred in nearly half of the stabilization 
programmes applied in Latin America during the past 20 years), most of the 
successes in this respect have been achieved in countries facing either a sudden 
rise in inflation or a sharp increase in an already acute inflationary process 
tending to hyperinflation. In countries with long-standing and relatively stable 
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inflation, however, it has proved more difficult to make a significant reduction in 
the rate of price increases while also maintaining or expanding economic 
activity. 
The different results achieved in these two types of cases are not due to 
mere chance. They can be explained analytically in terms of the very different 
costs of inflation and the similarly disparate risks involved in stabilization 
programmes, depending on the intensity and persistence of inflationary 
processes. The disadvantages or harmful effects of inflation are greatest in two 
types of situations. The first is when an outbreak of inflation of some intensity 
occurs in a situation in which price levels have traditionally been stable; this 
might be termed "occasional" inflation. The second is when an already high rate 
of inflation speeds up sharply, bringing with it the danger of hyperinflation. The 
costs of inflation are much lower, however, when inflation has persisted for a 
long time and its rate, although high, is relatively stable. 
When outbreaks of inflation occur, the costs of inflation are primarily 
related to the distortions in the allocation of resources and in income distribution 
caused by the sudden and unexpected increase in prices. This is due to the fact 
that, when the rate of price increases suddenly speeds up in a situation where 
there is no "tradition of inflation", not all prices will rise at the same speed and 
not all social groups will be affected in the same way by these increases, nor will 
they have an equal ability to protect themselves from the effects. Thus, for 
example, if wages lag behind the overall movement in prices, a regressive 
redistribution of income will occur; if nominal interest rates do not keep pace 
with the new rate of inflation, saving is discouraged and unwarranted transfers 
of income from lenders to borrowers will occur; if the exchange rate falls behind, 
this will create incentives for imports and disincentives for exports which will 
tend to accentuate external imbalances. Naturally enough, the greater the 
intensity and unexpectedness of such an outbreak of inflation, the worse these 
problems will tend to be. 
If inflation continues for several consecutive periods, however, the various 
economic agents and social groups will come to regard such ongoing price 
increases, rather than price stability, as being the "normal" situation. As a result, 
sooner or later they will develop mechanisms for protecting their real income 
against the effects of inflation. Hence, the key prices of the economy (wages, 
exchange rates, interest rates) will progressively be "indexed", as will taxes, 
rents and transactions involving installment payments. When this occurs, the 
adverse impact of inflation on the allocation of resources and the distribution of 
income will no longer be proportional to its rate (as is the case with occasional 
inflation) but rather to the differences between the expected and actual rates of 
inflation. When such differences are small —as normally occurs when the rate 
of inflation has shown no major variation for several years— the actual increases 
in prices will tend to be in keeping with economic agents' expectations and the 
negative repercussions of inflation will be slight. Thus, if an economy is 
extensively indexed, the costs of persistent and relatively stable inflation will be 
lower than those of occasional inflation, even if the rate of inflation is higher in 
the former case than in the latter. In this event, as attested to by the experience of 
various countries in the region, inflation will be a socially tolerable process 
which it is politically possible to "live with" and which is compatible with 
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satisfactory economic growth rates and acceptable margins of external 
imbalance. 
Nevertheless, even in an economy with broad-based and widespread 
mechanisms of indexation, the costs of inflation will rise if prices begin to climb 
at a much faster rate, and if the economy slips towards hyperinflation the costs 
will become socially intolerable. Under these circumstances, the ever-greater 
erosion of the real value of any item priced in nominal terms means that 
increasingly large and frequent adjustments will have to be made in wages, the 
exchange rate, interest rates, rents and other contracts: rather than being 
modified once a year, they will have to be adjusted every six months, every 
quarter or even every month. This shortening of the terms of contracts 
complicates economic calculations enormously and makes planning almost 
impossible. Furthermore, when indexation is based on such short periods, any 
outside disturbance which causes or calls for a change in relative prices helps to 
spark a rapid increase in the rate of inflation and adds to its momentum. What is 
more, as inflation speeds up, economic agents attempt to dispose of their liquid 
balances ever more rapidly by purchasing goods or foreign exchange. Prices and 
the exchange rate therefore increase much faster than the money supply, and 
money ceases to perform its prime function as a means of payment. This, in turn, 
tends to result in a regression towards barter and further impedes the operation 
of the economic system. 
For the above reasons, the costs of inflation usually take on the sinusoidal 
form shown in figure 15. During an initial stage, when inflation is a recent and 
unexpected phenomenon, its costs tend to be proportional to the rate of price 
increases. As inflation becomes persistent and, especially, if its rate is relatively 
stable, its costs diminish, primarily as a result of the emergence and expansion of 
indexation mechanisms. Its costs will begin to rise once again, however, if 
inflation goes beyond a critical threshold, after which it leads to a continual 
shortening of readjustment periods, thereby prompting the flight of capital and 
rendering economic calculations and planning virtually impossible.91 
However, the chances of a stabilization plan being successful, for a given 
intensity and duration of the inflationary process involved, are not only 
dependent on the different levels and types of costs which inflation has during 
various phases or stages, but also by the risks of recession associated with the 
application of such a programme. 
Generally speaking, these risks tend to be greater in the case of persistent 
inflation; in such cases, as has already been explained, inflationary expectations 
are very deeply-rooted and mechanisms of indexation exist which do a great deal 
to boost the momentum of the inflationary process. Hence, under such 
circumstances (as will be discussed in more detail later on), a stabiization 
programme which fails to guide expectations of inflation and which does not 
achieve a proper alignment between the -reduction of the growth rate of 
aggregate demand, on the one hand, and a simultaneous and relatively even 
deceleration in the various components of costs, on the other hand, runs the risk 
of causing a drop in economic activity. 
This risk is lower with occasional inflation, in which, precisely because of 
the absence of a long history of inflation, there are no indexation mechanisms 
and most economic agents base their actions on the assumption that the normal 
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situation is one of stability rather than of ongoing price increases. The risk of a 
stabilization programme causing a decrease in economic activity is also lower 
when its aim is to reduce hyperinflation, mainly because of the greater co-
operation and support which the various social groups are willing to lend an 
anti-inflationary policy under such circumstances. The risks of a stabilization 
programme causing a recession therefore tend to follow a path similar to an 
inverted "U", as shown in figure 15. 
The implications of the preceding analysis for economic policy are clear. 
Due, in part, to the fact that the costs of occasional inflation are high and are 
proportional to the intensity of the inflationary outbreak and, in part, to the fact 
that in such cases the risk of a stabilization programme prompting a drop in 
economic activity is lower, the decision to fight occasional inflation should be 
taken quickly in order to prevent a prolongation of the inflationary process and 
to avert the generation of indexation mechanisms and inflationary expectations 
which would later make it much more difficult to reduce the rate of price 
increases. 
The enormous economic costs of hyperinflation and the threat it 
represents to political and institutional stability also make it clear why there can 
be no delay in applying a stabilization programme in such a situation. 
An anti-inflationary policy is of lower priority and stabilization 
programmes tend to be postponed, however, when inflation is stable, even if it is 
high and persistent. As already explained, under such circumstances the 
existence of a broad-based and widely-used system of indexation markedly 
reduces the adverse effects of inflation, but it also increases the risk that a 
stabilization policy will lead to a recession. In practice, these two factors tend to 
lessen both the pressure on the government to implement an anti-inflationary 
programme and the amount of support which the better organized social groups 
are actually willing to give such a programme. 
D. S T A B I L I Z A T I O N POLICIES A N D E C O N O M I C A C T I V I T Y 
In order to be successful, any stabilization programme must include policies 
designed to control aggregate demand, rectify relative prices, and guide 
expectations. However, the relative importance of each of these policies will 
vary depending on whether the situation is one of occasional inflation, persistent 
but relatively stable inflation, or acute and sharply accelerating inflation. In 
general, the more intense the inflation, the less important it is to correct relative 
prices since, in this case, the really crucial tasks are to guide expectations and 
control total demand. On the other hand, in combatting occasional inflation, it is 
essential to correct relative prices and to bring aggregate demand quickly under 
control in order to ward off inflationary expectations and prevent the creation of 
indexation mechanisms. Finally, when faced with persistent but relatively stable 
inflation, the most important step is to destroy its momentum; in order to do so, 
the reduction in the growth rate of total demand must be coupled with a 
simultaneous and relatively even slowdown in the various components of costs. 
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1. Occasional inflation 
Although this is what may be termed "textbook" inflation, it is becoming less 
frequent in Latin America. Its analysis continues to be important, however, 
especially in order to interpret the Central American and Caribbean economies' 
experiences with inflation, since, until relatively recently these countries were 
able to maintain notably stable price levels for very extended periods of time. 
This has changed in the past few years, however, as a result of major 
outbreaks of inflation in more than a few of these countries. The reasons for 
these outbreaks have varied. Sometimes they have stemmed from an excessive 
growth of total demand that has been financed by a very considerable increase in 
money supply or by an expansion of foreign indebtedness which cannot be 
sustained over the long term. In other cases, inflation has been sparked by sharp 
drops in the supply of agricultural products (with a consequent increase in food 
prices) or by rising costs resulting from increases in the international prices of 
widely-used imports or from devaluations carried out in response to a 
deterioration in the country's terms of trade. 
Naturally, the extent to which it is necessary to apply each basic 
component of a stabilization programme (controlling aggregate demand, 
correcting key prices which have lagged behind, guiding expectations) will vary 
according to the cause of inflation. Thus, if an outbreak of inflation has been 
caused by excessive domestic spending, a strict control of demand will be of 
fundamental importance, although if the rate of price increases is significantly 
higher than international inflation, the control of aggregate demand should 
probably be coupled with a devaluation in order to regain international 
competitiveness.92 
However, if the outbreak has been caused by a disturbance in supply or, 
above all, by an increase in the exchange rate, a very severe restriction of 
aggregate demand may have recessionary effects; since a devaluation tends to 
push costs up, if nominal aggregate demand remains constant it will not be 
sufficient to buy up full employment output at the new price levels, and 
economic activity will therefore fall. Hence, in order to avoid such a decrease, 
nominal aggregate demand will have to be raised enough to permit all 
production to be sold at the new price levels, but not so much as to produce an 
additional rise in price levels, which would cancel out the desired devaluation in 
real terms. 
A situation similar to that caused by an increase in the exchange rate, albeit 
less acute, occurs when certain commodity prices which have been held down 
(oil, food, public services) are decontrolled. The immediate effect of this is, of 
course, an increase in the prices of these goods and services. If the demand for 
them is relatively inelastic, then the demand for other goods will decrease and 
their production will also probably drop.93 Therefore, in order to avoid a 
recession, decontrol should be accompanied by an increase in aggregate demand, 
even at the cost of allowing prices to stabilize at a higher level than before. 
In addition to accurately identifying the reason for the outbreak of 
inflation and attacking its specific cause, the stabilization of price levels in a 
situation of occasional inflation calls for measures to discourage expectations of 
continuing inflation. Thus, an essential step is to supplement policies for 
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controlling aggregate demand and correcting price lags with an incomes and 
price policy. Such a policy must establish a set of relative prices which are not 
only in keeping with the new conditions —i.e., that are such as to ensure that 
there will be neither a recession (excess supply) nor a supply shortage (excess 
demand)— but which also are viewed as credible by the economic agents. If this 
latter requirement is not fulfilled, economic agents will base their actions on the 
assumption that inflation is going to continue and will therefore help to ensure 
that the outbreak of inflation actually does lead to persistent inflation. 
How strict the incomes and prices policy should be will depend on the 
flexibility of prices and wages; the less flexible they are, the stricter the policy 
will have to be.94 Because of this, and depending on how pressing the need to 
curb inflationary expectations is, it may be preferable either to establish a 
(temporary) policy under which prices and wages are fixed and controlled or to 
control only public-sector prices and wages while laying down guidelines 
indicating the desired evolution of private-sector prices and wages. 
2. Persistent inflation 
As previously' noted, when inflation continues for several years, expectations 
that it is going to persist will be generated and will become ingrained. If 
mechanisms of indexation are widespread and if the future rate of inflation is 
gauged correctly, variations in relative prices will diminish and the transfer of 
income entailed by occasional or unexpected inflation will be reduced; as a result, 
many of the evils or costs typically associated with inflation will be lowered. 
Unfortunately, generalized expectations of inflation and widespread indexation 
not only make "living with" inflation more tolerable, but also make it more 
difficult to eradicate. Under these circumstances, any stabilization policy 
designed to slow down the rate of price increases by an amount greater than 
what the public believes possible will run the risk of causing a recession. Thus, in 
attempting to reduce persistent inflation, it is essential to guide expectations in 
such a way as to lower the rate of increase of key prices as simultaneously as 
possible, to the target level of inflation and to ensure that this slowdown is 
compatible with programmed monetary and fiscal restrictions. 
a) The simultaneous slowdown of key prices 
Decreasing the growth rate of the money supply and reducing the fiscal 
deficit constitute, in general, a necessary but not sufficient, condition for a 
successful stabilization programme. This is because, in practice, inflationary 
expectations do not respond immediately when restrictive monetary and fiscal 
policies begin to be applied. At first, the public is skeptical and wants to see 
results before believing that the authorities can bring inflation down to the 
target level. This is not unreasonable: after so many years of high inflation and 
after seeing numerous stabilization plans end in failure, economic agents have 
ample reason to doubt that a new anti-inflationary programme will be 
successful. Moreover, if they are to be persuaded to adjust their prices in 
accordance with the targeted rates of inflation, it is not enough for each of them 
to believe in the consistency and internal logic of the stabilization programme. 
Each agent must also think that all other agents are going to act in the same way. 
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If an economic agent believes that others are going to raise their prices by an 
amount greater than the programme's target level, then that agent will also set 
his prices at a level higher than that consistent with the target level of inflation. 
In this case, the restriction of nominal aggregate demand will have an adverse 
effect on production and inflation will slow down less than had been planned. 
This is why stabilization programmes, if they are to achieve their objectives and 
avoid a recession, must —in addition to controlling monetary expansion and the 
fiscal deficit— include a policy for simultaneous and evenly-applied 
"decelerated" indexing to guide or control the movement of the nominal values 
of variables such as wages, the exchange rate, interest rates and some key prices 
so that they will adjust (or decelerate) to the rate of inflation on which the 
monetary and fiscal policy is based. 
Thus, in contrast to the direction taken by orthodox stabilization 
programmes, what would initially have to be done would be to control prices 
rather than free them. However, in contrast to what tends to occur with 
traditional price controls, the purpose of doing so would not be to repress 
inflation, but rather to move the key variables to their final equilibrium levels as 
quickly as possible. 
b) Consistency between the policy on key prices and monetary/fiscal control 
Just as it is not sufficient to try to control the expansion of aggregate 
demand by means of monetary and fiscal policy, neither is it sufficient merely to 
control prices and guide expectations: if, while controlling prices, an 
expansionary monetary and fiscal policy is continued, inflation will be held 
repressed but not eliminated. Under such circumstances, inflationary pressures 
will, for a time, not be manifested in an increase in price levels but rather in 
shortages, the appearance of black markets and a balance-of-payments 
disequilibrium; they will ultimately, lead, however, to another acceleration of 
inflation. One essential component of a successful stabilization programme is 
therefore to control monetary and fiscal expansion, because this fuels — 
although it does not necessarily cause— every inflationary process. 
Not just any arbitrary target for the slowdown in inflation will do. It must 
be compatible with the monetary and fiscal controls which can actually be 
applied. If it is not, the programme will lack consistency and credibility, and 
expectations will ultimately push prices up above the programmed level. For 
example, if the monetary base is equivalent to 10% of the gross domestic 
product, if the projected fiscal deficit is 5 % of the GDP, and if it can only be 
financed through Central Bank loans, then the monetary base will have to 
expand by 5 0 % merely to cover the public-sector imbalance. Thus, unless there 
is a considerable increase in the demand for money or a very marked expansion 
of economic activity, inflation could not be cut to much less than 50% annually. 
A faster deceleration of key prices would not be consistent with the monetary 
and fiscal programme and would ultimately fail. 
c) The correction of price lags 
Another real difficulty facing stabilization programmes is that in most 
inflationary processes (except in the extreme, and improbable, case of a perfectly 
stable rate of inflation) the movement of prices, although widespread, is not 
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even. Thus, often as a consequence of previous unsuccessful stabilization efforts, 
the following values may lag significantly behind other prices: i) the exchange 
rate (which will have an adverse impact on the balance of payments), ii) the rates 
charged for public services (which will widen the fiscal deficit), iii) agricultural 
prices (which will slow the growth of staple food production), iv) interest rates 
(which will hamper an efficient allocation of investment and prompt a large-
scale and unwarranted redistribution of income away from savers and towards 
debtors), and v) real wages (which will produce a regressive income 
redistribution and will tend to result in a contraction of those productive sectors 
aimed at the domestic market). 
Thus, in order for a stabilization programme to have a lasting and effetive 
impact rather than merely producing a temporary reduction in inflation, these 
imbalances in relative prices must be corrected.. Unfortunately, the adjustment 
of prices which have lagged behind or which have been held down may be 
(mistakenly) seen by economic agents as an indicator of future inflation rather 
than simple as a corrective adjustment. If this happens, the level of inflation 
which is expected may be higher than the inflation target inherent in monetary 
and fiscal policy. For this reason, the number and size of such corrective 
adjustments should be kept to a minimum, for if there are many or very large 
adjustments, it is unlikely that the desired reduction in inflation can be obtained. 
Therefore, if the price lags do not jeopardize basic aspects of the economy (such 
as, for example, its external balance) it may also be preferable, especially if 
inflation is very high, to bring about a uniform reduction in the rate of increase of 
all prices until inflation is brought down to more manageable levels, and then to 
make corrective adjustments. On the other hand if the lags are very large and 
their correction cannot be put off it would appear best to correct the greatest lags 
first and only later to apply a programme for the simultaneous de-indexation of 
key prices. 
3. Hyperinflation 
As in the cases discussed above, controlling or halting an acute and mounting 
process of inflation or hyperinflation calls for the application of policies 
designed to restrict the growth rate of total demand, guide expectations and 
correct price lags. In this case, however, the first two policies take on special 
importance and special dimensions. 
a) Guiding expectations 
When the rate of inflation is not only very high but is also rising sharply 
and continuously, most prices begin to be adjusted according to an ever-smaller 
number of inflation indicators. In fact, under these circumstances the only 
indicators which are used for this purpose are those whose variations are very 
frequent, rapid and widely-publicized (e.g., the consumer price index, the open-
market interest rate or the exchange rate on the parallel market). 
If inflation speeds up even further, so that contracts come to be readjusted 
at intervals of less than one month, not even the consumer price index will serve 
these purposes, since it is usually published only on a monthly basis and with a 
slight time-lag. Under these conditions, most price adjustments are made on the 
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basis of variations in some key price which is free of controls, changes daily and 
for which information on its fluctuations is rapidly and readily available. 
Typically, the key price which is used is the exchange rate on the free market. 
If this extreme is reached, then in order to control inflationary 
expectations and eliminate the momentum of inflation it will be essential to 
control the price of the dollar or to stabilize it at a level that is calculated to 
balance the supply and demand for foreign exchange. If this is done, and for the 
same reason that increases in domestic prices and inflationary expectations were 
previously adjusted in accordance with the ongoing rise in the parallel-market 
exchange rate, they will now begin to stabilize and the rate of inflation will 
therefore drop off sharply. 
This process of winding down expectations —although it is of critical 
importance for the initial break-up of the inflationary spiral— does not, 
however, guarantee the success of the stabilization programme. In order to 
stabilize or moderate the increase in the exchange rate over an extended period 
rather than just temporarily, it is necessary, firstly, to have or obtain an adequate 
level of international reserves and, secondly, to apply fiscal, monetary and 
incomes policies which will expand nominal demand in line with the 
programme's inflation target. It is therefore essential that the lull in inflation 
which occurs immediately after the stabilization of exchange parities and the 
subsidence of expectations should be used to reduce the fiscal imbalance and the 
inflationary pressures exerted by the credit system as much as possible. 
If inflation is very high and still mounting but has not reached such an 
extreme that virtually all prices are adjusted at very short intervals in accordance 
with the variations in the exchange rate on the parallel market, reducing 
inflationary expectations will also require, in addition to the stabilization of the 
exchange rate, an administrative freeze for a certain length of time of other key 
prices of the economy including wages. This course of action will have the same 
effect of sharply diminishing economic agents' inflationary expectations and 
making them mutually compatible, thereby fulfilling a function analogous to 
that performed by the setting of the exchange rate in the case previously 
analysed. Like the latter measure, however, even in the best of cases a freeze can 
only be a temporary expedient: in order for the decrease in the inflation rate 
which this will initially produce to be maintained and consolidated, the 
expansion of total expenditure will also have to be reduced. 
b) Controlling aggregate demand 
In situations of hyperinflation, the tasks of reducing the public-sector 
deficit and striking a greater balance between the supply and demand of foreign 
exchange can be greatly eased if the previously-discussed price control measures 
can manage to bring about a sharp reduction in inflationary expectations and so 
in the rate of price increases. 
This is because a sharp drop in inflation will automatically reduce the 
losses of real tax revenues caused by the lag between the time when a transaction 
subject to taxes is carried out and the time when the tax is paid to the 
government. The recovery in the real value of taxes brought about by a drop in 
inflation may be very large and, of course, will be all the greater the higher the 
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prior rate of inflation, the sharper its reduction and the longer the delay involved 
in paying taxes.95 Furthermore, as inflation drops, nominal interest rates also 
tend to decline; as a result, the public sector's finance expenditures —which in 
some cases account for almost the entire fiscal deficit— are reduced. Thus, in 
practice, if the rate of inflation slows significantly, a series of mechanisms that 
constitute "vicious circles" when inflation is speeding up (more inflation-lower 
real tax receipts-larger fiscal deficit-higher inflation, etc.), are converted into 
"virtuous circles" which automatically help to cut the fiscal deficit and, as a result, 
to reduce inflation. 
Furthermore, when there is a considerable drop in inflation, the demand 
for money will tend to rise, thus making it possible to expand the mmoney 
supply for quite some time without generating inflationary pressures. Under 
certain circumstances, the increase in the demand for money caused by a drop in 
inflation may, paradoxically, help to augment the yield of the "inflationary tax" 
and therefore to reduce the public deficit.96 There will naturally be no such 
positive effect with zero-inflation, since the "inflationary tax" would then be 
equivalent to zero as well. In that event, either tax receipts will have to be 
increased or expenditure will have to be decreased in order to reduce the fiscal 
deficit.97 
c) The correction of price lags 
When inflation is very rapid and, especially, when the economy is shifting 
towards hyperinflation, all prices will rise very frequently. This greatly reduces 
the seriousness of the problem posed by the de-synchronization of adjustments 
and distortions in relative prices, thus making it easier to freeze prices or bring 
about a sharp slowdown in the rate of indexation. Indeed, in such a situation the 
only prices which tend to lag behind are those controlled directly by the 
government, such as the official exchange rate and the rates charged by public 
enterprises. If this is the case, these prices should be corrected before the 
stabilization programme is begun, especially in order to build up economic 
agents' confidence in the programme's ability to produce a permanent rather 
then temporary decrease in inflation. This is important because economic agents 
are unlikely to believe that the stabilization policy will be a success if such basic 
price as the real exchange rate continues to lag far behind other prices or if State 
enterprises continue running large deficits because the rates they charge are too 
low in real terms. 
E. S T A B I L I Z A T I O N P R O G R A M M E S : SOME G U I D E L I N E S 
A N D G E N E R A L P R I N C I P L E S 
1. The policy sequence 
Both the chances of success and the possible costs of a stabilization programme 
are influenced by the order in which its various components are applied or their 
relation in time to other major policies. 
Thus, in general, it seems wise to separate in time the application of 
adjustment policies (designed to reduce the external imbalance) from the 
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application of stabilization policies (designed to reduce inflation). Although the 
two have elements in common (e.g., the control of aggregate demand) which 
help both to achieve a balance in the external accounts and to slow the rate of 
price increases, there are other important components of adjustment policies 
(such as devaluation) which, although they help to reduce the external deficit, 
make it more difficult to achieve stabilization because of the upward pressure 
they exert on costs. Hence, if the exchange rate is raised substantially at the same 
time that demand is being sharply restricted, recessionary effects will tend to be 
produced unless the prices of non-tradeable goods are very downwardly flexible. 
In many cases, therefore, it may be preferable to carry out the adjustment 
programme first, even at the cost of producing some increase in the rate of 
inflation, and only then to put a stabilization programme into effect. 
Indeed, this principle is applicable to all policies for correcting price lags, 
since they exert upward pressure on costs and therefore tend to have 
recessionary effects if they are applied at the same time as a policy designed to 
restrict total demand. It therefore appears best to make such corrections before 
initiating the rest of the stabilization programme. Once the necessary changes in 
relative prices have been made, stabilization policies can then be applied which 
are directed solely towards eliminating or reducing the momentum of inflation 
by controlling total demand and guiding expectations. 
If the situation is one in which a recession must be avoided or minimized, 
then it will also be necessary to vary the policies to be applied in accordane with 
the nature of each phase of the stabilization programme (particularly in respect 
of monetary and fiscal policy) since, even if inflation is reduced substantially, 
some time will pass before the demand for money expands. Because of this lag, 
the money supply cannot be increased at the outset of the programme as much as 
it can and should be expanded once expectations of a lower rate of inflation have 
become widespread and have ben consolidated. If monetary policy is adjusted too 
quickly on the assumption that the reduction of inflation will generate a greater 
demand for money, the success of the stabilization programme will be 
endangered because the demand for liquid balances will not rise very much 
initially. On the other hand, if the authorities keep the money supply under tight 
control (ignoring the fact that, after a time, the demand for money will grow due 
to the slowdown of inflation), a lack of liquidity, very high interest rates and a 
recession will ensure. Monetary policy should therefore by strict during the 
initial phase of the stabilization programme but should then gradually be made 
increasingly expansionary as inflationary expectations subside and as the 
public's demand for liquid balances consequently increases. 
2. Price policies 
As has already been pointed out, in order to avoid a contraction which would 
disturb economic activity it is vital that the rate of nominal changes in economic 
variables such as wages, the exchange rate, interest rates and the prices of certain 
key goods should decelerate simultaneously and in harmony with the inflation 
target implicit in the programmes of monetary and fiscal restraint. In order to 
achieve this it will in most cases be necessary to apply (at least temporarily) 
some form of price controls. The fundamental purpose of such a policy must be 
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to assure each economic agent, as far as possible, that in adjusting his price in 
accordance with the targeted level of inflation he will not suffer a systematic 
relative loss, as all other economic agents will be obliged to adjust their prices in 
accordance with the same target. 
a) Which prices are to be controlled? 
It is even more important to guide or control (and not hold down) the 
prices of certain goods when progress toward external equilibrium and domestic 
stabilization requires correction of certain relative prices, such as the exchange 
rate and the price of public services. Indeed, if no attempt is made to direct other 
prices towards their new equilibrium, it is highly likely that, at least initially, 
measures designed to raise the real exchange rate and the relative prices of public 
services will lead to considerable increases in the prices of other goods, 
essentially as a result of the reluctance of producers to accept a decline in their 
earnings caused by attempts to change relative prices, and also by their tendency 
to confuse this corrective adjustment with more generalized inflationary 
pressure. In contrast, it will be far easier to bring about this adjustment in 
relative prices if producers observe that, as a result of price control, the economic 
authorities limit rises to those goods whose prices were extremely low. 
Naturally, there is no question of reducing inflationary pressure by 
administrative fixing of artificial prices, nor of setting up complex bureaucratic 
machinery to control them. What are required are relatively simple and easy-to-
apply rules. In contrast with traditional price controls, which are primarily 
designed to set the prices of agricultural products, the suggested controls should 
centre on industrial prices, which in many cases are more sensitive to 
inflationary expectations and to oligopolistic influences. This effort should 
concentrate on control of the prices of the main enterprises, for reasons both of 
simplicity and because they are able to exercise a certain oligopolistic pressure on 
their suppliers and force them to accept prices in keeping with those of the 
products manufactured by the former. Moreover, large enterprises normally use 
technologies which are more capital-intensive, making it easier for them to 
temporarily absorb the drop in operating income which might be caused by the 
price-control policy, by lowering their profit margins. Another sector whose 
prices could be directed is that producing certain basic inputs for the construction 
industry. In many cases, government public-works and housing programmes 
generate a considerable proportion of the overall demand for such inputs and 
this consequently provides the opportunity to influence their price in accordance 
with the overall aims of anti-inflation policy. 
b) The rate of slowdown: a freeze or decelerated indexation? 
As has already been noted, the rate at which inflation may be slowed down 
is closely linked to the degree of monetary and fiscal control which is actually 
feasible, to the number of key prices in need of correction, to the degree to which 
they need to be adjusted and to inflationary expectations. Generally speaking, as 
has also been analysed above, it would seem preferable to apply the stabilization 
programme once the worst distortions in relative prices have been corrected. 
Once these readjustments have been carried out, there nevertheless remains the 
option between following a gradualist approach (progressively bringing down 
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the rate of inflation) or applying shock treatment (freezing prices at their 
present level). 
There are a number of advantages in a freeze. First of all, it is easier to 
administer, since economic agents and the public at large know that, legally 
speaking, most prices should not rise.98 Every purchaser thereby becomes a price 
inspector. Secondly, as it has a sharp initial impact, a freeze also helps to bring 
inflationary expectations to an abrupt halt. However, its effectiveness to a large 
extent depends on the authorities being really able to control expansion of public 
expenditure and the money supply and to ensure exchange-rate stability. 
Freezing prices without being able to exert firm control over fiscal, monetary 
and exchange variables carries the risk of failure for the stabilization policy, 
either because the public has no faith in it and puts pressure on the currency by 
making speculative purchases of foreign currency or goods, or because —even if 
the public has faith in such a policy— if in practice fiscal and monetary control is 
weak and partial, aggregate demand may rise well above what is compatible with 
a zero rate of inflation. The principal cost of the failure of a price freeze is the 
loss of confidence of the economic agents and the public in the government's 
capacity to control inflation: a confidence which, as has already been explained, is 
vital if any future attempt at stabilization is to succeed. It follows that ordering a 
price freeze without sufficient control over the fiscal and monetary variables, as 
well as over the exchange position, may prove disastrous. 
In contrast, the gradualist alternatives —i.e., indexing prices and contracts, 
not backwards on the basis of past inflation, as is usually the case, but forwards, 
in accordance with the increasingly low targeted rate of inflation— possesses the 
advantage of making possible considerable slowdowns in the rate of price 
increases. (For example, reducing monthly inflation by half from one quarter to 
the next), even though the authorities may not yet possess complete control over 
aggregate demand. Moreover, initial fulfilment of the proposed inflation targets 
helps increase the confidence of the economic agents in their being met in the 
future, which makes it possible to gain time in order to control aggregate 
demand. Nevertheless, gradualism has its own problems. On the one hand, it 
requires greater administrative control over prices, since the public is unable to 
act as price inspectors as efficiently as in the case of a price freeze (it is easier to 
control a 0 % increase in prices than, for example, a 2 % or 5 % one). In addition, 
precisely because the deceleration of the rate of inflation is gradual, inflationary 
expectations are more likely to remain for some time, particularly if a large 
number of economic agents believe that sooner or later the stabilization policy 
will fail. 
c) A dichotomy: credible prices versus equilibrium prices 
If prices are to be set, either by a price freeze or by decelerated indexation, 
it will be necessary to decide at what level they are to be set or frozen. 
Since there is no question of attempting to suppress inflation completely, 
prices must be set at a level compatible with the inflation implicit in monetary 
and fiscal policy. While this is theoretically correct, it raises the problem of the 
programme's credibility. The best stabilization programme can fail if the public 
has no faith in it or if a large number of economic agents fear a lack of faith on the 
part of other economic agents and consequently act accordingly, bringing about, 
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for example, a "flight from the currency" to purchase goods or dollars. In other 
words, the public's conviction that the programme is going to fail in fact brings 
about this very failure, thus generating a self-fulfilling prophecy. This explains 
the importance of the credibility of a price policy. 
This credibility is strengthened if prices are set not necessarily at their 
levels of equilibrium, but at levels at which the public believes they can be 
maintained and which discourage any potential run from the currency towards 
goods or towards the dollar. This is the logic of the principle of overshooting, 
above all in setting the exchange rate and the rate of interest. Unfortunately, 
such a policy also involves costs. Overshooting such prices —at least if an 
attempt is made to maintain them for some time at the very high real level at 
which they are initially set— generates recessionary pressures, since it brings 
aggregate demand below the level of equilibrium. Such recessionary pressure is 
aggravated if, for the same reasons, the prices of public services are set at higher 
levels than necessary, if the money supply is subject to excessive control 
(ignoring the fact that, as inflation slows down, the demand for money will rise 
after some time) or if real wages are reduced more than necessary. 
There is thus a dichotomy between setting equilibrium prices —with the 
consequent risk that if the public has no faith in them the programme will fail— 
or overshooting in the case of some prices to develop credibility, with the risk of 
producing a recession. The most prudent approach, in setting the key prices 
which are most rapidly adjusted (the exchange rate and interest rates) would 
appear to be to overshoot somewhat initially to discourage a stampede from 
national currency towards the dollar or towards goods. As inflation dies down 
and the economic agents gain confidence in the programme it will be possible to 
lower the real exchange rate towards its long-term equilibrium level. 
Simultaneously, the money supply will have to be expanded at the same rate as 
the demand for money in order to supply the economy with sufficient liquidity 
and gradually reduce the real rate of interest. 
In turn, while prices are frozen or subject to control, the key to deciding 
whether prices are out of balance or not is the presence of shortages or an excess 
of supply. If most prices had been set at an extremely low level, there would be 
widespread supply shortages; conversely, if there was a widespread excess of 
supply, it would imply that prices had been set at an extremely high level (with 
respect to wages). 
d) Ending the freeze 
If prices have been frozen or subject to control as part of the stabilization 
programme, there arises the problem of how to free them from control and 
thereby return to a more normal state of affairs in which most (if not all) prices 
are freely set by the market. Generally speaking, such liberalization must needs 
be gradual —so as to avoid generating expectations of an outburst of inflation— 
and must only be carried out once the indexation patterns have been altered and 
the terms of contracts lengthened. If this has not been done, any increase in 
prices caused by an ending of the freeze or by liberazation would not signify a 
once and for all rise, but would lead, through the mechanism of indexation, to 
immediate rises in wages and other costs, which would once again revive the 
inflationary spiral. 
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For this reason, it is advisable for the freeze to be ended selectively, 
beginning with competitive activities or those in which effective price control is 
more difficult in practice, as it is likely that these activities will have already 
carried out the price modifications they require. Any decision to end the freeze 
must also take into account the size of the establishment, initially reducing 
control over small and medium-sized enterprises while maintaining stricter 
control of prices in supermarkets, large enterprises and those producing basic 
inputs, where it is easier to gradually change over from a freeze to a system of 
"regulation", with "notified" or authorized prices. 
3. Incomes policy 
In order to facilitate a stabilization process which avoids both the danger of 
recession and that of excess demand, the price policy needs to be complemented 
by an incomes policy, a fundamental component of which is a wages policy, 
calling for the establishment of certain overall principles with regard to wage 
adjustments. 
The main criterion here is that in order to maintain the purchasing power 
of wages during a process of stabilization it will be necessary for them to increase 
not only on the basis of past inflation but also on the basis of forecast inflation, 
and the frequency with which readjustments are granted will have to vary 
depending on whether the rate of inflation accelerates or declines. 
During periods of declining inflation, indexation of the nominal wage on 
the basis of past inflation raises its purchasing power, since the average real 
annual wage (which is the pertinent one rises when the rate of inflation 
declines." It follows that indexing wages on the basis of past inflation means 
that future inflation is sure to be similar to what it has been in the past, or that 
real wages will rise (which, depending on the initial conjuncture, may or may not 
be desirable). Conversely, if nominal wages are adjusted solely on the basis of 
future inflation, their purchasing power will fall even if the target is met, and 
even more so if it proves impossible to bring down inflation as much as 
forecast.100 
Consequently, to maintain real wages it will be necessary to readjust them 
on the basis both of past and of future inflation.101 Even so, this involves the risk 
that, if inflation fails to fall as much as forecast, real wages will decline or, if 
inflation slows down more than forecast, real wages will rise. It follows that a 
more stable and less risky formula would be: a) to readjust wages on the basis of 
both past and forecast inflation, and b) to readjust them once again when 
inflation reaches the target level —whether this occurs after 12 months, or after 
a longer or shorter period.102 This ensures that the average real wage for the 
period covered by the readjustment is the real wage which has been set as a 
target. 
Moreover, incomes policy also needs to lay down guidelines for the level 
and evolution of interest rates. This does not of course mean setting them so as 
to be negative in real terms, as has often occurred in the past, since it is quite 
clear that not everybody can receive all the credit they require at subsidized 
rates. It is well known that a negative real rate of interest segments the market 
between those who have access to credit whose cost has been brought artificially 
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down by fixing the interest rate, and those who do not have such access. In order 
to take advantage of this cheap financing, the happy few tend to build over-sized 
or over-mechanized installations, or to use resources to purchase assets whose 
value is depressed as a result of tight credit, which tends to further concentrate 
wealth in the hands of the few. In addition, segmentation of the market 
inhibits the expansion of those activities with more restricted access to banks 
—traditionally the small and medium-sized firms, who generally use relatively 
more labour— obliging them to resort to credit from the curb markets at rates 
far higher than the equilibrium rate. 
On the other hand, a real rate of interest much higher than would be 
normal raises problems also, at least when it is maintained for more than a 
certain time, since it leads to sharp rises in financial costs and ultimately helps 
bring down production. Moreover, as recent experience in a number of countries 
in the region has shown, it is clearly impossible for real interest rates of 2 5 % to 
30% to be paid for a long period in economies which are growing at an annual 
rate of 5% or 6 % , without a financial crisis occurring. 
Since the credit market adjusts rapidly in price (the rate of interest), 
disequilibria in other markets —for goods, currency, assets— tend to be reflected 
in it through absurdly high real interest rates which mirror the disequilibria in 
these other markets but are incapable of correcting them. Consequently, as long 
as these disequilibria persist, it will be necessary to maintain (or "suggest") a real 
rate of interest which is slightly higher than the international rate (but below the 
disequilibrium rate), as this represents the best approximation to the long-term 
equilibrium rate of interest. 
The logical counterpart of this is that at such conjunctures credit will need 
to be rationed in quantity, and not only through price, until the excess demand 
caused by the imbalances existing in the other markets has disappeared. 
Meanwhile, it will be necessary to decide what part of the demand for credit is 
"legitimate" i.e., due to potential productive capacity which could be put into 
effect, and what part is "illegitimate", (i.e., due to the desire of the applicant to 
postpone liquidation of stocks or of assets or a drop in his prices). Of course, it is 
not always easy to make such a distinction or to put it into practice, but it is 
preferable to be guided by it than to risk a crisis throughout the financial system 
caused by ci.arging extremely high real rates of interest which quite clearly can 
only be paid either exceptionally or temporarily. 
4. Control of aggregate demand 
As has already been pointed out, a slowdown in the rate of growth of 
aggregate demand constitutes a basic component of any anti-inflationary 
programme. Whether such a slowdown in the rate of growth of aggregate 
demand leads to a recession or not, however, depends both on the size of the 
cutback which is made in overall expenditure and on the way in which it is 
carried out, since —depending on the mechanisms used— the cut in 
expenditure can have the effect of either reducing the level of inflation or 
slowing down economic activity. 
In the case of many stabilization programmes, the first thing affected by a 
cutback is government investment, thereby jeopardizing future growth. This 
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drawback is reinforced in the short term when the cutback in expenditure is 
centred on a small number of activities (such as public works and housing 
construction), which makes it virtually impossible for the readjustment to be 
carried out solely by means of drops in prices rather than production. 
Consequently, a cutback in public expenditure which concentrates on its 
imported element and which involves a smaller decline in public demand for 
domestically-produced goods has a greater likelihood of being absorbed through 
a deceleration in the rate of growth of prices rather than through drops in 
production. 
Of course if it is desired to maintain expenditure on investment directed 
towards domestic sectors (or to reduce it to a lesser extent), it will be necessary to 
reduce current expenditure more sharply. This poses delicate problems of a 
political nature, since in most countries remunerations constitute the main 
component of current expenditure. Consequently, in so far as it is necessary to 
reduce overall government expenditure and an attempt is made to avoid sharp 
cutbacks in the level of public investment, it will probably be necessary to reduce 
the real amount of remunerations paid by the public sector. Although this is 
difficult from the political angle, it is likely that in the short term a reduction in 
the average wages of the public sector will prove preferable to its alternative: i.e., 
a cutback in employment, which generally not only has regressive consequences 
from the distributive point of view, but also tends to affect the volume of goods 
and services produced by the public sector. 
Subsidies constitute another major item of current expenditure; 
consequently, in many cases it is necessary to reduce them in order to balance the 
fiscal budget. Though this decision may be inevitable, however, it must be 
adopted in a manner which minimizes its possible negative impact on the 
poorest sectors of the population.103 
A third means of reducing total government expenditure involves cutting 
outlays on defence. Although it is impossible to assess governmental decisions in 
this field solely or even principally from the economic viewpoint, it would seem 
reasonable to assume that in certain cases a cutback in such expenditure would 
allow considerable progress to be made towards restoring equilibrium in 
governmental finances and reducing the external deficit. This latter consequence 
would be of particular significance if the reduction in defence expenditure were 
focused on armaments, whose imported component is extremely high in most 
Latin American countries. 
Nevertheless, in order to bring down the public sector deficit, which is 
often quite high, it does not suffice merely to reduce expenditures, but it is also 
necessary to raise revenues, which in turn requires an increase in tax collection 
and a rise in the prices and rates charged by State enterprises. No doubt both the 
mechanisms and procedures used to achieve this end and their relative 
importance will differ from one country to another. However, there are three 
ways of increasing public-sector income which have proved particularly effective 
in Latin America's recent experience. 
The first of these is automatic indexation of taxes, which is particularly 
called for in countries with high inflation. In this respect, it is worth 
remembering that if the tax system is not indexed and the lag allowed for by law 
between the moment at which the tax is incurred and the moment at which it 
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must be paid is as little as three months, with a 4 0 % annual rate of inflation the 
tax actually paid will drop by 10% in real terms for this reason alone. 
The second involves control of tax evasion. Since this often reaches 
considerable proportions, it might be preferable to take steps to control it in 
order to increase fiscal revenue, rather than introducing new taxes or raising the 
existing rates, which are on occasions quite high, partly as a result of the scale of 
evasion. As recent experience has shown on a number of occasions, it is possible 
to reduce evasion considerably by introducing more efficient control. This 
requires, in addition to the fundamental need for a firm political will to enforce 
tax legislation, the following conditions, among others: a) thorough 
simplification of the tax system, both as regards the number of taxes and rates 
and exemptions as well as special or discriminatory systems, as this simplifies 
tax collection by traditional methods and is essential if it is to be backed up by 
modern systems of computerized control; b) transformation of the tax 
departments into specialized units within the government administration, 
endowed with sufficient means to carry out their tasks and possessing highly 
qualified and well-paid technicians, and c) the adoption and strict enforcement 
of sanctions for those who infringe tax law, since in addition to providing more 
efficient control this convinces taxpayers that it is economically more 
advantageous to pay their taxes than to run the risk involved in not doing so. 
A third means of increasing public-sector revenues is by establishing and 
maintaining realistic prices and rates for the goods and services provided by 
State enterprises, some of which are often responsible for a major part of the 
overall government deficit. In addition to making a contribution to a better 
balance between public-sector income and expenditure, rises in rates and prices 
possess two further advantages. The first is the speed with which they increase 
the State's resources, which is normally far faster than in the case of changes in 
tax law; the second involves the corrections which are thus made in the system of 
relative prices and the positive impact these have on the process of adjustment. 
In a large number of cases the artificially low prices charged by State enterprises 
stimulate domestic consumption of tradeable goods, thereby helping to intensify 
the external disequilibrium, either by increasing imports or reducing the amount 
of goods available for export. 
Moreover, and in order to prevent the restrictive credit policy which is 
normally part and parcel of stabilization programmes from having undesirable 
recessionary and redistributive consequences, it is vital to bear in mind that such 
a policy is in no way neutral. Credit restriction has a disproportional impact on 
those sectors which are particularly sensitive to variations in the interest rate 
and in the availability of credit, such as construction and agriculture, as well as 
small and medium-sized firms, which are generally unable to offer the same 
guarantees to the financial system as larger production units. Such activities and 
enterprises make particularly intensive use of labour and consequently if their 
level of production declines it tends to lead to a disproportionate fall in 
employment. For this reason it is desirable that, when applying a restrictive 
monetary policy, guidelines should be set which ensure maintenance of the share 
of total credit available for such activities and enterprises. 
It is also important to bear in mind that however well conceived it may be, 
a stabilization programme is unlikely to fully achieve its inflation targets. 
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Consequently, the monetary and credit targets which are set should not be 
expressed in absolute terms —as is characteristically the case of agreements with 
the International Monetary F u n d — but in relative terms, particularly as regards 
the reduction of inflation. Thus, for example, if the decline in inflation coincides 
in practice with that initially forecast, the planned reduction in the rate of 
growth of the money supply should be maintained. If, on the contrary, inflation 
declines less than planned —in which case strict maintenance of the planned 
monetary deceleration would run the risk of causing a decline in production— 
there should be flexibility to increase the rate of expansion of the means of 
payment in accordance with a predetermined criterion. 
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Washington, D.C., p. 25. 
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5 4See Richard L. Ground, "Perturbaciones, déficit, crisis y políticas de ajuste: un enfoque 
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in February 1986, discounts were as follows: Argentina, 3 0 % ; Brazil, 2 0 % ; Bolivia, 8 0 % ; Chile, 
3 5 % ; Mexico, 1 5 % ; Nicaragua, 9 0 % ; Peru, 5 0 % ; and Venezuela, 10%. Only in the cases of Bolivia 
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6 0See PREALC, Más allá de la crisis, Santiago, 1985. 
6 ' See UNICEF, The State of the World's Children, 1984, New York, 1984. 
" S e e Peru 1985 (Message to the Nation from the President of the Republic, Fernando 
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production cannot, by definition, exceed domestic demand. 
'••Generally speaking, the greater the relative weight in GNP of agriculture, exports and 
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2 6 % . 
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inflation were to fall to 5 0 % and, as a result, the demand for money rose to 2 0 % of the gross 
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perishable goods and those which are subject to heavy seasonal variations, such as vegetables and 
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" I f the nominal wage remains at 100 for a year, and inflation is 100%, the real average 
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the nominal wage is doubled the following year (200), the real wage at the beginning of the year is 
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100In line with the previous example, if an attempt is made to bringdown inflation to 5 0 % in 
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101 In the specific example given above, if it is wished to maintain the real wage at the same 
level as in year 1, and 5 0 % inflation is expected, it will be necessary to adjust nominal wages by 8 0 % , 
raising them from 100 to 180 so that in real terms they rise to 90 (180:200) at the beginning of the 
year, and later fall during the year to 60 (180:300) at the end. Thus the real average wage for the year 
will be approximately 75 in year 2, i.e., it will keep the real value it had in year 1. 
102 In the specific example given above, wages are readjusted by 8 0 % at the beginning of year 
2 and will again be adjusted when inflation reaches 50%. If the latter reaches 5 0 % after 12 months, 
this leads to the same case as above: an annual readjustment. If inflation reaches 5 0 % after 10 
months, the readjustment will be brought forward, as the average wage for the 10 months will 
already have reached the level of 75 which is the real wage set as a target, while the contrary will be 
true if the rise in prices does not reach 5 0 % until more than 12 months have passed. 
1 0 i As noted in section D of chapter III of this document, the main mechanism for achieving 
this aim is the replacement of price subsidies —which reduce the purchase price of the subsidized 







L A T I N A M E R I C A A N D T H E C A R I B B E A N : M A I N E C O N O M I C I N D I C A T O R S " 
Gross domestic product at market prices 
Population (millions of inhabitants) 
Per capita gross domestic product 
Per capita gross national income 
Gross domestic product 
Per capita gross domestic product 
Per capita gross national income 
Consumer prices' 
Terms o f trade (goods) 
Purchasing power of exports of goods 
Current value of exports of goods 
Current value of imports of goods 
Exports of goods 
Imports o f goods 
Merchandise trade balance 
Nei: payments of profits and interest 
Balance on current account 
Nei: movement of capital1" 
GUibal ba lance ' 
Total gross external debt 
Source: lit!!.AO, on the basis ol olfiii.il Inures 
"The figures nil the gr<ins domestii product and lonsuiiier 
rcspettivel), the index of per cjpita ĵ niss natiiinal mum 
Caribbean tminmcv ''Pmvisiunal estimates sttbjei 
ttansfvt payment*. ' Includes V>njj- anJ short- terin 
international reserves (of reserve si^ni plus counterpart i 
1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985k 
Indexes ( 1 9 8 0 = 100) 
100.0 100.4 9 9 . 0 96.5 9 9 . 6 102.3 
356 364 373 .381 .390 3 9 9 
100.0 98.1 94.4 89 .9 90 .7 91.1 
100.0 96.2 89.7 85.1 86.1 8 6 . 0 
G r o w c h rates 
5.3 0.4 -1.5 -2.5 3.3 2.7 
2.8 -1.9 •3.7 -4.7 0 .9 0.4 
3.7 •3.8 -6.8 -5.1 1.2 -0.1 
56.1 57.6 84 .8 131.1 185.2 274.5 
5.1 -7.6 -8.9 -1.8 4.1 -2.9 
12.4 0.3 -7.5 5.2 11.6 -4.6 
32.3 7.6 -8 .9 0.1 11.5 -5.7 
34.9 7.8 -19.8 -28.5 5.0 -1.9 
B i l l ions o f dollars 
89.1 95.9 87 .4 87.5 97.5 91 .9 
90.5 97.6 78.3 56.0 58.8 57.6 
-1.4 -1.7 9.1 .31.5 .38.7 .34.3 
17.9 27.1 38.7 34.2 36.1 35.1 
-28.1 -40.1 -40.9 -7.4 -1.0 -4.4 
29.5 37.3 19.8 .3.0 10.3 4.7 
1.4 -2.8 -21 .0 -4.4 9.3 0.3 
222.5 277.7 318.4 344 .0 360.4 368.0 
prites, refer t„ 
anil the -l.irj 
apital. official 
tlic firiiup funned by 
' Vari.ni.in (mm 
nrt.jLitej transfer pay 
he minimes 
¿•lare to rhi 
Deietnber . DILI tber. 
..missions 
exiept Cuba < emin 
is Cuba .in.1 the 
Intitules net unrequ 
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T a b l e 9 
L A T I N A M E R I C A A N D T H E C A R I B B E A N : E V O L U T I O N O F T O T A L G R O S S D O M E S T I C P R O D U C T 
A n n u a l g r o w t h ra tes 
C o u n t r y 
1 9 8 1 1 9 8 2 1 9 8 3 1 9 8 4 1 9 8 5 ° 1 9 8 1 - 1 9 8 5 ° 
A r g e n t i n a - 6 . 7 -6 .3 3 . 0 2 .1 - 4 . 1 - 1 1 . 8 
B a r b a d o s -2 .7 - 4 . 5 0 . 3 3 . 0 - 4 . 3 ' 
B o l i v i a - 0 . 3 - 6 . 6 - 7 . 3 - 3 . 1 - 2 . 1 - 1 8 . 1 
B r a z i l - 2 . 0 1 .4 -2 .7 4 . 8 8 . 2 9 . 5 
C o l o m b i a 2 . 3 1 . 0 1.2 3 . 6 2 . 6 11 .2 
C o s t a R i c a - 2 . 4 - 7 . 3 2 .7 7 . 3 1 . 6 1 .3 
C u b a f 15 .1 3 .1 3 . 8 7 . 4 4 . 5 3 8 . 2 
C h i l e 5 .2 - 1 3 . 1 - 0 . 5 6 . 2 2 . 3 - 1 . 2 
E c u a d o r 3 . 8 1.1 - 1 . 6 4 . 6 2 . 7 1 1 . 0 
E l S a l v a d o r - 8 . 4 - 5 . 7 - 1 . 0 1 . 4 1 . 4 - 1 2 . 0 
G u a t e m a l a 0.9 - 3 . 4 - 2 . 8 0 . 2 - 0 . 9 - 5 . 9 
G u y a n a -0 .7 - 1 0 . 8 - 1 0 . 3 5 . 8 
H a i t i - 1 . 5 - 4 . 0 0 . 2 2 . 8 1 .2 - 1 . 5 
H o n d u r a s 0 . 7 - 0 . 6 - 1 . 2 2 . 6 1 .6 3 . 0 
J a m a i c a 2 .5 - 0 . 3 1 .4 -1 .5 0 . 7 ' 
M e x i c o 8 . 3 - - 5 . 2 3 .5 2 . 5 9 . 0 
N i c a r a g u a 5 . 3 - 1 . 2 4 . 7 - 1 . 5 - 2 . 7 4 . 4 
P a n a m a 4 . 0 4 . 9 - 0 . 1 - 0 . 4 3 . 3 12 .2 
P a r a g u a y 8 . 7 - 0 . 7 - 3 . 0 3 . 3 4 . 0 12 .5 
P e r u 3 .7 - 0 . 2 - 1 2 . 0 4 . 4 2 . 0 - 3 . 0 
D o m i n i c a n R e p u b l i c 3 . 9 1.3 4 . 6 0 . 7 - 2 . 2 8 . 4 
T r i n i d a d a n d T o b a g o - 0 . 9 2 . 5 - 7 . 1 - 4 . 5 - 9 . 9 ' 
Uruguay 1 . 0 - 1 0 . 7 - 5 . 9 - 1 . 2 0 . 4 - 1 5 . 7 
V e n e z u e l a - 1 . 0 - 1 . 3 - 5 . 6 - 1 . 0 - 1 . 2 - 9 . 6 
L a t i n A m e r i c a a n d t h e 
C a r i b b e a n 1 * 0 . 4 - 1 . 5 - 2 . 5 3 . 2 2 . 7 2 . 2 
L a t i n A m e r i c a a n d t h e 
C a r i b b e a n , e x c l u d i n g 
B r a z i l a n d C u b a 1 . 5 - 2 . 7 - 2 . 4 2 . 5 0 . 2 - 1 . 0 
Source: ECLAC, on the basis of official figure 
Provisional estimates subject to revision. Cumulât iv e variation 1981-1984 1. 'Relates to coca! social product. 'Excluding Cuba. 
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T a b l e 9 
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: EVOLUTION OF PER CAPITA GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT 
C o u n t r y 
A n n u a l g r o w t h r a t e s 
C u m u l a t i v e 
v a r i a t i o n 
1 9 8 1 1 9 8 2 1 9 8 3 1 9 8 4 1 9 8 5 ° 1 9 8 1 - 1 9 8 5 ° 
A r g e n t i n a - 8 . 2 - 7 . 8 1 .4 0 . 5 - 5 . 5 - 1 8 . 5 
B a r b a d o s - 3 . 5 - 5 . 2 -0 .5 1 .8 - 7 . 3 
B o l i v i a - 2 . 9 - 9 . 0 -9 .7 - 5 . 6 - 4 . 7 - 2 8 . 4 
B r a z i l - 4 . 2 - 0 . 9 - 4 . 9 2 . 5 5 . 8 - 2 . 0 
C o l o m b i a 0 .1 - 1 . 1 - 1 . 0 1 .4 0 . 5 - 0 . 1 
C o s t a R i c a - 5 . 0 -9 .7 4 . 6 - 1 . 0 - 1 1 . 2 
Cuba * 14 .4 2 .5 3 .2 6 . 8 3 . 8 3 4 . 1 
C h i l e 3 . 6 - 1 4 . 4 - 2 . 1 4 . 5 0 . 8 - 8 . 7 
E c u a d o r 0 . 8 - 1 . 8 - 4 . 4 1.7 - 0 . 2 - 3 . 9 
E l S a l v a d o r - 1 1 . 0 - 8 . 4 - 3 . 8 - 1 . 5 - 1 . 6 - 2 4 . 0 
G u a t e m a l a - 1 . 8 -6 .1 -5 .5 - 2 . 6 - 3 . 7 - 1 8 . 3 
G u y a n a - 2 . 6 - 1 2 . 6 - 1 2 . 0 3 . 9 - 2 2 . 2 ' 
H a i t i - 3 . 9 - 6 . 4 - 2 . 3 0 . 2 - 1 . 4 - 1 3 . 1 
H o n d u r a s - 2 . 8 - 4 . 0 - 4 . 5 - 0 . 8 -1 .7 - 1 3 . 0 
J a m a i c a 1.1 - 1 . 6 -1 .7 -2.Ï 
M e x i c o 5 .4 - 2 . 6 - 7 . 6 0 . 9 - 4 . 3 
N i c a r a g u a 2 . 0 - 4 . 4 1.3 - 4 . 8 - 5 . 9 - 1 1 . 6 
P a n a m a 1.7 2 .7 -2 .2 - 2 . 5 1.1 0 . 7 
P a r a g u a y 5 .4 - 3 . 6 - 5 . 9 0 . 2 1.1 - 3 . 2 
P e r u 1 . 0 -2 .7 - 1 4 . 3 1 .8 - 0 . 6 - 1 4 . 8 
D o m i n i c a n R e p u b l i c 1.5 - 1 . 1 2 .2 - 1 . 6 - 4 . 4 - 3 . 5 
T r i n i d a d a n d T o b a g o -1 .5 1 .6 - 8 . 0 -5 .5 - 1 3 . 0 e 
U r u g u a y 0 . 3 - 1 1 . 3 -6 .5 - 1 . 9 - 0 . 3 - 1 8 . 6 
V e n e z u e l a - 3 . 9 - 4 . 1 - 8 . 2 - 3 . 7 - 3 . 8 - 2 1 , 6 
L a t i n A m e r i c a a n d t h e 
C a r i b b e a n d - 1 . 9 - 3 . 7 - 4 . 7 0 . 9 0 . 4 - 8 . 8 
L a t i n A m e r i c a a n d t h e 
C a r i b b e a n , e x c l u d i n g 
B r a z i l a n d C u b a - 0 . 9 - 5 . 0 - 4 . 7 0 . 1 - 2 . 1 - 1 2 . 1 
Source: ECLAC, on the basis of official figures for the gross domestic product. The population figi 
Demogrd/ico, Vol. XVIII, N° 35. January 1985. 
"Provisional estimates subject to revision. Refers to total social product. 'Cumulative 
taken from CELADE estimates published in Boletin 
1981-1984. * Excluding Cuba. 
T a b l e 4 
L A T I N A M E R I C A A N D T H E C A R I B B E A N : U R B A N U N E M P L O Y M E N T 
(Average annual rates) 
Country 1 9 7 5 1 9 7 6 1 9 7 7 1 9 7 8 1 9 7 9 1 9 8 0 1 9 8 1 1 9 8 2 1 9 8 3 1 9 8 4 1 9 8 5 
A r g e n t i n a " 3 .7 4 . 9 3 . 3 3 .3 2 . 5 2 . 6 4 . 7 5 . 3 4 . 6 4 . 6 6 . 3 
B o l i v i a 6 7 . 9 4 . 5 7 . 6 7 . 5 9 . 7 9 . 4 12 .1 1 2 . 6 
B r a z i l ' 6 . 8 6 . 4 7 . 2 7 . 9 6 . 3 6 . 7 7 .1 5 . 3 
C o l o m b i a 1 ' 1 1 . 0 1 0 . 6 9 . 0 9 . 0 8 . 9 9 . 7 8 .2 9 . 3 1 1 . 8 13 .5 14 .1 
C o s t a R i c a ' 5 . 4 5 , 1 5 . 8 5 .3 6 . 0 9 .1 9 9 8 . 6 6 . 6 6 . 7 
C h i l e 7 1 5 . 0 16 .3 1 3 . 9 1 3 . 3 1 3 .4 11 .7 9 . 0 2 0 . 0 1 9 . 0 18 .5 1 7 . 0 
H o n d u r a s * 8 . 8 9 . 0 9 . 2 9 . 5 10.7 11 .7 
M e x i c o 7 . 2 6 . 8 8 . 3 6 . 9 5 .7 4 . 5 4 . 2 4 .1 6 . 7 6 . 0 5 . 0 
N i c a r a g u a ' 1 8 . 3 1 5 . 8 1 9 . 9 15 .2 1 6 . 3 
P a n a m a ' 8 . 6 9 . 0 9 . 6 1 1 . 6 9 . 8 1 1 . 8 1 0 . 3 11 . 4 11 .1 11 .5 
P a r a g u a y 6 . 7 5 . 4 4 .1 5 .9 4 .1 2 .2 5 . 6 8 . 4 7 .4 
P e r u 8 . 4 9 . 4 10 .4 11 .2 1 0 . 9 10 .4 1 0 . 6 1 3 . 9 16 .4 
Uruguay" 1 12.7 1 1 . 8 10 .1 8 . 3 7 .4 6 .7 1 1 . 9 15 .5 1 4 . 0 13 .1 
V e n e z u e l a " 8 . 3 6 . 8 5 . 5 5 .1 5 . 8 6 . 6 6 . 8 7 . 8 10 .5 12 . 9 1 3 . 3 
Source: ECLAC and PREALC, un the basis of official figures. 
'National urban; average April-October. "La Par, 1977. 1978 and 1979; second semester; 1980, average May-October; 1983 and 1984, second 
semester. ' Metropolitan areas of Rio de Janeiro, Sao Paulo. Belo Horizonte, Porto Alegre, Salvador and Recife, average for 12 months; 1980, average June-
December. 'Bogotá, Barranquilla, Medellin and Cali, average for March, June, September and December. 'National Urban; average for March, July and 
November; 1984. average March and November. 'Greater Santiago; average fur four quarters; as from August 1983 data relate to the metropolitan area of 
Santiago. National averages. Metropolitan areas of México City, Guadalajara and Monterrey, average for four quarters; 1985, average for three 
quarters. Non-agriculturaI activities. ' National urban; 1980 corresponds to urban unemployment recorded in the population census taken in that year; 1981, 
1982 and 1985, metropolitan area. 'Asunción. Fernandode la Mora, Lambarl and urban areas of Luque and San Lorenzo, annual average; 1981, first semester; 1983. 
average September, October and November; 1984, average August and September. Non-agriculturaI activities. "Montevideo, average for four 
charters. "National urban, average for two semesters; 1984 and 1985. national average. 
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T a b l e 9 
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: EVOLUTION OF RATE OF 
UNEMPLOYMENT IN PRINCIPAL CITIES 
1 9 8 0 1 9 8 1 1 9 8 2 1 9 8 3 1 9 8 4 1 9 8 5 
1 9 8 4 1 9 8 5 ° 
I II I I I I V I I I I I I I V 
L a t i n A m e r i c a 6 . 2 6 . 6 7 . 0 8 .1 8 . 2 7 . 8 8 . 6 8 . 3 8 . 5 7 . 6 8 .1 7 . 7 7 . 5 
A r g e n t i n a ' 
C a p i t a l a n d G r e a t e r 
B u e n o s A i r e s 2 . 3 4 . 5 4 . 7 4 . 0 3 . 8 5 . 3 4 . 0 3 . 6 5 . 6 4 . 9 
C ó r d o b a 2 . 4 3 . 8 4 . 4 5 . 0 4 . 8 5 . 0 4 . 4 5 .1 5 . 3 4 . 7 
G r e a t e r M e n d o z a 2 . 3 4 . 8 4 . 1 4 . 5 4 . 5 3 .7 5 . 0 3 . 9 3 .7 3 .7 
R o s a r i o 3 . 4 5 . 8 8 . 4 6 . 3 6 . 7 10.7 7 . 0 6 . 3 11 .1 10 .2 
B r a z i l ' 
R i o d e J a n e i r o 7 . 5 8 . 6 6 . 6 6 . 2 6 . 8 4 . 9 6 . 9 7 . 4 6 . 7 6 . 0 6 . 0 5 . 4 4 . 5 3 . 6 
S â o P a u l o 5 . 7 7 . 3 6 . 0 6 . 8 6 . 8 5 . 0 7 . 8 7 . 5 6 . 7 5 . 1 6 . 1 5 . 8 4 . 8 3 .5 
R e c i t e 6 . 9 8 . 6 7 . 5 8 . 0 9 . 0 7 . 2 8 . 9 9 . 6 9 . 9 7 . 5 7 . 8 8 . 4 7 . 3 5 . 4 
P o r t o A l e g r e 4 . 5 5 . 8 5 . 3 6 . 7 7 . 0 5 . 4 7 . 6 8 . 2 6 . 9 5 . 3 5 . 8 6 . 3 5 . 6 4 . 0 
C o l o m b i a ' 
B o g o t á 7 . 9 5 .5 7 . 4 9 . 4 12 .2 1 2 . 8 1 2 . 6 1 2 . 0 1 1 . 8 1 2 . 4 13 .7 13 .2 1 2 . 6 11 .7 
B a r r a n q u i l l a 8 . 1 11 .1 1 0 . 4 1 3 . 8 1 3 . 8 15 .7 1 4 . 4 13 .1 1 5 . 3 1 2 . 4 14 .3 1 7 . 9 1 7 . 5 13 .1 
M e d e l l i n 14 .7 13 .1 1 3 . 3 1 7 . 0 1 6 . 4 1 6 . 0 16 .1 17 .1 1 5 . 3 17 .1 16 .1 16 .5 1 5 . 6 15 .7 
Cal i 1 0 . 0 9 . 0 9 . 6 1 1 . 6 1 3 . 3 1 4 . 4 1 3 . 4 1 2 . 9 1 4 . 5 1 2 . 5 1 3 . 4 1 5 . 4 15 .2 13 .7 
M c x i a / 
M é x i c o C i t y 4 . 3 3 . 9 4 . 0 6 . 3 5 . 8 5 .1 5 .4 5 . 3 6 . 4 6 . 2 5 .7 4 . 3 5 .2 
G u a d a l a j a r a 5 . 0 5 . 8 5 . 0 7 . 4 6 .1 3 . 8 6 . 9 5 .7 6 . 0 5 .7 3 . 9 3 .5 3 . 9 
M o n t e r r e y 5 .2 4 .2 4 . 9 9 . 8 7 . 5 5 . 8 8 .3 7 . 0 8 . 5 6 . 2 6 . 9 5 .1 5 . 4 
A s u n c i ó n ( P a r a g u a y ) 1 3 . 9 2 .2 5 . 6 8 . 4 7 . 4 7 . 4 
C a r a c a s ( V e n e z u e l a ) 6 . 7 5 .7 7 . 0 9 . 9 13 .2 12 .5 13.5 1 2 . 8 1 3 . 8 12.6 1 2 . 5 
L i m a ( P e r u ) 7 . 1 6 . 8 6 . 6 9 . 0 8 . 9 8 . 9 
L a P a z ( B o l i v i a / 7 . 5 9 . 4 1 2 . 8 1 2 . 6 1 2 . 9 12 .2 
M o n t e v i d e o ( U r u g u a y ) 7 . 4 6 . 6 1 1 . 9 15 .5 1 4 . 0 13 .1 1 4 . 6 14 .1 14.7 12 .7 13 .7 1 3 . 2 1 3 . 6 1 2 . 0 
S a n J o s é ( C o s t a R i c a ) ' 5 . 6 9 . 3 10 .5 8 . 5 6 . 6 6 . 5 7 . 9 5 .2 6 . 3 7 . 4 5 . 9 
S a n t i a g o ( C h i l e ) 1 " 11 .7 9 . 0 2 0 . 0 1 8 . 9 1 8 . 5 1 7 . 0 18 .3 1 8 . 4 1 9 . 0 18 .1 1 7 . 3 17 .2 18 .5 15 .1 
Source: ECLAC, on the basis of official data. 
'Provisional figures. 'Weighted average for the 25 cities with the largest population in Latin America. Havana,Santo Domingo, Fortaleza, Curitiba, Guayaquil, 
San Juan (Puerto Rico) and Guatemala City are excluded, for want of comparable data. ' Fi cures for April and October. 'Quarterly averages. 'Figures 
for March,July, September and December; 1985, March,July, September and December. 7Metropolitan areas; quarterly averages. 'Including Fernando de 
la Mora, Lambari and the urban areas of Luque and San Fernando; 1981, first semester; 1982, first quarter; 1983, average for September,October and November;- 1984, 
average for August, September and October. 'Metropolitan area; 1980 to 1983, average for two semesters; 1984, quarterly averages; 1985, first 
semester. ^Metropolitan area; 1980, April; 1981 to 1984, June. ' 1980, May to October; 1982 to 1984, average for June to December. ' 1980, average 
for two semesters; >981, quarterly averages. 'Figures for March, July and November; 1984, March and November only. "Greater Santiago, quarterly 
averages. As from August 1983, data refer to the Metropolitan Region of Santiago. 
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T a b l e 9 
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: EMPLOYMENT IN MANUFACTURING 
f1980 = 100) 
1981 1 9 8 2 1 9 8 3 1 9 8 4 1 9 8 5 " 
I 
1 9 8 4 
I I I I I I V I 
1 9 8 5 
I I I I I I V 
A r g e n t i n a 6 8 7 . 4 8 2 . 8 8 5 . 5 8 8 . 0 8 8 . 7 8 8 . 3 8 7 . 4 8 7 . 1 8 8 . 9 9 2 . 9 8 4 . 6 
B r a z i l ' 93 .1 8 8 . 5 8 1 . 6 8 1 . 5 8 8 . 1 7 9 . 5 8 0 . 6 8 1 . 9 8 3 . 9 8 6 . 0 8 7 . 3 8 8 . 8 9 0 . 7 
C o l o m b i a 9 5 . 5 9 0 . 5 8 4 . 5 8 3 . 6 8 2 . 4 8 2 . 7 8 3 . 3 8 3 . 8 8 4 . 6 8 1 . 9 8 2 . 4 8 2 . 8 
C o s t a R i c a ' 1 0 0 . 4 1 0 2 . 1 1 2 3 . 6 1 3 1 . 8 12B.8 1 3 4 . 7 
C h i l / 1 0 2 . 2 8 0 . 9 7 8 . 8 9 0 . 3 9 5 . 5 8 1 . 4 8 9 . 4 9 3 . 5 9 7 . 0 9 5 . 2 9 6 . 2 8 7 . 9 1 0 2 . 8 
E c u a d o r * 108 .5 1 1 0 . 1 1 0 5 . 3 1 0 4 . 5 103 .5 1 0 1 . 8 1 0 6 . 2 1 0 6 . 5 
P a n a m a ' 1 1 0 1 . 6 1 0 1 . 4 9 7 . 4 9 1 . 9 9 3 . 0 9 0 . 9 
M e x i c o 1 1 0 5 . 6 1 0 3 . 0 9 3 . 1 9 2 . 2 9 4 . 5 9 1 . 2 9 1 . 8 9 2 . 8 92.9 9 3 . 1 9 5 , 0 9 5 . 2 9 4 . 0 
Peru" 101 .1 9 4 . 7 9 4 . 3 8 4 . 4 8 3 . 3 86 .1 8 4 . 1 8 3 . 5 8 3 . 7 8 3 . 5 8 3 . 7 8 3 . 0 8 3 . 1 
V e n e z u e l a * 1 0 2 . 4 1 0 2 . 3 9 6 . 8 9 8 . 0 9 6 . 9 1 0 1 . 1 
P e r c e n t a g e v a r i a t i o n 
A r g e n t i n a 6 - 1 2 . 6 - 5 . 3 3 . 3 2 . 9 1 . 0 1 .6 1 . 8 4 . 3 3 . 8 5 .1 -3 .2 
8 . 4 B r a z i l ' - 6 . 9 - 4 . 9 - 7 . 8 - 0 . 2 8 . 2 - 5 . 0 - 2 . 1 1.2 5 . 3 8 .2 8 . 4 8 . 2 
C o l o m b i a * -4 .5 - 5 . 2 - 6 . 6 - 1 . 1 - 1 . 1 -3 .3 - 1 . 4 0 . 2 0 . 5 - 0 . 9 -1 .1 - 1 . 2 
C o s t a R i c a ' 0 . 4 1.7 2 1 . 4 6 . 6 2 5 . 7 - 2 . 1 
C h i l e ' 2 . 2 - 2 0 . 8 - 2 . 7 14 .7 5 . 8 8 . 0 1 7 . 9 1 3 . 0 19 .5 1 6 . 9 7.7 - 5 . 9 6 . 0 
E c u a d o r * 8 .5 1.4 - 4 . 4 - 0 . 7 -1 .7 - 2 . 8 0 . 7 1.1 
P a n a m a 6 1.6 - 0 . 2 - 4 . 0 - 6 . 3 - 5 . 2 - 7 . 4 
M e x i c o 1 5 . 6 - 2 . 5 - 9 . 6 - 1 . 0 2 . 6 -3 .5 - 2 . 4 0 .1 1 .9 2 .1 3.5 2 . 6 2 . 8 
Peru" 1.1 - 1 . 4 - 5 . 4 - 1 0 . 5 - 1 . 3 - 1 1 . 9 - 1 2 . 0 -9.9 - 8 . 2 - 3 . 1 -0 .5 - 0 . 6 -0 .7 
V e n e z u e l a * 2 . 4 - 0 . 1 - 5 . 4 2 . 3 0 . 3 4 . 2 
Source: ECLAC, on the basis of official figures. 
•Provisional fibres. 'Personnel gainfully employed In productive activities; 1985,January roJune. ' Personnel employed in industry in the Stare of S i i 
Piulo Total employment in manufacturing industry; 1985,January to September. 1 Wage-earning population employed in industry in the metropolitan 
area of San Josi; average for March, June and November; 1984, March and November 'Personnel employed in manufacturing industry in Greater Santiago 
Quarterly averages. As from August I98J. data relate to the Metropolitan Region of Santiago. "Personnel employed in manufacturing. Average for four 
quarers. Personnel employed in manufacturing in rhe districts of Panama and Colón, Quarterly averages; 1984, January to June 'Personnel employed in 
manufacturing. Quarterly averages; 1985, January to October. 'Index of employment in manufacturing in the metropolitan area of Lima, Quarterly 
averages. Personnel employed in manufacturing Average for two semesters. 'in relation to the same period in the preceding year. 
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Table 2728 
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: EVOLUTION OF CONSUMER PRICES 
{Variations from December to December) 
C o u n t r y 1 9 7 6 1 9 7 7 1 9 7 8 1 9 7 9 1 9 8 0 1 9 8 1 1 9 8 2 1 9 8 3 1 9 8 4 1 9 8 5 
L a t i n A m e r i c a " 6 2 . 3 4 0 . 0 3 9 . 0 5 4 . 1 56 .1 5 7 . 6 8 4 . 8 1 3 1 . 1 1 8 5 . 2 2 7 4 . 5 
L a t i n A m e r i c a , 
e x c l u d i n g B o l i v i a 
a n d C u b a 6 3 . 2 4 0 . 5 3 9 . 5 5 4 . 3 5 6 . 6 5 8 . 2 8 1 . 3 1 2 7 . 8 1 5 2 . 0 1 4 1 . 8 
A r g e n t i n a 3 4 7 . 5 1 5 0 . 4 1 6 9 . 8 139 .7 8 7 . 6 1 3 1 . 2 2 0 8 . 7 4 3 3 . 7 6 8 8 . 0 3 8 5 . 4 
B a r b a d o s 3 . 9 9 . 9 1 1 . 3 16 .8 16 .1 1 2 . 3 6 . 9 5 .5 5.1 3 . 0 ' 
B o l i v i a 5 .5 10 .5 13 .5 4 5 . 5 2 3 . 9 2 5 . 2 2 9 6 . 5 3 2 8 . 5 2 1 7 7 . 2 8 1 7 0 . 5 
B r a z i l ' 4 4 . 8 4 3 . 1 38 .1 7 6 . 0 9 5 . 3 9 1 . 2 9 7 . 9 1 7 9 . 2 2 0 3 . 3 2 2 3 . 0 
C o l o m b i a ' ' 2 5 . 9 2 9 . 3 17 .8 2 9 . 8 2 6 . 5 2 7 . 5 2 4 . 1 16 .5 18 .3 2 2 . 5 
C o s t a R i c a 4 . 4 5 . 3 8 .1 13.2 1 7 . 8 6 5 . 1 8 1 . 7 10 .7 17 .3 1 0 . 9 
C h i l e 1 7 4 . 3 6 3 . 5 3 0 . 3 3 8 . 9 3 1 . 2 9 . 5 2 0 . 7 2 3 . 6 2 3 . 0 2 6 . 4 
E c u a d o r ' 13 .1 9 . 8 1 1 . 8 9 . 0 14 .5 1 7 . 9 2 4 . 3 5 2 . 5 25 .1 2 4 . 4 
E l S a l v a d o r 5 .2 1 4 . 9 1 4 . 6 14 .8 1 8 . 6 1 1 . 6 1 3 . 8 15 .5 9 . 8 32 .1 
G u a t e m a l a 1 8 . 9 7 . 4 9 .1 13.7 9 .1 8 . 7 - 2 . 0 1 5 . 4 5 .2 3 1 . 5 
G u y a n a 9 . 2 9 . 0 2 0 . 0 19 .4 8 . 5 2 9 . 1 
H a i t i ' - 1 . 4 5 .5 5 .5 15 .4 15 .3 16 .4 6 .2 12 .2 6 .1 1 5 . 0 
H o n d u r a s 5 . 6 7 .7 5 . 4 2 2 . 5 11 .5 9 . 2 8 . 8 7 . 8 3.7 4 .2 
J a m a i c a 8 . 3 14 .1 4 9 . 4 19 .8 2 8 . 6 4 . 8 7 . 0 16.7 31 .2 2 2 . 8 ' 
M e x i c o 2 7 . 2 2 0 . 7 16 .2 2 0 . 0 2 9 . 8 2 8 . 7 9 8 . 8 8 0 . 8 59 .2 6 3 . 7 
N i c a r a g u a 6 . 2 10 .2 4 . 3 7 0 . 3 2 4 . 8 2 3 . 2 2 2 . 2 3 2 . 9 50 .2 3 3 4 . 5 
P a n a m a 4 . 8 4 . 8 5 . 0 10 .0 1 4 . 4 4 . 8 3 .7 2 . 0 0 . 9 0 . 8 ' 
P a r a g u a y 3 . 4 9 . 4 1 6 . 8 3 5 . 7 8 . 9 1 5 . 0 4 . 2 14.1 2 9 . 8 2 4 . 0 
P e r u 4 4 . 7 3 2 . 4 7 3 . 7 6 6 . 7 5 9 . 7 7 2 . 7 7 2 . 9 125 .1 1 1 1 . 5 1 5 8 . 3 
D o m i n i c a n R e p u b l i c * 7 . 0 8 . 5 1 .8 2 6 . 2 4 . 2 7 . 4 7 .1 9 . 8 4 0 . 9 3 9 . 4 s 
T r i n i d a d a n d T o b a g o 12 .0 11.4 8 . 8 19 .5 1 6 . 6 11.6 1 0 . 8 15 .4 14.1 6.9> 
U r u g u a y 3 9 . 9 5 7 . 3 4 6 . 0 8 3 . 1 4 2 . 8 2 9 . 4 2 0 . 5 5 1 . 5 66.1 8 3 . 0 
V e n e z u e l a 6 . 9 8.1 7 .1 2 0 . 5 1 9 . 6 1 0 . 8 7 . 9 7 . 0 13 .3 5 . 8 
Source: International Monetary Fund, International Financial Statistict, November 1984, and official information supplied by the countries. 
'Excluding Cuba. ''Variation between October 1985 and October 1984. ' Up to 1979, figures represent the Consumer Price Index in the city of Rio de Janeiro; 
from 1980 on wards, the variation in the national total. Up ca 1980, figures represent the variation in the Consumer Price Index for manual workers; from 1981 
onwards the variation in the national total, including manual workers and employees. ' U p to 1982, figures represents the variation in the Consumer Price Index 
in the city of Quito; from 198} onwards, the variation in ihe national total. 'Variation between September 1985 and September 1984. 'Variation between 
November 1985 and November 1984. Up to 1982, refers to the variation in the Consumer Price Index for (heCity of Santo Domingo; from 1985 onwards, refers 
to variation in (he national total. 
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: NET INFLOW OF CAPITAL 
AND TRANSFERS OF RESOURCES 
(Billions of dollars and percentages) 
Y e a r 
N e t i n f l o w 
o f c a p i t a l 
<1> 
N e t p a y m e n t s 
o f p r o f i t s 
a n d i n t e r e s t 
( 2 ) 
T r a n s f e r s o f 
r e s o u r c e s 
( 3 ) = ( l ) - ( 2 ) 
( 3 ) 
E x p o r t s o f 
g o o d s a n d 
s e r v i c e s 
( 4 ) 
T r a n s f e r s o f 
r e s o u r c e s / 
e x p o r t s o f 
g o o d s a n d 
s e r v i c e s * 
< 5 ) = < 3 ) / ( 4 ) 
( 5 ) 
1 9 7 3 7 . 9 4 . 2 3 .7 2 8 . 9 1 2 . 8 
1 9 7 4 1 1 . 4 5 . 0 6 . 4 4 3 . 6 14.7 
1 9 7 5 14 .2 5 .5 8 . 7 4 1 . 1 2 1 . 2 
1 9 7 6 1 7 . 8 6 . 8 1 1 . 0 4 7 . 3 2 3 . 3 
1 9 7 7 17 .1 8 . 2 8 . 9 5 5 . 9 1 5 . 9 
1 9 7 8 2 6 . 1 10 .2 1 5 . 9 6 1 . 3 2 5 . 9 
1 9 7 9 2 9 . 0 1 3 . 6 1 5 . 4 8 2 . 0 1 8 . 8 
1 9 8 0 2 9 . 5 1 7 . 9 1 1 . 6 1 0 7 . 6 1 0 . 8 
1 9 8 1 3 7 . 3 2 7 . 1 10 .2 116 .1 8 . 8 
1 9 8 2 1 9 . 8 3 8 . 7 - 1 8 . 9 1 0 3 . 2 - 1 8 . 3 
1 9 8 3 3 . 0 3 4 . 2 - 3 1 . 2 1 0 2 . 4 - 3 0 . 5 
1 9 8 4 1 0 . 3 3 6 . 1 - 2 5 . 8 1 1 3 . 9 - 2 2 . 7 
1 9 8 5 ' 4 . 7 3 5 . 1 - 3 0 . 4 1 0 8 . 0 - 2 8 . 1 
Source: 1973-1984: International Monetary Fund. Balance «/ Payment! Yearbook; 1985: ECLAC, on the basis of official data. 
'Percentages. Provisional estimates subject to revision. 
Table 9 
L A T I N A M E R I C A A N D T H E C A R I B B E A N : R A T I O O F T O T A L I N T E R E S T P A Y M E N T S T O 
E X P O R T S O F G O O D S A N D S E R V I C E S " 
I Pcrcoilufie n 
1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985'' 
Latin A m e r i c a 15.5 17.4 19.9 2 7 . 6 40 .5 3 5 . 9 35 .7 3 6 . 0 
O i l - e x p o r t i n g countr ies 16.0 15.7 16.6 2 2 . 6 35.1 32 .4 32 .2 3 2 . 0 
Inolivi J 1 3.7 18.1 24.5 32.1 43.5 44.4 63.1 60 .0 
Hai .idi >r 10.5 13.6 18.2 24.3 30.1 27.4 27.8 24.5 
Mexico 24.0 21.8 23.3 29.0 46 .0 39.3 40.2 37.0 
Peru 21.2 14.7 16.0 24.1 25,1 29.8 34.0 34.5 
Ve nei: ue Ja 7.2 6 .9 8.1 12.7 21.0 21.6 17.5 22.5 
N o n - o i l - e x p o r t i n g 
countr ies 15.1 18.8 23 .1 .32.7 45 .2 39 .4 38 .7 4 0 . 0 
Argentina 9 .6 12.8 22.0 35.5 53.6 58,4 58,7 54.5 
Brazil 24.5 31.5 34.1 40.4 57.1 43,5 38.7 43.5 
Colombia 7.7 10.1 11.8 21.8 25.8 26.5 23.6 23 .0 
Costa Rica 9.9 12.8 18.0 28.0 36.1 32.8 30.7 28 .0 
Chile 17.0 16.5 19.3 38.8 49,5 39.4 50.0 46.5 
HI Salvador 5.1 5.3 5.9 7.9 11.9 12.3 13.2 14.0 
(niatemala 3.6 3.1 5.3 7.5 7.8 8.7 8,9 11,5 
Haiti 2.8 3.3 2.0 2.5 2.2 2.4 5.3 5.0 
Honduras 8.2 8 .6 10.6 14.5 22.4 16,4 17.1 17,0 
Nicaragua 9.3 9.7 17.8 22.2 32.2 14.3 11.7 17.0 
Paraguay «.5 10.7 14.3 16.4 15.6 16,4 14.3 13.0 
Dominican Republic 14.0 14.4 14.7 20.2 22.6 24.5 19.7 18.5 
Uruguay 10.4 9 .0 11.0 12.9 22.4 24.8 3.3.8 .35.5 
Sou ili': IM7H-IVSI l;(.l,A(., on tlic b.isi-. ..f ijM Ir. mi [he IIIIM na li nú] Mi nKi.it', l'unii, I W ! f : LA' , .n i !u b.isi' ,.>f lili..i , ,i.i[.i 





LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: TERMS OF RESCHEDULING OF EXTERNAL DEBT WITH THE 
INTERNATIONAL PRIVATE BANKS, 1982-1985 a/ 
Country 






























Argentina 2, . 16c/ 6. ,8c/ 1. 25c/ - - - 1. 44 11. 5 0.15 
Brazil 2, .32 8. .0 1. 50 2.00 9.0 1.00 
Costa Rica 2, .25 8. .0 1. 00 - - - 1. ,66 9. 4 1.00 
Cuba 2, .25 7. .0 1. 25 1.88 9.0 0.88 1. ,50 10. .0 0.38 
Chile 2 .16 7, .0 1. ,25 1.75 9.0 0.63 1, .42 12. ,0 0.08 
Ecuador 2 .28 6 .7 1. .25 1.75 9.0 0.88 1, .39 11. ,9 -
Honduras 2 .38 7 .0 1. .38 - - - 1, .58 11. .0 0.88 
Mexico 1 .95 7 .6 1. .05 1.50 10.0 0.63 1, .13 14, .0 -
Panama 2 .25 6 .0 1. ,50 - - - 1, .40 11. .7 0.05 
Peru 2 .25 8 .0 1. .25 1.75d/ 9.0d/ 0.75d/ 
Dominican Republic 2 . 25c/ 6 ,0 c/ 1.25c/ - - - 1. .38 13. .0 -
Uruguay 2 .25 6 .0 1. ,41 - - - 1. .38 12, .0 -
Venezuela - - - - - - 1. .13 12. .5 -
Source; ECLAC, Economic Development Division, on the basis of official information from the countries and from 
various national and international sources. 
a/ Each column shows the terms agreed upon with the banks for rescheduled maturities and/or new credits. When the 
country negotiated both a maturity rescheduling and new loans, the figure represents a weighted average of the 
two components. 
b/ Calculated as a percentage of the total amount of the transaction and paid once and for all at the time of 
signing the loan contracts. 
c/ This agreement never came into force. The corresponding maturities were finally incorporated in the agreement 
concerted during the third round, 
d/ This agreement has not been terminated. 
T a b l e 11 
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT AND MEDIUM- AND, LONG-TERM LOANS 
Millions of dollars Millions of dollars at 1970 prices a/ 














Balance Net inflow 
Interest 
paid Balance 
Average 1961- 1965 330 -1 147 -817 511 -410 101 383 -1 334 -951 604 -475 129 
Average 1966- 1970 726 -1 676 -950 1 661 -886 775 760 -1 761 -1 001 1 728 -926 802 
Average 1971- 1975 1 712 -2 219 -507 7 740 -2 973 4 767 1 202 -1 618 -416 5 245 -2 025 3 220 
Average 1976- 1980 3 710 -3 312 398 18 968 -13 017 5 951 1 570 -1 442 128 8 159 -5 382 2 777 
1978 3 814 -3 447 367 19 142 -10 328 8 814 1 764 -1 595 169 8 857 -4 779 4 078 
1979 4 921 -3 960 961 20 803 -15 705 5 098 1 994 -1 605 389 8 432 -6 366 2 066 
1980 5 482 -3 966 1 516 27 887 -25 379 2 508 1 907 -1 379 528 9 703 -8 830 873 
1981 7 171 -4 933 2 238 38 148 -37 295 853 2 345 -1 613 732 12 478 -12 199 279 
1982 5 691 -4 934 757 17 840 -46 697 -28 857 1 859 -1 611 248 5 828 -15 255 -9 427 
1983 3 128 -3 174 -46 1 444 -39 846 -38 402 1 026 -1 041 -15 473 -13 077 -12 604 
1984 -3 183 -43 449 -1 037 -14 166 
Source: ECLAC, Economic Development Division, on the basis of International Monetary Fund, Balance of Payments Yearbook, 
1985. 
a/ Relates to nominal figures deflated by the unit value index of imports of goods and services, 




1981 1982 1983 1984 1984 1985 
Total 96.5 100.5 51.8 36.6 15.7 12.5 
Industrialized countries 45.1 43.6 22.7 16.4 8.1 5.7 
Developing countries 48.1 53.5 26.7 17.1 6.2 4.2 
Voluntary loans (48.1) (42.3) (13.0) (10.6) (5.4) (3.0) 
Involuntary loans a/ ( - ) (11.2) (13.7) (6.5) (0.8) (1.2) 
Others 3.3 3.4 2.4 3.1 1.4 2.6 
Source: Bank for International Settlements, International Banking and Financial 
Market Developments, Basle, October 1985, p. 12. 
a/ Loans forming part of the debt rescheduling process. 
Q Table 16 
BANK EUROCURRENCY CREDITS 
(Billions of dollars) 
Table 11 
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: EXPOSURE OF THE UNITED STATES BANKS, BY SIZE OF INSTITUTION a/ 
(Billions of dollars) 































Latin America 82, .5 49, .1 16. ,4 17. ,0 82.0 52, .6 15. .2 14. 2 •Ä 7. -7. ,3 -16.5 
Argentina 8, .8 5, .6 1. ,8 1. ,4 8.5 6, .0 1. ,6 0. 9 -3, .4 7. . 1 -11. ,1 -35.7 
Brazil 20, .5 12. .3 4. ,2 4. ,0 23.9 16. .0 4. .5 3. 4 16, .6 30. .1 7. .1 -15.0 
Colombia 3. .0 2. ,0 0. 5 0. 5 2.6c/ 1. .9 0. ,4 0. 3 -13. ,3c/ -5. ,0 -20. 0 -40.0 
Chile 6. ,1 3. ,3 1. 2 1. 6 5.9 3. ,6 1. 0 1. 3 -3. .3 9. ,1 -16. 7 -18.8 
Mexico 25. .2 13. ,6 5. .2 6. ,4 24.8 13. ,9 5. ,0 5. 9 -1. .6 2. ,2 -3. ,9 -7.8 
Peru 2. .3 1. .3 0. 6 0. ,4 1.7 1. ,0 0. ,4 0. 3 -26. .1 -23. ,1 -33. ,3 -25.0 
Venezuela 10. .7 7. ,2 1. 9 1. 6 10.0 7. , 1 1. ,7 1. 2 -6. .5 -1. .3 -10. 5 -25.0 
Source: United States Federal Financial Institutions Examination Council. 
a/ Excluding Panama. 
bj Comprising a total of 143 banks. 
cj At the end of 1985 Colombia obtained a Eurocurrency credit of one billion dollars, which increased the exposure of the 
O United States banks in that country. 
Table 20 
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: OFFICIAL RESERVES 
AND TOTAL BANK DEPOSITS OUTSIDE THE REGION 
(Billions of dollars) 
Gross inter- Deposits outside Deposits outside . , r ' . national the region as a the region, & _ , reserves, percentage of 
, n o c September international I7ÖJ IrtOC 
1985 reserves 
(1) (2) (3)=(l)/(2) 
Latin America and 
the Caribbean 83 389 33 264 250.7 
Argentina 9 020 2 162 417.2 
Bolivia 207 166 124.7 
Brazil 16 722 10 851a/ 154.1 
Colombia 3 433 1 095 314.4 
Costa Rica 193 453 42.6 
Chile 2 774 1 586 174.9 
Ecuador 2 006 582 344.7 
El Salvador 106 180 58.9 
Guatemala 1 305 213 612.7 
Haiti 120 6 2 000.0 
Honduras 133 110 120.9 
Mexico 21 537 4 512a/ 477.3 
Nicaragua 195 * * • • • • 
Paraguay 458 522 87.7 
Peru 2 551 1 296b/ 196.8 
Dominican Republic 255 165 154.5 
Uruguay 2 491 148 1 683.1 
Venezuela 19 873 9 217 215.6 
Source: ECLAC, Economic Development Division, on the basis of data supplied by 
the Bank for International Settlements and the International Monetary 
Fund. 
a/ August 1985. 
b/ July 1985. 
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T a b l e 11 
SELECTED MEASURES BY UNITED STATES COMMERCIAL BANKS AND THE UNITED 
STATES GOVERNMENT TO RESCUE PROBLEM DOMESTIC BORROWERS 
Measures adopted 
F A R M E R S 1. The government-owned Farmers' Home Administration can guarantee up 
to 90% of a loan restructured by a commercial bank, provided it has 
agreed to writedown 10% of the loan principal. Alternatively, the 
bank can take the writedown in the form of a lower interest rate. 
2. The Federal Reserve System instructed bank regulators to refrain 
from action which would discourage banks from exercising appropriate 
forbearance when these latter are co-operating with farmers having 
problem debts. 
3. The Federal Reserve System encouraged banks to extend due dates on 




1. Private b a n k s consolidated short-term loans into m e d i u m - t e r m 
liabilities. 
2. The banks granted new loans. 
3. Interest rates were capped; when interest rates rose above the 
designated levels payment of part of the interest was deferred. 





1. New lending by the banks took place to refinance interest payments 
and allow firms to finish construction projects-. 
2. The banks swapped debt for real estate. 
3. The banks established below-market interest rates. 
O 
CO 
Source: Based on data collected by the Washington Office of ECLAC and an Richard Weinert, 
"Banks and bankruptcy", Foreign Policy, No. 50, Spring 1983. 
Q Table 16 
L A T I N A M E R I C A A N D T H E C A R I B B E A N : E V O L U T I O N O F A V E R A G E R E A L W A G E S 
Country 1975 1 9 7 6 1977 1 9 7 8 1979 1 9 8 0 1981 1982 1 9 8 3 1984 1985° 
Annual average indexes ( 1 9 8 0 = 100) 
A r g e n t i n a 4 119 .6 80 .5 79 .3 77 .9 89.5 100 .0 8 9 . 4 80 .1 103 .6 131.5 114 .3 
B r a z i l ' 8 0 . 9 28 .7 89.1 9 3 . 9 95.1 100 .0 108.5 121.6 112.7 105.1 113 .1 
Colombia 1 ' 86 .5 88 .5 83.5 93 .2 99 .3 100.0 101 .4 105.2 110.4 118.7 114 .0 
Costa R i c a ' 70 .2 7 9 . 6 8 7 . 0 94 .7 99 .2 100.0 88 .3 70 .8 72.5 84 .7 9 2 . 2 
Chi le 7 69 .5 70 .5 79 .6 84.7 91 .8 100.0 109.1 108.7 97 .1 9 7 . 4 9 3 . 0 
M e x i c o 8 9 8 . 8 107.4 109.1 106.2 104.5 100.0 103.0 107.5 76 .2 71.7 73 .1 
Peru* 119 .9 130 .0 108.7 9 4 . 9 88 .9 100 .0 98 .2 100 .4 8 3 . 6 7 0 . 8 59.7 
Uruguay' 136 .5 128.5 113.2 109.1 100.3 100 .0 107.5 107.2 8 5 . 0 77.3 8 8 . 0 
Percentage variation7 
A r g e n t i n a 4 -5 .9 -32 .7 -1.5 -1 .8 14.3 11.8 - 1 0 . 6 -10 .4 29 .3 26 .9 - 1 3 . 0 
Braz i l c 9 .9 5 .9 4 .0 5.4 1.3 5.2 8.5 12.1 -7 .3 -6.7 7 .8 
Colombia ' ' -1 .8 2 .2 -5 .6 11.5 0.5 0 .8 1.1 3.7 5.0 7.5 -3 .3 
Costa R i c a ' -3.7 -13 .2 9 . 4 8 .8 4 .8 0 . 8 -11.7 - 1 9 . 8 10.9 7 .8 8 . 9 
Chi le 7 -4 .2 1.4 12.9 6.5 8.3 9 .0 9 .1 -0 .4 - 1 0 . 6 0 .3 -4.5 
M e x i c o 8 5.6 8 .6 1.6 -2.7 -1 .6 -4 .3 3 .0 4 .3 -29 .1 -5 .9 1.9 
P e r u 4 - 1 4 . 9 8.5 -16 .6 -12 .7 -6.3 12.4 -1 .8 2.2 -16 .7 -15 .3 -15 .7 
Uruguay' -8 .8 - 5 . 8 -11 .9 -3 .6 -8.1 -0 .4 7.5 -0 .3 -20 .7 -9 .1 14.1 
S o u r c e : E C L A C a n d P R E A L C , o n t h e b a s i s o f o f f i c i a l d a t a . 
" P r o v i s i o n a l f i g u r e s . b W a g e s o f m a n u a l w o r k e r s in m a n u f a c t u r i n g . c A v e r a g e w a g e s in b a s i c i n d u s t r i e s , d e f l a t e d b y t h e R i o d e J a n e i r o C P I ; 1 9 8 5 , a v e r a g e 
J a n u a r y to N o v e m b e r . rfWages o f m a n u a l w o r k e r s in m a n u f a c t u r i n g ; 1 9 8 5 , a v e r a g e J a n u a r y t o S e p t e m b e r . ' D e c l a r e d w a g e s o f w o r k e r s c o v e r e d by S o c i a l 
S e c u r i t y ; 1 9 8 5 , J a n u a r y t o N o v e m b e r . ^ A v e r a g e w a g e s o f m a n u a l w o r k e r s in n o n - a g r i c u l t u r a l s e c t o r s . * A v e r a g e w a g e s in m a n u f a c t u r i n g ; 1 9 8 5 , a v e r a g e 
J a n u a r y t o J u l y . h W a g e s o f m a n u a l w o r k e r s in t h e p r i v a t e s e c t o r in t h e m e t r o p o l i t a n a r e a o f L i m a ; 1 9 8 5 , a v e r a g e J a n u a r y t o O c t o b e r . ' I n d e x o f a v e r a g e 
r e a l w a g e s . ' I n r e l a t i o n t o t h e s a m e p e r i o d in t h e p r e c e d i n g y e a r . 
Table 20 
L A T I N A M E R I C A A N D T H E C A R I B B E A N : E V O L U T I O N O F U R B A N R E A L M I N I M U M W A G E 
(1980 = 100) 
C o u n t r y 1 9 7 6 1 9 7 7 1 9 7 8 1 9 7 9 1 9 8 0 1 9 8 1 1 9 8 2 1 9 8 3 1 9 8 4 1 9 8 5 " 
A r g e n t i n a 6 1 0 4 . 0 99.7 8 1 . 0 8 5 . 3 1 0 0 . 0 9 7 . 8 9 7 . 2 1 3 6 . 9 1 6 3 . 7 1 2 7 . 5 
B r a z i l ' 9 7 . 7 9 7 . 5 1 0 0 . 0 1 0 4 . 4 1 0 4 . 9 9 3 . 0 8 6 . 0 8 8 . 2 
C o l o m b i a ^ 7 5 . 1 77.9 8 9 . 5 9 7 . 5 1 0 0 . 0 9 9 . 4 1 0 3 . 7 1 0 8 . 3 1 1 3 . 1 1 1 0 . 0 
C o s t a R i c a 6 7 9 . 5 8 6 . 2 9 6 . 0 9 8 . 5 1 0 0 . 0 9 0 . 5 8 5 . 7 9 9 . 3 . 104 .5 1 1 2 . 2 
C h i l e ' 6 7 . 5 -79.6 1 0 0 . 7 9 9 . 8 1 0 0 . 0 1 1 5 . 9 1 1 6 . 6 9 3 . 9 8 0 . 2 7 6 . 1 
E c u a d o r ' 6 0 . 5 5 3 . 8 4 8 . 1 6 0 . 4 1 0 0 . 0 8 6 . 2 7 5 . 9 6 3 . 6 6 2 . 8 5 9 . 7 
E l S a l v a d o r * 1 0 0 . 8 9 0 . 3 4 0 . 3 8 7 . 7 1 0 0 . 0 9 6 . 8 8 6 . 7 7 6 . 6 7 6 . 9 6 6 . 4 
G u a t e m a l a 6 8 5 . 0 7 7 . 6 7 0 . 0 6 2 . 5 1 0 0 . 0 1 0 7 . 5 1 0 7 . 5 1 0 2 . 5 9 9 . 1 
H a i t i * 7 4 . 3 9 4 . 1 8 5 . 8 1 0 0 . 0 9 6 . 3 1 0 0 . 8 9 4 . 0 8 7 . 1 
H o n d u r a s ' 1 1 2 . 3 1 0 4 . 6 1 0 0 . 0 1 0 9 . 2 1 0 0 . 0 1 0 5 . 0 1 0 4 . 4 9 6 . 4 9 2 . 1 8 9 . 0 
M e x i c o ' 1 1 3 . 5 - 1 1 2 . 5 1 0 8 . 6 1 0 7 . 2 1 0 0 . 0 1 0 1 . 9 9 2 . 7 7 6 . 6 7 2 . 3 7 1 . 7 
N i c a r a g u a * 1 1 6 . 1 1 1 8 . 1 1 1 9 . 8 1 1 2 . 7 1 0 0 . 0 9 0 . 2 7 4 . 4 5 6 . 7 6 3 . 6 
P a n a m a ' 1 2 6 . 0 1 2 0 . 5 1 1 5 . 7 1 1 3 . 6 1 0 0 . 0 9 3 . 2 8 9 . 4 8 7 . 6 8 6 . 0 
Paraguay™ 1 0 0 . 6 9 2 . 0 9 4 . 8 9 2 . 4 1 0 0 . 0 1 0 3 . 2 1 0 1 . 1 9 3 . 6 9 3 . 4 9 9 . 1 
P e r u " 1 0 7 . 3 9 4 . 2 7 2 . 3 8 0 . 8 1 0 0 . 0 8 3 . 0 7 7 . 1 7 9 . 4 6 2 . 3 5 3 . 3 
D o m i n i c a n 
R e p u b l i c ' 94.7 1 0 5 . 0 1 0 0 . 0 9 3 . 0 8 6 . 3 8 0 . 8 8 2 . 2 
U r u g u a y " 1 7 1 . 5 1 1 4 . 7 1 1 3 . 6 1 0 4 . 8 1 0 0 . 0 1 0 3 . 4 1 0 4 . 6 8 9 . 6 8 9 . 9 9 4 . 1 
V e n e z u e l a ' ' 7 8 . 9 7 3 . 2 6 8 . 2 6 0 . 7 1 0 0 . 0 8 6 . 1 7 8 . 6 7 3 . 9 6 5 . 8 
P e r c e n t a g e v a r i a t i o n 
A r g e n t i n a 6 - 4 8 . 2 - 4 . 1 - 1 8 . 8 13 .7 17 .3 - 2 . 2 0 . 1 3 9 . 9 2 2 . 5 -26.7 
B r a z i l ' - 0 . 2 2 . 6 4 . 4 0 . 4 - 1 1 . 3 - 7 . 5 2.6 
C o l o m b i a ' ' •6.2 3 .7 13 .1 10 .7 2 . 5 - 0 . 6 4 . 4 4 . 4 5 . 0 - 3 . 2 
C o s t a R i c a 6 1 4 . 8 8 . 4 1 1 .4 2 . 6 1 .6 -9 .5 - 5 . 3 15 . 9 5 .2 7 . 4 
C h i l e ' 1 0 . 8 1 7 . 9 2 6 . 5 - 0 . 9 0 . 2 1 5 . 9 0 . 7 - 1 9 . 5 - 1 4 . 6 - 5 . 2 
E c u a d o r ^ - 1 1 . 2 - 1 0 . 6 2 5 . 7 6 5 . 5 - 1 3 . 8 - 1 1 . 9 - 1 6 . 2 - 1 . 3 - 5 . 0 
E l S a l v a d o r * 9 . 5 - 1 0 . 7 - 2 . 9 8 . 6 - 3 . 2 - 1 0 . 4 - 1 1 . 6 0 . 3 - 1 3 . 6 
G u a t e m a l a 6 - 1 0 . 6 - 8 . 7 - 9 . 7 - 1 0 . 7 5 9 . 9 7 . 5 - 4 . 7 - 3 . 3 
H a i t i * 2 6 . 6 - 8 . 8 16 .5 - 3 . 7 4 . 7 - 6 . 7 - 7 . 3 
H o n d u r a s ' - 4 . 7 -6.9 - 4 . 4 1 1 . 5 -8 .3 5 . 0 - 0 . 6 - 7 . 7 - 0 . 4 - 3 . 3 
M e x i c o ' 1 1 . 6 - 0 . 9 - 3 . 4 - 1 . 3 -6 .7 1 .9 - 9 . 0 - 1 7 . 4 - 5 . 6 - 0 . 9 
N i c a r a g u a * 3 .1 1.7 1 .4 - 5 . 9 - 1 1 . 3 - 9 . 8 - 1 7 . 5 - 2 3 . 8 12 .2 
P a n a m a - 3 . 8 - 4 . 4 - 4 . 0 - 1 . 8 - 1 2 . 0 - 6 . 8 - 4 . 1 - 2 . 0 - 1 . 8 
Paraguay™ - 8 . 3 3 .1 -2 .5 8 .2 3 .2 - 2 . 0 - 7 . 5 - 0 . 2 9 . 0 
P e r u " - 1 2 . 2 - 2 3 . 2 11 .7 2 7 . 8 - 1 7 . 0 - 7 . 1 2 . 9 - 2 1 . 5 - 1 2 . 7 
D o m i n i c a n 
R e p u b l i c ' 9 . 7 - 4 . 8 - 7 . 0 - 7 . 2 - 6 . 4 1.7 
U r u g u a y " - 3 . 1 - 3 3 . 5 - 0 . 5 - 7 . 7 - 4 . 6 3 . 4 1 .2 - 1 4 . 3 0 . 3 4 . 7 
V e n e z u e l a ' ' - 7 . 1 - 7 . 2 - 6 . 8 - 1 1 . 0 6 4 . 7 - 1 3 . 9 - 8 . 7 - « . 0 - 1 0 . 9 
Source: ECLAC, on che basis of official data. 
"Provisional figures. National minimum wage; 1985, January to May. 'Minimum wage for the city of Rio de Janeiro, deflated by the corresponding 
CPJ. *Minimum wage (or upper urban sea ors. 'Minimum income. 'Overall minimum living wage, calculated on the basis annua J minimum 
living wages and legal supplementary benefits. 'Minimum wage for non-agricultural activities inSan Salvador. * Minimum daily wage paid in industrial 
firms. Minimum wage in the Central Distrìa and San Pedro Sula, for manufacturing industry. 'Minimum wage in Mexico City, deflated by the 
corresponding CPI. Minimum wage for industrial workers in the Department of Managua. 'Minimum current wage for all activities except 
construction. "Minimum wage in Asundón and Puerto Sttoessner; 1985, January to August. " Minimum wage in the metcopolLcaa «rea of Lima tor non-




L A T I N A M E R I C A A N D T H E C A R I B B E A N : E V O L U T I O N O F R E A L W A G E S 
I N T H E C O N S T R U C T I O N S E C T O R 
(1980 = 100) 
C o u n t r y 1 9 7 6 1 9 7 7 1 9 7 8 1 9 7 9 1 9 8 0 1 9 8 1 1 9 8 2 1 9 8 3 1 9 8 4 1 9 8 5 " 
A r g e n t i n a 1 5 2 . 5 1 2 0 . 8 8 4 . 7 8 4 . 6 1 0 0 . 0 9 1 . 3 8 2 . 5 1 2 5 . 6 1 4 9 . 0 1 0 9 . 0 
B r a z i l ' 1 0 0 . 0 1 1 0 . 1 1 0 7 . 0 9 9 . 3 1 0 0 . 0 9 6 . 0 9 4 . 2 8 3 . 0 8 0 . 0 8 2 . 8 
C o l o m b i a * ' 7 3 . 8 6 8 . 7 7 8 . 9 8 9 . 0 1 0 0 . 0 1 0 2 . 0 1 0 2 . 4 1 0 6 . 9 1 0 8 . 9 1 0 & 1 
C o s t a R i c a ' 8 6 . 8 8 7 . 1 9 4 . 7 1 0 3 . 3 1 0 0 . 0 8 5 . 1 6 6 . 0 7 9 . 8 7 9 . 6 
C h i l e ' 7 8 . 0 8 1 . 3 8 4 . 8 9 1 . 9 1 0 0 . 0 1 0 5 . 6 1 0 0 . 2 7 5 . 0 7 3 . 4 6 1 . 4 
G u a t e m a l a 8 9 1 . 8 8 9 . 9 8 8 . 4 9 5 . 2 1 0 0 . 0 1 2 2 . 2 1 2 1 . 7 1 0 9 . 5 
H o n d u r a s ' 1 105 .7 9 4 . 8 8 9 . 7 1 0 7 . 2 1 0 0 . 0 1 0 4 . 5 1 0 2 . 2 9 4 . 4 9 0 . 1 8 7 . 1 
M e x i c o 1 9 8 . 7 1 0 3 . 9 1 0 3 . 9 1 0 4 . 6 1 0 0 . 0 1 0 3 . 3 1 0 1 . 1 7 8 . 0 7 2 . 7 7 0 . 6 
N i c a r a g u a ' ' 1 5 7 . 8 1 3 4 . 2 1 3 7 . 1 1 1 6 . 8 1 0 0 . 0 9 9 . 5 9 4 . 1 9 6 . 9 9 6 . 3 
P a r a g u a y * 1 1 1 . 0 1 1 0 . 0 1 1 6 . 9 1 0 3 . 8 1 0 0 . 0 1 0 4 . 7 9 8 . 5 8 7 . 2 8 9 . 3 
P e r u ' 1 2 5 . 6 1 0 5 . 8 9 3 . 0 9 5 . 1 1 0 0 . 0 9 9 . 0 1 0 8 . 5 9 1 . 6 7 8 . 0 6 1 . 6 
U r u g u a y " 1 1 4 7 . 5 1 2 5 . 9 1 2 0 . 5 1 0 8 . 3 1 0 0 . 0 1 1 0 . 5 1 0 4 . 9 8 0 . 1 6 4 . 7 7 0 . 4 
V e n e z u e l a " 9 4 . 7 1 0 0 . 7 1 0 0 . 8 1 0 0 . 0 9 9 . 0 
P e r c e n t a g e v a r i a t i o n " 
A r g e n t i n a 6 •43.9 - 2 0 . 8 - 2 9 . 9 -0 .1 18 .2 - 8 . 7 - 9 . 6 5 2 . 2 1 8 . 6 - 2 7 . 4 
B r a z i l ' 8 . 9 10 .1 - 2 . 8 -7 .2 0 . 7 - 4 . 0 - 1 . 3 - 1 2 . 4 - 3 . 6 3 .5 
C o l o m b i a d •3.5 - 6 . 9 1 4 . 9 1 2 . 8 1 2 . 3 2 . 0 0 . 4 4 . 5 1 . 8 - 5 . 9 
C o s t a R i c a ' 0 . 3 8 . 8 9 .1 - 3 . 2 - 1 4 . 9 - 2 2 . 4 2 0 . 8 7 . 7 
C h i l e ' 4 . 8 4 .2 4 . 3 8 . 4 8 . 8 5 . 6 - 5 . 1 - 2 5 . 2 - 2 . 2 - 1 6 . 4 
G u a t e m a l a * 2 9 . 6 - 2 . 1 -1 .7 7 .7 5 . 0 2 2 . 2 - 0 . 4 - 1 0 . 0 
H o n d u r a s ' 1 - 4 . 8 - 1 0 . 3 - 5 . 4 1 9 . 0 - 6 . 7 4 . 5 - 2 . 2 - 7 . 7 - 4 . 5 - 3 . 3 
M e x i c o 1 1 1 . 0 5 .2 0 . 7 - 4 . 4 3 . 3 - 2 . 1 - 2 2 . 8 - 6 . 8 -4 .1 
Nicaragua^ • 1 1 . 6 - 2 . 6 2 . 2 - 1 5 . 2 - 1 4 . 0 - 0 . 5 - 5 . 4 3 . 0 - 0 . 6 
P a r a g u a y * 9 . 8 -0.9 6 . 3 - 1 1 . 1 - 3 . 8 4 . 7 - 6 . 0 - 1 1 . 5 2 . 5 
P e r u ' - 1 1 . 2 - 1 5 . 8 12 .1 2 . 3 5 .2 - 1 . 0 9 . 6 - 1 5 . 5 - 1 5 . 1 - 2 2 . 3 
Uruguay™ 0 . 2 - 1 4 . 6 - 4 . 8 - 1 0 . 1 •7.7 1 0 . 5 - 5 . 0 - 2 3 . 6 •19.2 7 . 6 
V e n e z u e l a " 6 . 3 0 .2 - 0 . 2 - 1 . 0 
Source: ECLAC, on the basis of official data. 
"Provisional figures. ^Average cost of labour, including social security contributions, in the Federal Capital. Average for 12 months; 1985, January to 
October. 'Hourly wage for the peon category in Rio de Janeiro Average for 12 months; 1985: January to October. Average cost of labour in Bogota. 
Average for 12 months; 1985, January to October. ' Average wage according to household surveys. Average for March,July and November; 1976, average forjuty 
and November; 1984, March only. ' l 9 7 6 to 1983: salaries and wages for medium-type building. 1984 and 1985: average wages in the sector. Average for 12 
months. 'Average wages for workers covered by Social Security. Annual average. Minimum wage in the Central District and San Pedro 
Sula. 'Average cost of labour in the country. Average for 12 months; 1985, January to November. J Average wage for workers covered by Social Security. 
Average for 12 months; 1984, January to July. Average wage for manual workers in Asunci6n. Average for June and December. Average wage in the 
metropolitan area of Lima. Average for February, May, August and November; 1985, average for February, May and August. "Average cost of labour in the 
country. Average for 12 months; 1984, January to November. "Average wage pec person employed in the urban sector, according to household survey. Seaitvd 
semester of each year. ' In relation to the same period in the preceding year. 
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Table 19 
LATIN AMERICA A N D T H E CARIBBEAN: PUBLIC E X P E N D I T U R E O N 
EDUCATION A N D HEALTH 












































































S o u r c e : I n t e r n a t i o n a l M o n e t a r y F u n d , Government Finance Statistics. 
"1982. 
Table 20 
L A T I N A M E R I C A A N D T H E C A R I B B E A N : D I S T R I B U T I O N O F E D U C A T I O N S U B S I D I E S , 
B Y Q U I N T I L E S O F F A M I L Y I N C O M E 
(Percentages) 
A r g e n t i n a C o s t a R i c a C h i l e R e p u b l i c U r u g u a y 
Q u i n t i l e s 
F i r s t p o o r e s t . 2 8 . 3 1 9 .9 2 5 . 8 1 0 . 6 3 1 . 4 
S e c o n d p o o r e s t 1 9 . 9 2 2 . 4 2 2 . 6 1 3 . 6 2 1 . 0 
T h i r d p o o r e s t 1 7 . 9 16.7 1 8 . 5 1 7 . 8 1 7 . 9 
F o u r t h p o o r e s t 1 7 . 0 2 1 . 0 1 5 . 0 2 4 . 9 16 .2 
F i f t h p o o r e s t 1 6 . 9 1 9 .9 18 .1 3 3 . 0 1 3 . 5 
T o t a l 1 0 0 . 0 1 0 0 . 0 1 0 0 . 0 1 0 0 . 0 1 0 0 . 0 
Source: joint Programmeon Latin American Economic Integration (EQ EL)/In ter-American Development Bank (IDB) research in progress on the distributive effect of 
social public expenditure. 
L A T I N A M E R I C A A N D T H E C A R I B B E A N : D I S T R I B U T I O N O F H E A L T H S U B S I D I E S , 
B Y Q U I N T I L E S O F F A M I L Y I N C O M E 
fPercentages) 
A r g e n t i n a C o s t a R i c a C h i l e 
D o m i n i c a n 
R e p u b l i c 
U r u g u a y 
Q u i n t i l e s 
F i r s t p o o r e s t 5 1 . 2 3 0 . 0 2 2 . 3 4 1 . 3 3 4 . 0 
S e c o n d p o o r e s t 1 7 .4 1 8 . 9 2 9 . 0 16 .1 2 9 . 7 
T h i r d p o o r e s t 1 8 . 8 2 1 . 0 2 1 . 5 2 0 . 1 16 .1 
F o u r t h p o o r e s t 8 . 3 1 6 . 9 1 5 . 9 1 3 . 5 8 . 4 
F i f t h p o o r e s t 4 . 3 1 3 . 2 1 1 . 3 9 . 0 1 1 . 8 
T o t a l 1 0 0 . 0 1 0 0 . 0 1 0 0 . 0 1 0 0 . 0 1 0 0 . 0 
Source: EC1EL/IDB research in progress on the distributive effect of social public expenditure. 
T a b l e 2 2 
L A T I N A M E R I C A A N D T H E C A R I B B E A N : D I S T R I B U T I O N O F S O C I A L S E C U R I T Y S U B S I D I E S , 
B Y Q U I N T I L E S O F F A M I L Y I N C O M E 
(Percentages) 
A r g e n t i n a C o s t a R i c a C h i l e R e p u b l i c U r u g u a y 
Q u i n t i l e s 
F i r s t p o o r e s t 9.9 9.3 6.2 8.6 10.3 
S e c o n d p o o r e s t 13.3 9.5 12.3 16.4 16.1 
T h i r d p o o r e s t 19.5 15.7 15.5 28.2 18.8 
F o u r t h p o o r e s t 23.0 33.1 23.8 37.5 23.8 
F i f t h p o o r e s t 34.3 32.4 42.3 9.3 31.1 
T o t a l 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 





LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: G R O S S DOMESTIC 
F I X E D CAPITAL FORMATION 




Source: E C L A C , o n t h e b a s i s o f o f f i c i a l d a t a . 
m 
Figure 10 
LAT IN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: URBAN UNEMPLOYMENT 
IN SELECTED COUNTRIES 
(Annual average rates) 
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Figure 3 
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: UNEMPLOYMENT IN SOME PRINCIPAL CITIES 
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Figure 3 
L A T I N A M E R I C A A N D T H E C A R I B B E A N : R E A L A V E R A G E 
W A G E S I N S E L E C T E D C O U N T R I E S 
(Indexes 1980-100) 
Source: ECLAC, on the basis o f official data. 
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Figure 10 
LAT IN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: TWELVE-MONTH VARIAT IONS IN THE 
CONSUMER PRICE INDEX OF SELECTED COUNTRIES 
, \ </ „ — 
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Source: E C L A C , o n t h e basis o f o f f i c ia l data . 
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Figure 6 
ARGENTINA: CONSUMER PRICE INDEX 
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Figure 6 
ARGENTINA: CONSUMER PRICE INDEX 
Source: E C L A C , o n t h e b a s i s o f o f f i c i a l d a t a . 
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Figure 8 
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Figure 3 
L A T I N A M E R I C A A N D T H E C A R I B B E A N : T W E L V E - M O N T H V A R I A T I O N S I N T H E 
C O N S U M E R PR ICE I N D E X OF S E L E C T E D C O U N T R I E S 
Source: ECLAC, on the basis of official data. 
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Figure 10 
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: T E R M S OF T R A D E , VOLUME AND 
PURCHASING POWER OF E X P O R T S (GOODS) 
(Indexes 1970 - 100) 
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Figure 10 
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: MAIN COMPONENTS 
OF THE CURRENT ACCOUNT 
(Millions of dollars) 
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Figure 10 
LATIN AMERICA AND THE C A R I B B E A N : RATIO BETWEEN THE T R A N S F E R O F 
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